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ABSTRACT
The main objective of this study has been to model macroeconomic performance of 
African economies, and therefore, a macro econometric model was constructed to 
facilitate this exercise. The study has investigated thirteen African countries during the 
period 1980-97. Based on the growth rate of real GDP and per capita income, and other 
macroeconomic indicators, Botswana emerges as the African “Tiger Economy”, which 
has pursued sound economic policies. Other good macroeconomic performers are 
Mauritius and Namibia. The macro econometric model was constructed for four* African 
economies in Southern Africa: Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa. An 
instrumental variable technique was applied to estimate the model, and the WinSolve 
(simulation program) was utilised to perform policy simulations.
Based on estimated model (1970-96), consumption is not influenced by real interest rates. 
However, real interest rates are a determinant of investment only in South Africa. The 
determinant of consumption is real disposable income and the determinant of investment 
is real domestic income, in all the countries. Exchange rate effects boosted exports in the 
economy following a pegged exchange rate system (Namibia), and have constrained 
imports in the economy, which have experienced massive exchange rate depreciation or a 
weak currency (Mauritius). The existence of speculative money demand is well 
confirmed in Botswana and South Africa, but not in Namibia and Mauritius. In all 
countries, real wage rates and the level of income significantly determine employment.
In the simulation model, a tax stabilisation rale was enforced, and a quarter of last year’s 
cumulated debt was raised in taxes. When the tax rale is in place, the effects of 
government spending to stimulate the level of income is less potent than when the tax 
rale is relaxed. The simulation model was used to perform historical simulations, and the 
ability of the model to replicate the actual data demonstrates the “goodness of fit” of the 
model. Hence the model was subjected to shocks, and the potency of economic policies 
on the economy was assessed. These policies are interest rate, exchange rate devaluation, 
fiscal policy (government spending and tax cuts), and income policy (wages rise). Based 
on simulation evidence, interest rate policy was more potent in stimulating economic 
activities in South Africa than in the remaining economies.
Interest rate control in Mauritius and the lack of an independent interest rate policy in 
Namibia explain why the interest rate policy in these economies is less potent. Exchange 
rate devaluation improves the trade balance in Namibia and Botswana whilst the trade 
balance in Mauritius and South Africa deteriorates. The conduct of fiscal policy (rise in 
government spending or tax cuts) to raise the level of income is more effective in South 
Africa. While a rise in government spending is less effective in Mauritius, tax cuts are 
more potent in this economy. Tax cuts policy is relatively less effective than a rise in 
government spending in Namibia and Botswana. Policy prescriptions are country-specific 
and the study recommends an implementation of proposed growth policy targets.
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11.1 Overview of Macroeconomic Performance of Developing Economies
The outlook for the world economy has worsened in recent months, reflecting the
slowdown in the U.S. economy, compounded by the failure of recovery efforts in Japan 
and slower growth in Europe. This has created large uncertainties and risks, making 
economic management among developing countries more difficult. The implications of 
this for developing countries are severe, particularly in terms of lower exports against the 
backdrop of weakening demand in advanced economies and a secular decline in nonfuel 
commodity prices (IMF survey, May 2001). Faced with the present global economic 
slowdown, world economies have experienced a vast difference in macroeconomic 
performance in past years.
Despite a growing desire for a rapid integration of world economies, differences in 
macroeconomic performance between developed and developing economies in general, 
and within developing economies in particular, have been increasingly observed. It has 
been well recognised that the industrial revolution of mid-eighteenth century, which 
started in England and Northern Europe, resulted into the industrialisation of the 
developed nations only. In theory, the dependency theorists (developed in Latin America 
in the 1960s) maintained that the development of peripheral nations within the 
international capitalist system is unlikely since rich nations actually develop at the 
expense of the LDCs.
According to the IMF Survey (May 2001), the barriers to developing country exports in 
industrialised markets continue to severely disadvantage developing countries. For 
example, industrial countries spend more than $300 billion a year on agricultural 
subsidies, which is roughly equivalent to the total GNP of sub-Saharan Africa, and their 
tariffs on meat, fruit, and vegetable—all primary exports from the developing world can 
exceed 100 percent. These have the effect of inhibiting developing country exports and 
competitiveness. In the past 27 years, Asian economies have experienced a vast 
acceleration of the development process within the international capitalist system. On the 
other hand, the development process in the developing nations of Africa, Latin America,
Chap te r 1 Background  To  M acroeconom ic Perform ance o f A fr ic a n  Econom ies
2the Middle East, and the Pacific has remained disappointing. While the notion that rich 
nations actually develop at the expense of the LDCs cannot be rejected, evidence has 
confirmed the spectacular growth in Asian economies, in the face of poor economic 
performance in other developing nations.
External shocks on developing economies in the form of oil price shocks of the 1970s, 
subsequent recessions in industrialised countries and the debt crisis of the early 1980s 
have partly caused economic contraction in the developing world. Other causes include 
the recent financial crises of the early 1990s in Latin America and late 1990s in East 
Asian, and the oil crisis of mid-2000. Economic contraction is also eminent due to 
internal shocks such as the Dutch disease, volatile capital flows and macroeconomic 
instability, currency substitution, lack of export diversification, depleted international 
reserves, low degree of financial intermediation, underdeveloped financial sector, 
inefficient political cycles, lack of administrative capacity, and increasing political 
instabilities. Available evidence suggests that, excluding Asia, unsound macroeconomic 
policies and economic mismanagement especially in Latin America and Africa, have 
mainly contributed to this prolonged slow down in the developing world.
There is growing evidence to support the claim that, in the context of a developing 
economy, five related economic issues are obstacles in the development process. These 
issues are the (1) level of external debt, (2) the position of the balance of payments, and
(3) the rate of inflation, (4) increasing government debt (denominated in home currency), 
and (5) holdings of international reserves. Firstly, many developing countries are facing 
an unsustainable levels of debt, increasing debt overhang, and the problem of debt 
arrears1. Table 1.1 based on World Bank (2000) evidence, shows a mounting level of
1 Recent efforts to reduce external debts of LDCs include the Naples terms, Enhanced Toronto Terms 
(ETT), the World Bank/IMF Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Cologne summit. 
Under the Naples terms, 67 percent debt reduction (pre-cut-off date debt) is extended to die poor countries 
with less than $ 500 per capita income and with the present value of debt-to-export ratio of 350 percent. 
Debt restructuring under the ETT is possible only for severely indebted low income countries with arrears 
and payments on pre-cut-off debt falling due over a year but less than than 18 months period. The objective 
of the World Bank/IMF HIPC Initiative launched in 1996 is a debt relief to die world's poorest, most 
heavily indebted countries, and its objective is to reduce the external debt burden of a country which pursue 
sound macroeconomic policies to a sustainable level. More recently in 1999, the G7 at Cologne summit 
agreed to reduce official development assistance (ODA) claims for heavily indebted poor countries by up to
3external debt in all developing countries, which stood at US$ 2,553,988 million in 1999. 
The severely indebted African economies are Nigeria, South Africa and Morocco, which 
each posted outstanding external debt in excess of US$ 20,000 million in 1998. On the 
other hand, low and sustainable external debt of only US$ 548.2 million is recorded for 
Botswana. Table 1.2 reveals that, in terms of total external debt as a percentage of 
exports, relatively low debts level (18.7%) are evident in Botswana. In contrast, the level 
of external debt has exceeded 50% in the remaining African economies, which is both 
worrisome and disappointing. These high levels of external debt (% of exports), which 
mounted to 777% in the DRC, 581% in Uganda, 282% in Burkina Faso, 257% in Nigeria, 
and 242% in Kenya, is a clear manifestation of an existence of an African debt crisis.
As shown in Table 1.3, in only 10 years from 1980 to 1990, external debt as a percentage 
of exports has tripled in Sub-Saharan Africa from 65% in 1980 to 209%, which confirm a 
vast external debt accumulation during the 1980s. Although the current evidence suggests 
that the level of external debt has stabilized in the 1990s, the severe debt level of 225% 
observed in 1999 in Sub-Saharan Africa is extremely high and unsustainable, which 
shows a great need to implement a debt financing and sustaining policy for African 
economies. Total external debt in 1999, as reported by the World Bank (2000), stood at 
US$ 231,100 for Sub-Saharan Africa. In other parts of the developing world, it was US$ 
170,739 for South Asia, US$ 214,19 for the Middle East and North Africa, US$ 792,652 
for Latin America and The Caribbean, US$ 485,916 for Europe and Central Asia, US$ 
659,389 for East Asia and Pacific. For all developing countries, external debt was US$ 
2,553,988 million in 1999.
Faced with increasing external finance constraints and widening domestic saving and 
foreign exchange gaps many indebted developing countries will continue to face a debt 
disease in the 21st centuiy. The debt disease would be in the form of debt repayment 
difficulties and increasing debt unsustainability. Unless there is an immediate and
100 percent and non-ODA claims -  which include trade insurance and loans made by import-export banks 
by 90 per cent or more. More importantly, Japan in April 2000, announced that it will cancel 100 percent of 
its non-ODA claims.
4unconditional 100 per cent external debt forgiveness by the developed countries, the debt 
crisis is likely to prevail. The current problem of debt overhang discourages productive 
investment and mitigates against economic growth in the developing world2. As evidence 
shows, out of 40 heavily indebted poor countries, about 31 are African
Table 1.1 Total External Debt Outstanding in African Countries (1998) 
US$ million
Countries 1998
Zimbabwe 4,716
Mauritius 2,482
Botswana 548.2
South Africa 24,712
Tanzania 7,603
Burkina Faso 1,399
DRC 12,929
Morocco 20,687
Kenya 7,010
Ghana 6,884
Nigeria 30,315
Uganda 3,935
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank (2000)
countries, which confirms the existence of an African debt crisis. Another adverse 
consequence of external indebtedness is poor macro economic performance. Table 1.4 
reveals that in terms of economic aggregates, Sub-Saharan Africa has registered the 
lowest GNP and exports in 1999. Clearly, there is evidence of a strong correlation 
between high levels of external debt and poor macroeconomic performance. In the 
developing world, this correlation is particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa.
2 On April 2000, the World Bank and the IMF as being the heavily indebted poor countries classified 40 
developing countries. These are countries with a 1993 GNP per capita of US $695 or less and 1993 present 
value of debt to exports higher than 220 percent or present value of debt to GNP higher than 80 percent. 
For easy reference, these countries are, Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d ’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.
5Tab le  1.2 E x te rn a l Debt P ro file  in  A fr ic a n  Countries
Zimbabwe 1980 1990 1998 Mauritius 1980 1990 1998
EDT/XGS(%) 45.6 159.6 183.8 EDT/XGS(%) 80.8 55.4 89.8
EDT/GNP(%) 11.9 38.2 79.8 EDT/GNP(%) 42.1 37.6 59.6
TDS/XGS(%) 3.8 23.2 38.2 TDS/XGS(%) 9.0 8.8 11.3
INT/XGS(%) 1.5 9.9 8.5 INT/XGS(%) 5.8 3.0 5.6
INT/GNP(%) 0.4 2.4 3.7 INT/GNP(%) 3.1 2.0 3.7
RES/EDT(%) 53.4 9.1 6.6 RES/EDT(%) 24.2 77.3 23.2
RES/MGS
(months)
2.7 1.6 1.2 RES/MGS
(months)
1.9 4.6 2.5
Botswana 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 8 Nigeria 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 8
EDT/XGS(%) 19.6 23.3 18.7 EDT/XGS(%) 32.1 226.4 257.7
EDT/GNP(%) 13.4 15.4 11.8 EDT/GNP(%) 14.6 130.7 78.8
TDS/XGS(%) 2.1 4.4 2.7 TDS/XGS(%) 4.1 22.6 11.2
INT/XGS(%) 1.2 1.6 0.9 INT/XGS(%) 3.3 14.6 4.7
INT/GNP(%) 0.8 l . l 0.6 INT/GNP(%) 1.5 8.4 1.5
RES/EDT(%) 234.3 601.3 1,099.1 RES/EDT(%) 119.3 12.4 28.7
RES/MGS
(months)
4.3 16.2 24.0 RES/MGS
(months)
5.8 5.0 6.5
DRC 1980 1990 1998 Uganda 1980 1990 1998
EDT/XGS(%) 198.4 397.5 777.2 EDT/XGS(%) 208.3 1,051.2 581.9
EDT/GNP(%) 33.1 119.7 208.2 EDT/GNP(%) 55.6 61.1 58.2
TDS/XGS(%) 22.6 13.5 1.2 TDS/XGS(%) 17.3 60.0 23.6
INT/XGS(%) 11.0 5.7 1.1 INT/XGS(%) 3.7 14.9 5.0
INT/GNP(%) 1.8 1.7 0.3 INT/GNP(%) 1.0 0.9 0.5
RES/EDT(%) 8.0 2.5 - RES/EDT(%) 0.4 1.7 18.4
RES/MGS
(months)
1.7 1.0 - RES/MGS
(months)
0.1 0.7 4.5
Tanzania 1980 1990 1998 Kenya 1980 1990 1998
EDT/XGS(%) 698.6 1,182.9 644.6 EDT/XGS(%) 164.3 316.0 242.4
EDT/GNP(%) - 160.5 94.3 EDT/GNP(%) 48.1 87.3 61.5
TDS/XGS(%) 21.2 32.9 20.9 TDS/XGS(%) 21.0 35.4 18.8
INT/XGS(%) 10.5 11.3 9.5 INT/XGS(%) 11.1 14.9 5.7
INT/GNP(%) - 1.5 1.4 INT/GNP(%) 3.3 4.1 1.4
RES/EDT(%) 0.4 3.0 7.9 RES/EDT(%) 15.9 3.4 11.2
RES/MGS
(months)
0.2 1.4 2.9 RES/MGS
(months)
2.1 0.9 2.4
Ghana 1980 1990 1998 South Africa 1994 1996 1998
EDT/XGS(%) 115.2 389.7 336.6 EDT/XGS(%) 69.8 71.6 68.9
EDT/GNP(%) 31.6 67.2 91.8 EDT/GNP(%) 16.3 18.6 18.9
TDS/XGS(%) 13.1 37.0 28.4 TDS/XGS(%) 9.3 11.7 12.2
INT/XGS(%) 4.4 10.8 9.3 INT/XGS(%) 2.9 4.0 4.3
INT/GNP(%) 1.2 1.9 2.5 INT/GNP(%) 0.7 1.1 1.2
RES/EDT(%) 23.6 8.0 6.6 RES/EDT(%) 15.2 9.0 22.3
RES/MGS
(months)
3.1 2.3 1.8 RES/MGS
(months)
1.3 0.8 1.8
Morocco 1980 1990 1998 Burkina Faso 1980 1990 1998
EDT/XGS(%) 214.1 293.7 169.9 EDT/XGS(%) 88.0 164.7 282.8
EDT/GNP(%) 50.3 98.3 60.3 EDT/GNP(%) 19.5 30.3 54.5
TDS/XGS(%) 33.4 21.5 23.0 TDS/XGS(%) 5.9 6.8 10.7
1NT/XGS(%) 17.8 10.6 8.4 INT/XGS(%) 3.1 3.1 3.7
INT/GNP(%) 4.2 3.6 3.0 INT/GNP(%) 0.7 0.6 0.7
RES/EDT(%) 8.8 9.6 22.4 RES/EDT(%) 22.6 36.5 26.7
RES/MGS
(months)
1.7 3.2 4.4 RES/MGS
(months)
1.5 4.7 5.5
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank (2000)
6Table 1.3 External Debt Profile in Developing Countries in 1999 (US$ million, 
unless otherwise indicated i
Debt
Indicators
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
Europe and 
Central Asia
East Asia and 
Pacific
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
EDT/XGS(%) 162.5 111.3 194.6 133.7 94.4 225.1
EDT/GNP (%) 28.2 44.2 46.2 42.2 34.8 75.8
TDS/XGS(%) 14.5 11.0 34.5 14.8 14.8 14.8
INT/XGS(%) 6.7 4.9 13.1 6.7 5.1 5.1
INT/GNP(%) 1.2 1.9 3.1 2.1 1.9 1.7
RES/EDT(%) 23.4 32.5 20.7 22.2 52.0 14.3
RES/MGS
(months)
4.5 5.5 4.4 3.6 6.4 3.2
External Debt Profile in Developing Countries in 1990
Debt
Indicators
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
East Asia and Pacific Sub-Saharan
Africa
EDT/XGS(%) 327.4 113.9 255.7 108.4 209.6
EDT/GNP(%) 32.0 42.8 44.4 29.8 63.0
TDS/XGS (%) 29.0 15.1 24.5 15.7 12.9
INT/XGS(%) 15.6 5.3 12.3 6.0 6.3
INT/GNP(%) 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.7 1.9
RES/EDT(%) 6.9 21.4 12.3 31.5 8.7
RES/MGS
(months)
2.0 3.3 3.6 4.0 2.0
External Debt Profile in Developing Countries in 1980
Debt
Indicators
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
East Asia and Pacific Sub-Saharan
Africa
EDT/XGS(%) 161.5 40.8 201.0 - 65.5
EDT/GNP(%) 16.0 20.7 34.1 21.2 23.5
TDS/XGS(%) 11.8 5.6 36.2 - 7.2
INT/XGS(%) 5.2 3.1 19.2 - 3.8
INT/GNP(%) 0.5 1.6 3.3 1.7 1.4
RES/EDT(%) 40.5 90.9 22.3 - 37.7
RES/MGS
(months)
6.2 6.3 4.3 - 3.0
External Debt Profile in Al1 Developing Countries
Debt
Indicators
1980 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999
EDT/XGS (%) 88.4 162.5 140.3 127.7 147.9 136.6
EDT/GNP(%) 20.3 34.2 37.6 36.0 42.1 41.5
TDS/XGS (%) 13.5 18.3 15.8 17.2 18.4 18.7
INT/XGS(%) 7.1 7.8 6.6 6.2 7.0 7.2
INT/GNP(%) 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2
RES/EDT(%) 34.8 15.3 25.2 27.9 27.6 29.7
RES/MGS
(months)
3.8 2.9 3.9 4.0 4.7 5.0
Note: EDT/XGS is total external debt to exports of goods and services (including workers' remittances), EDT/GNP is total external 
debt to gross national product, TDS/XGS is debt service ratio expressed as total debt service to exports of goods and services, 
INT/XGS is interest service ratio expressed as total interest payments to exports of goods and services, INT/GNP is interest service to 
gross national product, RES is international reserves, MGS is imports of goods and services.
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank (2000)
7Tab le  1.4 M acroeconom ic Perform ance o f A l l  Developing Countries (US$ m illion ,
unless otherwise indicated
Economic
Aggregates
1980 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999
GNP 3,006,505 4,271,676 5,693,402 6,457,678 6,017,872 6,156,074
XGS 689,112 898,946 1,524,860 1,822,068 1,715,333 1,869,660
MGS 676,215 928,822 1,647,043 1,938,905 1,801,217 1,833,479
RES 212,177 222,924 538,198 649,234 699,746 757,526
CAB -6,134 -22,992 -111,893 -109,979 -74,102 -25,800
Macroeconomic Performance of Developing Countries (US$ million, unless 
otherwise indicated) 1980 ____________ ______________ ________________
Economic
aggregates
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
East Asia and 
Pacific
Sub-Saharan
Africa
GNP 237,953 405,482 754,716 443,994 259,402
XGS 23,542 205,736 127,980 - 92,852
MGS 29,615 144,421 160,470 - 93,307
RES 15,404 76,217 57,381 - 22,950
CAB -4,882 46,988 -30,194 - 429
Macroeconoir 
otherwise indi
tic Performance of Developing Countries (US$ million, unless 
icated) 1990
Economic
aggregates
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
East Asia and 
Pacific
Sub-Saharan
Africa
GNP 405,725 427,672 1,072,872 919,508 280,690
XGS 39,674 160,839 186,130 252,826 84,374
MGS 52,723 144,477 194,845 261,293 91,549
RES 8,893 39,150 58,341 86,264 15,417
CAB -11,637 1,861 -1,578 -5,610 -1,766
Macroeconomic Perform ance of Developing Countries (US$ million, unless otherwise indicated) 1999
Economic
aggregates
South Asia Middle East 
and North 
Africa
Latin America 
and die 
Caribbean
Europe and 
Central Asia
East Asia and 
Pacific
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
GNP 604,825 484,093 1,717,342 1,152,533 1,892,543 304,738
XGS 105,083 192,376 407,388 363,478 698,665 102,670
MGS 106,708 151,105 443,766 364,256 645,593 122,051
RES 39,899 69,550 164,142 107,921 342,978 33,036
CAB -9,586 6,683 -58,349 -15,337 61,053 -10,264
Note: GNP is gross national product, XGS is exports of goods and services, MGS is imports of goods and services, RES is 
international reserves, and CAB is current account balance.
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank (2000)
Secondly, the position of the balance of payments (BOP) is of crucial importance in the 
development process of a developing economy. The persistent BOP difficulties 
experienced in many LDCs since the 1980s has been the root cause of increasing 
domestic macroeconomic imbalances and deteriorating economic conditions in many 
economies. Economic theory suggests that there are two options to cure external
imbalances. The first option is to finance a temporary balance of payments deficit either 
by running down international reserves, or external finance from international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, or by borrowing from the domestic 
financial sector. The second option when there is a persistent balance of payments deficit 
is economic adjustment. This adjustment involves either a reduction in domestic 
absorption if domestic output is below domestic absorption (fiscal gap), or decreases in 
money supply if there is excessive domestic money supply. In addition it requires an 
increase in exports if imports exceeds exports (foreign exchange gap), or a rise in 
domestic savings if domestic investment financed by foreign capital inflows is above the 
level of domestic savings (savings-investment gap). Experience on developing countries 
suggests that neither of these two options were effective in correcting external imbalances 
in many developing economies.
Under the first option, external finance culminated into an external debt problem, 
excessive money printing fuelled domestic inflation, and the use of inadequate 
international reserves resulted in depleted reserves. On the other hand, the existence of 
poorly developed domestic financial sector created high, unsustainable levels of domestic 
interest rates. The second option has been more problematic and difficult to enforce. This 
is due to bottlenecks and supply rigidities in most economies and the lack of political will 
on the part of the politicians. Excessive reliance 011 exports of primary commodities, 
which have traditionally faced a declining world demand, has constrained export 
expansion. Low degree of central bank independence has undermined efforts to restraint 
the growth of money supply. Similarly, the prevalence of financial disintermediation in 
the domestic financial sector coupled with financial repression and the lack of financial 
liberalisation has discouraged the mobilisation of domestic savings.
Since a cut in government development spending tends to increase political unrest and 
adversely affects the poor, it has been practically difficult to ensure fiscal restraint in 
many developing economies. Faced with these economic constraints, many developing 
countries have traditionally resorted to money printing as an easy way to finance the 
external deficit. This option has resulted in inflationary pressures in many economies.
9From table 1.4, since the 1980s, in all developing countries, the current account balances 
has remained in persistent deficits.
Thirdly, high inflation has slowed down the development process. This is because high 
inflation reduces the country’s ability to export competitively in the world market and 
removes its comparative advantage. It reduces consumer’s welfare by increasing the cost 
of living of the poor and increases the level of external debt by reducing the value of the 
local currency. Inflation increases dissavings by contributing to capital flight and shifts 
the production possibility frontier inward. By discouraging the producers to produce as a 
result of rising costs of the factors of production, it acts as a disincentive to domestic 
investment and hence discourages foreign capital inflows. Fourthly, escalating 
government debt is on the rise in many developing counties. From table 1.5, high 
government debt (outstanding as a percentage of GNP) in 1998, reached 36.5% in South 
Africa and 27.9% in Turkey. Having failed to reduce high level of government spending 
in order to cure government debt, many developing countries have resorted to money 
printing through the central bank, as an easy (but costly) way to reduce the government 
debt. As evidence has shown, money creation has resulted in rocketing domestic interest 
rates, accelerating inflation, and large fiscal deficits. It has been well recognised that a 
low budget deficit is necessary to control inflation, avoid balance of payments 
difficulties, reduce excessive growth of money supply, avert currency depreciation, and 
prevent capital flight.
Among the more common indicators of good fiscal policy are a small budget deficit and a 
low ratio of government consumption (World Bank, 1994). Easterly, Rodriguez and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) argue that budget deficit tends to be bad for growth, it increases 
financial and price instability and crowd out private investment. Fifthly, the low and 
depleted international reserves are evident in many developing countries. International 
reserves are important for the survival of all world economies. Table 1.2 provides crucial 
information about the holdings of international reserves in African economies. Faced 
with inadequate international reserves, foreign investors’ confidence in the economy is 
eroded, the currency put under severe speculative attacks, the imports of basic necessities
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is rationed, and has the potential to accumulate external debt in order to finance the 
development activities.
Accordingly, the high holdings of international reserves as a percentage of external debt 
and imports are well documented in Botswana. This strong correlation of low debt and 
high reserve position indicates that external debt has depleted international reserves in 
many African economies. Clearly, assessing the holdings of international reserves in 
relation to external debt and imports is extremely low in all African economies, apart 
from Botswana. Importantly, the level of external debt and its extent of sustainability, the 
rate of inflation and the position of the balance of payments and the extent of government 
indebtedness to the domestic economy, are crucial issues. These issues matter in the 
development process of a developing economy and hence are important economic 
indicators of growth, which should never be undervalued, in any well-devised economic 
policy.
As a consequence of the latter issues, the economic performance of many developing 
economies has worsened. In addition to the economic constraints posed by the current 
international economic order3, domestic macroeconomic mismanagement has partly 
contributed to poor macroeconomic performance of many developing economies. East 
Asian economic success in the past years could be attributed to sound economic policies 
pursued in these economies, suggesting that it is still possible for developing nations to 
develop, provided that an economy is adopting an appropriate sound economic policies. 
Sound economic policies, among other things, include low government budget deficits, 
sustainable current account imbalances, low inflation, export diversification, mobilisation 
of domestic savings, accumulation of international reserves, and low growth of money 
supply. Other indicators of sound economic policies include: high degree of financial 
intermediation, low consumption spending, and promoting productive investment,
3 The current international economic order under the auspices of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund has failed to curb capital flight from developing nations, prevent commodity price drops, 
avoid financial crises in emerging markets, write-off foreign debts of developing nations, and reduce global 
poverty.
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increasing absorptive capacity, and avoiding exchange rate misalignments, absence of 
debt overhang and financial repression, and financial liberalisation.
Evidence shows that sound macroeconomic policies are linked to good economic growth 
(Little et al, 1993 and Barro and Martin, 1995), and sound macroeconomic policies with 
sustainable fiscal deficits and realistic exchange rates are a prerequisite to progress 
(Summers and Thomas, 1993). East Asia’s governments kept fiscal and external deficits 
under control by maintaining macro-economic discipline (Liepziger and Thomas, 1993). 
Appropriate trade policies pursued in Asia in favour of promoting exports, in contrast to 
inward looking import substituting industrialisation adopted in Latin America and Africa, 
have partly caused spectacular growth performance in Asia. The later view is shared by 
Balassa and McCarthy (1984), Little et al (1993), and Hossain and Chowdhury (1998) 
who report that export-oriented economies have outperformed, and adjusted to external 
shocks, better than inward-looking economies. Hossain and Chowdhury (1998) 
maintained that the two distinguishing economic features of successful Asian economies 
are (1) openness or ‘neutral’ trade regimes and (2) active government intervention. The 
work by Balassa, 1968; Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978; and Little, 1979) support the 
view that opening export to world markets spurs economic growth. Amsden (1989), Lee
(1992), Sachs (1987) and Wade (1990) have shown that Asian economies have achieved 
late industrialisation as a result of active government intervention. Clearly, governments 
in Latin America and Africa can follow the Asian example of fostering late 
industrialisation by pursuing sound trade policies.
1.2 Macroeconomic Performance of Africa in the Global Economy
This section develops macroeconomic indicators in an attempt to provide evidence on 
performance of world economies between developed and developing countries and across 
regions within developing economies so as to quantify macroeconomic performance of 
Africa in the global economy. Macroeconomic performance is analysed in terms of 
balance of payments, international reserves, reserves of gold, exports, inflation, and 
growth rate. As figure 1 shows, balance of payments position in developing countries 
deteriorated throughout the 1980s until 1991, before improving in the 1990s; whereas it
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deteriorated in 1981-82, and 1992 in the industrialised countries only. In Asian 
economies, balance of payments position has remained improving throughout the period 
1981-96, before it deteriorated severely in 1997, as a result of the financial crisis in East 
Asia. In contrast, African economies experienced the worst and persistent deterioration of 
the balance of payments during the period 1981-96, before improving only in 1997.
While international reserves have remained rising in Asia, a decline in 1976-78, 1981-83, 
1986, and 1992; in Africa is observed. Reserves of gold are on the rise in Asia, but facing 
a rapid downward trend in Africa, suggesting that there is an increasing depletion of gold 
in Africa4. Within developing nations, Africa is the poorest exporter. In 1997, exports 
exceeded $1000 millions in Asia, remained above $150 millions in the Middle East, were 
more than $200 millions in Latin America but failed to reach $130 millions in Africa. 
Figure 3 shows that African inflation has remained relatively higher than in Asia, 
reaching 60 percent in 1994 and annually averaging 20.7 percent, while the annual 
average inflation in Asia has been 9.6 percent only, for the period 1970-1997. The growth 
rate has remained positive in Asia, averaging 6.68 percent annually. Annual average 
growth rate of 2.8 percent experienced in Africa is below the annual average growth rate 
of 3.77 percent in Latin America and 4.45 percent in the Middle East.
As table 1.6 confirmed, developing economies as a group faces a number of increasing 
economic constraints. These economic issues are low reserve position in the IMF, 
deteriorating balance of payments, inadequate international reserves, increasing inflation, 
poor export performance and insufficient possession of gold. Annual inflation in 
developing countries has averaged 29.6 percent, compared to 5.9 percent in developed 
economies, for the period 1970-97. In addition, annual average producer prices has been
35.5 percent in developing economies, while it remained only 5.1 percent in developed 
economies during the same period. High inflation in developing economies, accompanied 
by rapid increases in producer prices, have reduced the productive capacity of these
4 Gold is an important asset in the reserve holdings of a number of countries, and the IMF remains one of 
the largest official holders of gold in the world. On January 31, 2000, the IMF held about 103 million 
ounces (3,217 metric tons) of gold at designated depositories. The IMF’s total gold holdings valued on its 
balance sheet was SDR 4.9 billion (about $6.8 billion) on the basis of an average historical acquisition cost.
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economies to produce and export competitively in world markets. As a consequence, 
poor export performance has been observed in many developing economies (excluding 
Asia).
Clearly, economic mismanagement manifested in unstable or stagnant economies, poor 
export performance, accelerating inflation, deteriorating balance of payments, depleted 
international reserves, unsustainable use of natural resources (i.e., gold) is evident in 
many LDCs. According to evidence, rapid development of Asian economies was partly 
caused by high export performance, fast building of international reserves, low inflation 
(price stability), massive improvement in the balance of payments position, huge and 
increasing accumulation of gold, and sustainable/low external debt. On the other hand, a 
number of factors, such as, persistent deterioration of the balance of payments, low and 
depleted international reserves, declining and insufficient possession of gold, have 
contributed to an increasing economic contraction in many developing economies, 
especially in Sub-Saharan African economies. Other factors include high inflation (price 
instability), lack of export diversification, and external debt crisis (unsustainable levels of 
debt, increasing debt overhang and the problem of debt arreas).
Evidence has shown that large and persistent differences in macroeconomic performance 
of world economies in the past years have resulted in large differences in the quality of 
life across regions of the world. Available evidence suggests that high-growth economies 
are characterised by relatively high rates of investment, high enrolment in both primary 
and secondary schools, low rate of illiteracy, low population growth rate, well developed 
financial sector, and more political stability. Following Mankiw (2000) who reports that 
poor countries are ten times poorer than the world’s richest countries, there is a great 
need to fight poverty in the poor countries. As Robert Lucas (1988), put it that “once one 
starts to think about economic growth, it is hard to think about anything else”; the focus 
now should shift to poverty reduction in the poor countries, and nothing else. It is well 
recognised that economic growth is the engine of poverty reduction. According to earlier 
researchers (Kuznets, 1973), economic growth involves a rapid rate of structural 
transformation, which includes shifts from agriculture to industry to services.
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Unlike Asia and Latin America, because many African economies are dominated by the 
agricultural sector, it shows that there has been low economic growth, if any. Therefore 
there is a long way to go before we can achieve an industry-based African economies. In 
the growth model of Solow (1956), output per worker depends positively on saving and 
negatively on population growth; and thus, the high population growth experienced in the
Table 1.5 Government debt (outstanding as a % of GNP, 1998) in LDCs
Countries Total debt Domestic debt
Argentina 37.2 12.3
Brazil 23.6 14.1
China 11.8 8.0
Colombia 17.9 7.2
Czech Rep. 12.2 11.5
Hungary 28.5 25.9
India 30.3 16.0
Korea 10.2 4.9
Mexico 22.2 8.6
Philippines 42.6 13.5
Poland 29.7 8.9
South Africa 44.4 36.5
Thailand 13.7 6.2
Turkey 43.2 27.9
Ukraine 23.4 5.2
Note: Total government debt is the aggregate of domestic and external debt of the Central Government. Domestic debt 
comprises securities issued in local fixed-income markets and external debt comprises direct government 
bomowings-loans and debt securities-issued overseas in foreign currency. It does not include central 
bank debt, including IMF credits and central bank instruments.
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank (2000)
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Tab le  1,6 M acroeconom ic Perform ance o f W o r ld  Econom ies
In d ic a to rs D eveloped
co u n trie s
D eveloping
co u n trie s
A sia A frica E u ro p e L a tin
A m erica
M id d le
E a s t
Inflation
1970 5.6 6.9 6.9 6.1 6.5 8.4 2.3
1980 12.4 26.8 15.2 15.7 26.2 46.2 23.5
1990 5.2 77.1 6.5 16.5 153.8 503.5 10.9
1997 2 11.2 5 12.9 58.2 13.7 6.5
Mean (70-97) 5.9 29.6 9.6 20.7 39.6 93.1 14.3
Exports (% of GDP)
1970 222 77 17 12 - 16 13
1980 1265 675 164 92 - 103 210
1990 2453 941 452 83 - 126 150
1997 3628 1917 1118 123 - 232 177
Mean 1573.3 710.6 321.8 61.1 - 97.8 115.8
Capital formation (% of 
GDP)
1970 23.5 17.5 18.2 - 27.1 22.7 20.8
1980 23 26.6 27.4 - 29.1 25 27.3
1990 21.3 26.1 31.1 - 27.2 19.8 23.2
1997 19.9 25.8 31.5 - 20.7 21 19.4
Mean 21.6 24.7 27.1 - 28.4 21.9 23.8
Consumption (% of GDP)
1970 76.2 65.4 84.8 78.3 71.9 78 74.9
1980 78.1 73.9 74.7 75.1 69.2 76.9 64.1
1990 79.1 73.1 68.9 78 72.7 78.1 77.9
.1997 79.4 73.9 66.7 84.2 80.8 78.9 78.5
Mean 78.5 73.9 74.1 78.4 72.9 77.8 74.5
Producer prices
1970 4.3 7.7 4.4 4.2 6.7 13.3 5.8
1980 14.4 32.6 22.6 16.6 11 55.1 30.6
1990 3.1 107.1 7.7 12.1 150.2 479.7 13.3
1997 0.5 10.8 6.1 5.1 41.7 11.7 6.8
Mean 5.1 35.5 9.4 12.7 34.8 103.2 15.1
Reserve position in the 
IMF
1970 6646.6 990.1 152.6 227.9 14.8 531.7 63.1
1980 10798.2 6037.3 831.6 699.2 15.8 1479 3011.7
1990 19976.5 3772.4 924.3 76.4 67 23.1 2681.7
1997 41336.5 5741.5 3201.8 150.5 269.2 431.4 1393.2
Mean 18351.6 6079.9 1089.1 274.9 96.5 708.5 3898.2
International reserves
1970 72597 20648 5789 3575 1002 5473 4610
1980 214523 140195 31009 15696 5354 31611 56536
1990 441946 246080 146115 12228 15641 34142 37955
1997 603332 681083 384648 29042 73074 125927 68392
Mean 284414.9 193537.8 102961.6 10747 14720.7 38830.5 43650.5
Balance of Payments
1981 -12136 -24734 4730 -10584 -11065 -4141 -3674
1990 54878 -25776 22926 -2190 -22426 -9604 -14483
1997 16942 42608 -11210 3585 23214 16356 10663
Mean 28169.6 -74.7 25109.1 -7205.4 -5441.5 -9891.9 -2645.1
Gold
1970 941.41 118.33 19.99 28.84 7.64 31.73 30.13
1980 813.88 141.68 37.37 21.13 16.11 32.26 34.82
1990 795.81 143.42 52.57 12.06 12.09 31.29 35.42
1997 732.47 158.10 56.76 12.70 30.20 23.49 34.95
Growth rate of real GDP 34.2
Mean 2.7 4.7 6.68 2.8 - 3.77 4.45
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics (1998)
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F igure  2 Com parative  M acroeconom ic Perform ance o f A fr ic a  and A s ia
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developing nations, has caused a persistent decline in output per worker. In the new 
growth theory, when people are active in research in a more populated economy,
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economic growth is generated5. The lack of access to research facilities, such as, the use 
of the Internet in poor economies; coupled with high population growth, will continue to 
act as a constraint to economic growth. Catching up the rich countries will remain 
difficult because African economies lack access to information technology.
Because of these differences in cross-country economic performance, many researchers 
have advanced reasons for good economic performance of some economies. Young 
(1994) has attributed the spectacular growth of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan in the past three decades to rising investment, increasing labour-force 
participation, and investment in human capital, but not rapid technological progress. 
According to Solow (1956) the steady state rate of growth of income per person depends 
only on the rate of technological progress. The importance of technological progress as a 
way of accelerating the development process in the developing world is therefore well 
stressed.
Endogenous growth theory implies that there should be persistent differences in growth 
rates among countries with different saving and investment rates (Dombusch and Fischer, 
1994). Accordingly to increase growth increase investment by reducing budget deficits in 
order to crowd-in private investment and by providing tax incentives; reduce unnecessary 
regulation; and encourage investment in human capital, that is, spend more resources and 
effort on education and training. In addition, increase infrastructure investment, and 
provide tax incentives for research and development spending. Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1991) observe that major imiovations and advances in knowledge are often the 
result of the work of extremely talented individuals. Clearly the lack of investment in 
human capital especially in Africa is a major factor contributing to low rate of knowledge 
accumulation and transmission currently experienced in this continent. More investment
5 These predictions of endogenous growth theory are consistent with Chinese experience. China is the most 
populated world economy, and has achieved the highest world mean growth rate of 9 percent during the 
period 1980-1997. This is because many more Chinese were active in research and development activities 
than in other world economies.
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in research and development activities will spur economic growth in the developing 
regions of the world6.
More recent studies by Kormendi and MeGuire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989), Barxo 
(1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Wha Lee
(1993), Knight, Loayza and Villaneuva (1993), Levine and Zervos (1993) have 
empirically identified determinants of economic growth. These factors are investment, 
population growth, per capita income, export growth, inflation rate and debt service ratio 
as important determinants of economic growth. Their major findings are that growth is 
positively related to tbe investment ratio, positively related to the rate of population 
growth, negatively related to the initial level of per capita income and positively related 
to the growth of the money supply (i.e. money is not neutral). On the other hand it is 
negatively related to the variance of money supply growth and the rate of inflation, and 
not significantly related to the growth of government expenditure, or the growth of 
exports as a proportion of GDP, except when government consumption is omitted.
1.3 Macroeconomic Performance of Individual African Economics in the Global 
Economy
The whole of history has been the history of accelerating the pace of development in the 
global economy7. Surprisingly, significant development has occurred in the industrialised 
and tbe newly industrialised economies only, while most world economies are still 
developing very slowly. Following tbe decolonisation process of third world countries 
after the Second World War these countries have with little success, attempt to minimise 
reliance or dependency on external resources in the development process8. However, 
some newly industrialised countries (NICs) of Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore) have succeeded in establishing a major industrial and manufacturing
6 P. Romer (1990) has researched the link between research and development (R&D) activities; and 
economic growth.
7 Development refers to life-sustenance, ability to meet basic human needs; self-esteem, meeting basic and 
other needs with a sense of dignity; and freedom from servitude, which involves emancipation from all 
forms o f oppression and empowerment to choose.
8 Third world refers to the developing nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the 
Pacific. These countries have shared similar characteristics, which include colonial histories, low GNP per
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sector; and are recognised for their success in achieving export-led rapid economic 
growth. In addition, rapid economic growth experienced in these economies was 
associated with a strong agricultural base. Unlike countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
agricultural sector of these economies has been characterised by increasing 
diversification of the agricultural sector, expansion of agricultural exports, improvement 
of agricultural productivity, and development of agriculture-related industry.
In constrast, many African countries do not meet the criteria of NICs status9. Therefore, 
the key features of African economies, which have partly contributed to poor 
macroeconomic performance in most economies, are: subsistence fanning (subsistence 
economies), lack of structural transformation and demographic transition as well as 
economic diversification. Other features include heavy reliance on poor economic 
infrastructure, prevalence of absorptive capacity, and failure to commit resources to 
scientific development. The contributing factors to the current perpetual intellectual and 
technological dependence of many African countries on the outside world are the failure 
to curb brain drain and the low pace of building local intellectual capacity, the absence of 
economic democracy, the prevalence of bureaucratic pathology, and persistent political 
instabilities10. The latter issues facing many African economies are indicators of domestic 
macroeconomic mismanagement, which has spanned over the past 30 years.
Bloom and Sachs (1998) argued that in recent debate, six sets of factors have frequently 
been invoked to account for Africa’s poor economic performance. These factors are: (1) 
external conditions: the legacy of centuries of slave trading and colonial rule, as well as 
the manipulation of African politics during the cold war; (2) heavy dependence on a
capita, unstable or stagnant economies, intellectual and scientific dependence, high vulnerability, and 
peripheral status within the international economic community.
To achieve the NICs status, (1) manufacturing products must constitute 30% of GDP; (2) manufactured 
exports must reach 50% of total exports; (3) employment must shift from agriculture to industry; and (4) 
per capita income must reach at least $ 2000 U.S. Contributing to attainment of NIC status, particularly in 
die Asia-Pasific region have been (1) effective land policies; (2) family planning and population control; 
(3) commitment to investments in education at all levels; and (4) export-driven growth.
10 Economic democracy refers to “ a diverse, diffused, pluralistic, and heterogeneous pattern of ownership”. 
Bureaucratic padiology refers to an organisational climate or structure in which the interests of citizens, 
employees, and society at large are subordinate to die self-centred and self-aggrandizing goals of 
audioritarian leaders and officials.
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small number of primary exports, with declines and volatility in terms of trade; (3) 
internal politics: characterized by authoritarianism, corruption, and political instability;
(4) economic policies: protectionism, statism, and fiscal profligacy; (5) demographic 
change: in particular, rapid population growth; and (6) social conditions: deep ethnic 
divisions, indicated by high levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity and low 
levels of “social capital,”
Faced with increasing dependence on the outside world in the development process, 
coupled with domestic macroeconomic mismanagement, Sub-Saharan African countries 
have experienced the world’s worst macroeconomic performance. In support of these 
findings, Bloom and Sachs (1998), report that the poverty of sub-Saharan Africa is one of 
the most obdurate features of the world economy. Accordingly, since the industrial 
revolution, this has been the world’s poorest and also its most slowly growing region. As 
a consequence, poor macroeconomic performance has primarily caused the low growth 
rate of real per capita GDP. Therefore, low economic growth and the slow pace of the 
development process is manifested in the low growth rate of real per capita GDP. As 
shown in table 1.8, African economies have undergone economic turmoil in the form of 
abject poverty, but not development in the true sense. As clearly revealed by evidence, 
the structural adjustment and stabilisation policies of the IMF and the World Bank 
adopted in these economies since the early 1980s have failed to raise the levels of per 
capita income in most African economies (an exception being Uganda). Consequently, 
the policies of the IMF and the World Bank did not succeed in reducing poverty in 
Africa11. On the other hand, domestic macroeconomic mismanagement has partly
11 Given the failure of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) -  a concessional lending 
facility of the IMF to reduce poverty and generate growth in the developing world, this facility was recently 
on November 22, 1999 replaced with the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Because 
poverty is on the rise in many developing countries, there are 80 low-income countries, which are eligible 
for PRGF assistance. These countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Cote 
d ’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao 
P.D.R., Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia F.Y.R., Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Grenadines,
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contributed to rising poverty in these economies. Based on the growth rate of real per 
capita GDP as a useful indicator of the level of development and the extent of poverty, 
high economic growth is evident in eight fast growing Asian economies in the past 17 
years12. Table 1.8 confirmed that eight slow growing African economies have faced 
negative growth rates of per capita incomes whereas many Asian economies have 
recorded growth in per capita incomes during the same period. According to OECD 
Economic Outlook Report (2000), raising levels of per capita income in the long term 
requires a broad set of policies, including: sound macroeconomic management; a tax 
system that encourages work effort and entrepreneurship; openness to international trade 
and competition. It requires also government expenditure programmes that emphasise 
investment and capital accumulation, including investment in infrastructure.
Unlike in Asian economies, available evidence suggests that economic policies in most 
African countries have failed to eradicate or even to reduce poverty. Given the low per 
capita incomes in these economies at the beginning of the 1980 and accompanied by the 
low growth rate of real per capita GDP over the period 1980-97, there is strong evidence 
to claim that poverty is rising at an alarming rate in these economies. In African 
economies under study, poverty reduction is evident only in Botswana, Mauritius, and 
Namibia. In the latter economies, the annual average growth rate of per capita real 
income has remained above 2% in the past 17 years. The existence of extreme poverty is 
confirmed by Bloom and Sachs (1998) who estimates that in 1990, 47 percent of Africa’s 
population lived in abject poverty, that is, with income of less than $1 per day. The high 
growth rate African economies (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and Uganda) display the 
highest growth rate of real per capita income. These findings suggest that those fast 
growing economies are likely to eradicate poverty better than the slow growing 
economies, which is consistent with theoretical expectations.
Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen Republic, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
12 The principal objective of any growth-oriented development policy is to raise the level of real per capita 
GDP.
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While extreme poverty is on the rise in DRC and South Africa, good macroeconomic 
performance, which have resulted in improving living conditions is observed in 
Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia. Importantly, in tenns of the growth rate of real per 
capita GDP, the macroeconomic performance of most African economies in the global 
economy, especially in the area of poverty reduction is dissappointing and the future 
prospects are gloomy. In support of these findings, Bloom and Sachs (1998) confirmed 
that over the period 1985-96, per capita economic growth averaged -0.6 percent per year. 
Twenty-one countries out of the forty-two for which data are available experienced 
negative per capita economic growth. African per capita income growth averaged 1.5 
percent in the 1960s, 0.8 percent in the 1970s, and -1.2 percent in the 1980s. Output per 
capita continued to decline from 1990 to 1996 at a rate of 0.9 percent per year. Africa’s 
overall slow growth has continued despite intensive reform efforts during the past 
decade.
The existence of poverty in these economies coincide with the new Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility o f the IMF, which clearly demonstrates that poverty is really still a 
developmental disease in many developing economies. In terms of other economic 
indicators, much of evidence revealed in tables 1,7-1.8, is self-explanatory. It is sufficient 
to note that low international reserves, low savings and investment rates, and large fiscal 
deficits are observed more in Africa and less in other regional economies. However, most 
African economies have achieved similar macroeconomic performance, with the 
exception of Botswana. Macroeconomic performance of most African economies is more 
similar to economic performance observed in Latin America, but far worse than the 
growth experiences of Asian economies during the past 17 years. As table 1.7 shows, 
throughout the period 1980-97, the capital account has deteriorated in South Africa and 
Nigeria whereas most African economies have experienced low, depleted international 
reserves. High rate of inflation and excessive growth of money supply is clearly observed 
in most African economies.
As evidence shows, in the global economy, these economies are neither low inflation nor 
low growth of money supply economies. The low degree of financial intermediation
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(proxied by money supply as a percentage of GDP), coupled with excessive government 
consumption is well confirmed in these economies. High government expenditure by 
crowding out the private sector in the economy, reduces the positive role played by the 
financial sector in the process of financial intermediation. Table 1.8 indicates that many 
African economies have witnessed massive exchange rate depreciation. Excluding 
Botswana, the mean GDP growth rate per annum has remained below the growth rate 
reached in most Asian economies during the past 17 years. In the DRC, the annual 
average growth rate has remained negative since the 1980s. During the period 1980-97, 
the level of per capita income has remained above $1500 in South Africa, Mauritius, 
Botswana and Namibia, whilst it failed to reach $600 in most African economies. Based 
on evidence there is a strong correlation of both low saving and investment rates in many 
African economies13.
Botswana is the only African economy, which had undergone a significant improvement 
in the current account of the balance of payments and a fiscal surplus. A twin surplus of 
current account surplus and fiscal surplus is unique to the Botswana (exporter of high 
quality diamonts) case. All other African economies have suffered from severe internal 
and external imbalances, of persistent fiscal and current account deficits. However, fiscal 
deficits appear to be worse than the current account deficits in the majority of these 
economies. African economies display low interest rates than Latin American economies, 
however African interest rates are higher than in Asia. Clearly, the available evidence 
suggests that the relatively high per-capita income economies (i.e., South Africa, 
Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, and Kenya) are also the low consumption 
economies.
As evidence shows, Botswana has experienced a spectacular growth performance, which 
is attributed to sound macroeconomic policies pursued in this African economy. In the 
African continent, Botswana has been the most successful African economy of the 20th
13 These findings are consistent with Feldstein and Horioka (1980) who observed strong correlation of 
savings and investment in developing countries. High correlation of saving and investment suggests that 
there is a deficiency of foreign capital inflows, which suggest the need to mobilize more foreign capital
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century. Clearly, Botswana is the African “Tiger Economy”. Botswana’s good 
macroeconomic performance is equivalent to Singapore’s remarkable performance in 
Asia.
1.4 Summary of Main Findings
In terms of macroeconomic performance, African economies are classified into two 
groups of countries. These groups are the good performers, and the poor performers.
Good performers
These groups of countries are Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia. Consistent with 
findings of the current study, Bloom and Sachs (1998) report that over the period 1985- 
96, traditionally fast-growing Mauritius and Botswana achieved per capita growth of 
more than 4 percent per year, which confirm that indeed Mauritius and Botswana are 
good performers. These high per-capita income economies14 face high savings and high 
international reserves (excluding Namibia) relative to other African economies. However, 
international reserves in Mauritius are extremely low. The high current account deficit in 
Mauritius might have contributed to low international reserves. The current account 
improved significantly only in Botswana, and slightly in South Africa, but deteriorated in 
all other African economies15. Apart from Botswana and South Africa, all African 
economies have experienced both fiscal deficit and current account deficit. High growth 
rates observed in budget surplus economy & low budget deficit economies, and vice 
versa. Apart from Mauritius and Namibia, these countries have the strongest current
inflows to support domestic investment. Evidence shows that massive foreign capital inflows, which 
funded investment in Singapore and Korea has accelerated the development process in these economies.
14 Per capita income above $1500 is recorded only in 4 African economies (South Africa, Mauritius, 
Botswana and Namibia). With the exception of Botswana, all economies have experienced internal and 
external imbalances of persistent current account and fiscal deficits. But current account surplus is evident 
in South Africa. These high savings economies have experienced relatively low interest rates, coupled with 
low consumption spending, and are high exporters. Massive export revenues boosted domestic savings 
whereas low interest rates mobilised domestic savings.
15 In all world economies, significant improvement in the current account by 9.6 per cent is observed in 
Singapore only. Good macroeconomic performance experienced in Singapore, in terms of world highest 
investment rate (39.2%), budget surplus (6.54%), world highest exports rate (168.2%), high international 
reserve position ($22216.4), low inflation rate (2.6%), little exchange rate depreciation (1.85%) and 
spectacular growth rate (7.85%), are economic factors which caused current account improvement in 
Singapore.
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account position and display high international reserves. Similarly, these economies are 
also the high exporters.
The good macroeconomic performance experienced in Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia 
is associated with excellent export performance16. In the latter economies, high savings, 
high levels of per capita incomes, high investment, and high growth are attributed to high 
exports. Thanks to attractive tourist industry and exports of textiles, Mauritius follows 
excellent economic performance of Botswana. The highest growth rate in Botswana was 
associated with the highest exports, investment and savings observed in this economy. 
High per capita income and high growth rates did not result in high consumption in 
Botswana and Mauritius, but have produced high savings. Although Botswana and 
Namibia display good export performance, these high exports are due to mineral exports 
especially the sale of diamonds, but not as a result of export diversification. These two 
economies have a low industrial base, and are outperformed by many Asian economies, 
in terms of exports of industrial goods and services. High investment in Botswana was 
• due to high government savings in the form of a budget surplus, but not foreign capital 
inflows. This is because Botswana recorded net capital outflows. The degree of financial 
intermediation has played a crucial role in mobilising domestic savings and pooling 
resources into productive investment in Mauritius.
These findings are consistent with Bloom and Sachs (1998) who report that, with the sole 
exception of Mauritius17, no African country has made a similar transition to export-led 
growth in manufactures or services. This is partly the result of Africa’s greater inherent 
difficulties, but also due to the fact that neither African governments nor the IMF or the 
World Bank have promoted the kinds of institution needed for such a transition. 
Accordingly, the Bretton Woods institutions promoted virtually no structural change. 
After twenty years of reform, Africa remains the exporter of a narrow range of primary
16 Evidence suggests that Singapore and Botswana have experienced high exports in excess of 60 per cent. 
Huge revenues from exports were both transformed into domestic savings, accumulated into international 
reserves, and domestically invested to generate high growth observed in Singapore and Botswana. 
Singapore and Botswana are the most successful economies of our generation in the developing world.
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commodities (for example, oil, diamonds, copper, gold, coffee, tea, cocoa, palm oil, and 
rubber), most of which are suffering long-term declines in international terms of trade. A 
recent study on structural adjustment and growth on Sub-Saharan Africa (Farhad and 
Alberto, 2001), found that in the short mn, macroeconomic stabilisation policies, if 
implemented according to the program conditionality, slow down growth, but their 
negative effects disappear in the long mn.
Namibia has relatively low international reserves because it started accumulating only 
after independence in 1990. Inflation similarity with South Africa is because Namibia 
was a South African colony before independence, and the South African Reserve Bank 
has successfully pursued its monetary policy in Namibia, which resulted in much similar 
inflation in the two economies. The absence of a central bank before independence in 
Namibia has caused a low degree of financial intermediation in this economy, which 
explain the low savings and investment rates. Good export performance is associated 
with exports of diamonds and other minerals such as copper, etc. It is this excellent 
export performance, which explained the high growth rate observed in this economy. The 
high level of consumption as a percentage of GDP might have also contributed to low 
levels of savings and investment rates. In terms of the growth rate of GDP (4.78%), per 
capita growth rate of GDP (3.9%), and the high level of per capita income, coupled with 
good export performance, low and sustainable fiscal deficit and debt (both domestic and 
foreign), Namibia cannot be classified as a poor performer. Despite the isolation of 
Namibia in international trade in the past, Namibia is a good performer.
Poor performers
These groups of countries are Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, 
Morroco, Democratic Republic o f Congo (DRC) and Burkina Faso18. Uganda has
17 Teal (1999) confirm that Mauritius is the most successful African economy which exports manufactured 
goods and provide convincing reasons why African economies face low levels of manufactured exports.
18 Poor performers faces a number of characteristics, such as, high budget deficits, high interest rates, 
massive exchange rate depreciation, high and rising inflation, low savings, and high growth rate of money 
supply are well observed. In addition, low per capita income coupled with inadequate international reserves 
is evident.
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recorded high growth rate. Foreign capital inflows into African economies generated a 
high growth rate in Uganda only. The low tax revenue in Uganda and the DRC reveal the 
prevalence of poor tax administrations and inefficient tax system in these economies. In 
the latter economies the public sector face increasing tax revenue constrains which has 
partly triggered a persistent fiscal imbalances. Although Uganda has recorded high 
growth rate, it camiot be classified as a good performer. In terms of other macroeconomic 
indicators, such as the high level of debt and inflation, low international reserves, etc, 
Uganda is clearly a poor performer19.
Large fiscal deficits are evident in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. Fiscal imbalances 
might have created imbalances in the external sector in African economies, and vice 
versa. Because Zimbabwe and Kenya are not low tax revenue economies, there is no 
evidence to suggest that shortages of tax revenues have triggered fiscal imbalances in 
these economies. South Africa, Botswana, and Nigeria have both the strongest current 
account positions and the highest international reserves suggesting that high position of 
international reserves is crucial in restoring external balance. Because South Africa is the 
richest and most well developed African economy, it has experienced low growth 
performance than the poorest African economies.
Capital outflows have contributed to low growth rates in South Africa and Nigeria, 
however, in the face of capital outflows, high savings combined with low consumption 
have triggered high investment in South Africa. Large fiscal deficits in Nigeria might 
have partly contributed to low growth performance in this economy. In theory, the 
absolute convergence hypothesis predict that poor economies tend to grow faster than 
richer economies (see, Solow, 1956; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). It is well known that 
Nigeria and South Africa are large powerful African economies, however, their 
disappointing macroeconomic performance in terms of low GDP growth rates, and high 
levels of external debt, are factors which disqualify them from being good performers.
19 GDP growth rate is assessed in relation to other indicators because macroeconomic performance cannot 
solely be based on the high GDP growth rate. This is because a high GDP growth rate will not be sustained 
in the environment of excessive levels of debt (both domestic and external).
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The low international reserve position in the DRC implies that this country has used its 
international reserves to finance fiscal deficits, which explain its low reserves position. 
These current account deficit economies face low international reserves and are low 
exporters. There is sufficient evidence to maintain that three African economies, namely, 
Ghana, Uganda, and the DRC, have pursued the worst economic policies throughout the 
period 1980-97. Cross-country evidence have revealed that some poorer economies 
(such Botswana and Korea in the 1960s) in the global economy have grown faster than 
richer economies, however, not all-poorer economies have achieved high growth 
performance. There is strong evidence to confirm that for the period 1980-97, the DRC 
has experienced negative real growth rates caused by the persistent prevalence of a four­
digit average inflation per annum experienced in this economy throughout this period.
These high inflation economies (Ghana, Uganda & DRC) show both a high growth rate 
of money supply, massive exchange rate depreciation & high level of government 
consumption. In contrast, single-digit/low inflation economies (Burkina Faso, Morocco)20 
display low growth rate of money supply, little exchange rate depreciation & low degree 
of government consumption. High inflation and high interest rates have caused low 
investment in these economies. Investment is constrained by a number of factors. Firstly, 
debt overhang is contributing to capital outflows and high interest rates is discouraging 
productive investment. Secondly, excessive consumption is encouraging dissavings and 
the prevalence of imder developed financial sectors is undermining the role of financial 
intermediation to mobilise savings and stimulate investment. Thirdly, high rates of 
domestic taxes are disincentives to promote investment and political instabilities is 
discouraging foreign investors to invest in the local economy while local investors are 
encouraged to invest abroad.
20 Morocco and Burkina Faso have repressed the financial sector by pursuing policies of interest rate 
control and suppressed inflation.
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Comparative Macroeconomic Performance of South Africa and Singapore
Based on current evidence, the comparative performance of Singapore and South Africa 
can be summarised as follows:
(1) Mean interest rate differential is above 10%, higher than interest 
rate in Singapore by 10%.
(2) Mean taxes as a percentage of GDP reached 23% in South Africa, and thus 
higher than Singapore by 7%.
(3) The level of government spending (% of GDP) of 18% in South Africa is much 
higher than the spending in Singapore by 8%.
(4) Inflation differentials between Singapore and South Africa has annually 
averaged 10%. Low inflation of 2.6% and high inflation of 12% are recorded in 
Singapore and South Africa, respectively.
(5) The mean rate of investment and saving of 39% and 44%, respectively, were 
recorded in Singapore; whilst the investment and savings rates of 21% and 25% 
were observed in South Africa.
(6) Current account improvement and exports performance in Singapore is twice 
higher than in South Africa.
(9) The level of consumption (% of GDP) in Singapore is less than in Botswana 
by almost 19%.
(10) The growth rate of per capita income per annum is higher in Singapore by 2%, 
compared to the rate of -1% in South Africa.
These differences in macroeconomic performance, especially between South Africa and 
Singapore over the period 1980-96, have caused great disparity in the annual growth rate 
of these two economies. As evidence shows, the highest world mean growth rates per 
annum during this period are recorded in China (9.99%), Botswana (8.96%), and 
Singapore (7.85%). It is intuitive to argue that if  South Africa had pursued similar sound 
economic policies to Singapore, South Africa could have experienced better growth 
performance21. The poor growth performance is partly explained by the trade sanctions
21 To be more specific, if for instance, macroeconomic policies were characterised by, inflation of less than 
3%, government spending of less than 50% and taxes of not more than 60% (all percentages of GDP), and 
interest rate of 7%.
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and economic embargoes applied against South Africa by the international community 
before independence due to its apartheid policies.
These conclusions have important policy implications for other African economies in 
particular and all developing economies in general. The most important lesson based on 
these important findings suggest that to improve macroeconomic performance of African 
economies it is important for policy makers to implement growth policy targets, which 
will improve the overall macroeconomic performance of these economies. This raises an 
important question of which policy instruments should be used and what policy targets be 
implemented. An empirical question deals with issues such as, what levels of interest 
rate, rate of inflation, government spending and taxes, and the appropriate equilibrium 
exchange rate, should be advocated in these economies so as to catch up with spectacular 
Asian growth performance.
While it is inappropriate to suggest, for instance, a fall in interest rate or a reduction in 
government spending for different economies by the same percentage change, policy 
targets should be country specific and be based on individual country's growth 
experiences. Importantly, the discussion so far reveals that a much lower interest rate, 
rate of inflation, lower level of government spending and low taxation and realistic 
exchange rates should be at the forefront of policy debates in these African economies.
To assess the effects of any policy instrument, such as, changes in interest rate, or in the 
level of government spending on tbe economy, it is appropriate to have a macro 
econometric model for any economy under study. Evidence shows that to assess the 
impact of any policy target on the economy is vital to specify, estimate, and simulate a 
macro econometric model, which is consistent with institutional characteristics of the 
economy being modelled. Before any policy targets, which will assist these economies to 
catch up with Asian economies are recommended, it is vital to build a macro econometric 
model for these African economies.
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1.5 Statement of the Problem
Despite the development of large econometric models for developing countries over the 
past years, these models cannot be successfully applied and extensively generalised to 
other countries. This is because of differences in model specification, estimation, 
definitions of variables, and in the level of aggregation. In addition, most LDCs exhibit 
different institutional features, which require diverse models for different countries and 
hence a model to fit a specific country being modelled. These have rendered it impossible 
to formulate a representative macro-econometric model for this group of countries. These 
models are too generalised to provide a consistent approach to projections for all 
countries and to facilitate intercountry comparisons. As a result of country differences a 
representative model applicable to all countries may turn out to be inapplicable if peculiar 
characteristics of these countries are not incorporated. The lack of an appropriate macro 
econometric model for these economies has become a huge problem facing policymakers.
There is a great need for more substantial work in the construction of macro econometric 
models for African economies. From the 13 African economies under study, low external 
debt as a percentage of exports and GDP is well confirmed for Botswana, South Africa, 
and Mauritius. Although the debt data for Namibia is not presented as results of 
differences in data sources, Namibia has a relatively low debt, which compares favorably 
with Botswana. Given the evidence of a debt crisis in African economies and its 
associated adverse growth effects, the debt problem, which is increasing poverty in many 
African economies, is a contentious issue in the development process of these economies. 
These economies are unique in the sense that they have successfully managed the level of 
external debt (as a percentage of GDP and exports) much better than many other African 
economies. In terms of growth performance, these economies have achieved the highest 
growth rates during the past 20 years, apart from South Africa. However, South Africa is 
the most powerful and well-developed African economy. In addition, these economies 
share close geographical location, and are all Southern African economies, with little 
interest rate and inflation differentials, and harmonized tax regimes. For these valid and 
convincing reasons, an experiment of the macro econometric model for African 
economies was constructed and simulated on these four Southern African economies.
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Such a model will increase the understanding of the structural features of these 
economies with a view to analysing the implications of alternative growth-oriented 
strategies and developmental policies. Currently no effort so far has been made in 
constructing macro econometric models for these economies, which incorporates error 
correction mechanism and policy rules. Consequently, a macro econometric model with 
peculiar characteristics of these African economies is urgently needed. A model is 
necessary in order to study various sectors of the economy, and to test the applicability of 
various economic theories on the time series of these economies. A macro-econometric 
model, will therefore, be a useful aid in interpreting empirical evidence based on these 
economies and serving as the fundamental vehicle for the accumulation and consolidation 
of empirical knowledge about the current structure and future functioning of the African 
economies in general.
Based on the evidence, developing economies face poor macroeconomic performance. In 
developing countries as a group, Africa has been the poorest continent in terms of 
macroeconomic performance. As the evidence shows, Africa has achieved poor 
macroeconomic performance and therefore there is a great need to model the 
macroeconomic performance of African economies. Many researchers have in the past 
years, modelled African economies as a group of countries and hence inappropriately 
generalised research findings on all economies. Such studies have resulted in 
inappropriate policy recommendations, which were not country-specific.
Modelling individual country performance of the African economies is vital and should 
never be neglected, as it has been a tradition in the past research work on African 
economies. Poor macroeconomic performance of African economies can be better 
understood and consistently explained in line with evidence, only by modelling 
individual economies, but not as a group of economies. This is because many African 
economies have experienced significant differences in macroeconomic performance. 
Therefore, this study has a unique approach in modelling macroeconomic performance of 
African economies in an attempt to accelerate the creation of new ideas on these 
economies. Poor macroeconomic performance of African economies has increased
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research interest on these economies. This study, therefore, unlike previous research on 
African economies, is an attempt to provide an extensive econometric modelling of these 
Southern African economies in the same period.
1.6 Objectives and Organisation of the Study
Objectives of the study
The paramount objective of this study is to model macroeconomic performance of 
African economies. To undertake this task, a macro econometric model is constructed for 
4 Southern African economies22 during the period 1970-96. Specific objectives are as 
follows:
(1) to quantify macroeconomic performance of African economies and propose growth 
policy targets, which will help African economies to catch up with Asian spectacular 
growth experience.
(2) to specify tbe model,
(3) to estimate the model, and
(4) to simulate the model, in order to perform historical simulations and policy 
simulations.
(5) to provide policy recommendations,
Given the poor macroeconomic performance of African economies in the past 30 years, 
the first objective should be the focus of any intellectual work in the 21st century in an 
attempt to address the developmental issues facing the African continent in general.
Organisation of the study
Chapter one has dealt with macroeconomic performance of African economies. A 
number of macroeconomic indicators were used to confirm that African economies have 
experienced poor macroeconomic performance. The application of macro economic 
indicators (compared with Asian growth experience) has provided a fruitful direction of 
future policy targets for African economies. Successful implementation of these policy
22 These economies are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.
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targets will help African to catch up with the Asian spectacular growth perfonnance. To 
improve macroeconomic perfonnance, the study has proposed a construction and an 
increasing use of large-scale macro econometric models in order to study the policy 
effects of economic policies on African economies. Accordingly, without using a macro 
econometric model it will remain difficult for policy makers to know the potency of 
economic policies on the economy and hence to achieve the desired policy targets.
To assess the potency of economic policies, a model was constructed, estimated, and then 
used to perform policy simulations, in the remaining chapters. In chapter two, a macro 
econometric model is specified for four African economies. A model is estimated in 
chapter three. Historical simulation is contained in chapter four. Chapter five and six 
discus policy simulations based on the interest rate and exchange rate policies, 
respectively. The simulation effects on the economy arising from the conduct of fiscal 
policy (a rise in government spending) constitute chapter seven. Chapter eight deals with 
policy simulatons of fiscal policy (tax cuts) and income policy (a rise in wages). 
Important findings, policy implications and the direction for future research are the main 
focus of chapter nine.
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Table 1.7 Macroeconomic Performance of African Economies in the Global 
__________ Economy (1980-97) ________ __________________________
Countries Mean
CAA
Countries Mean
INR Countries Mean (P) Countries Mean(GMS)
China 6770.6 China 25910 Singapore 2.6 PNG 9.23
Thailand 5916.5 Singapore 22216.4 Malaysia 3.7 Burkina Faso 12.2
India 5026.4 Thailand 9567.1 Burkina Faso 5.1 Morocco 12.6
Indonesia 3760.4 Korea 9248 Thailand 5.5 Singapore 13.52
Malaysia 3316.6 Malaysia 8839.7 Morocco 6.5 South Africa 15.4
Korea 2501.8 India 6998.7 PNG 6.8 Malaysia 15.7
Philippines 2227.6 Indonesia 6191.8 Korea 7.4 Pakistan 15.88
Pakistan 1356.9 Philippines 2363.8 Pakistan 8.9 India 16.76
Morocco 928.9 Nigeria 1941.4 India 9.4 Sri Lanka 17.36
Sri Lanka 586.1 Botswana 1860.9 Indonesia 9.5 Korea 18.39
Kenya 255.1 Morocco 1251.9 Mauritius 9.7 Thailand 18.56
Ghana 244.4 South Africa 1037.9 Botswana 11.2 Mauritius 18.9
Zimbabwe 239.3 Pakistan 828.8 China 11.3 Philippines 19.52
Tanzania 237.1 Sri Lanka 621.8 Sri Lanka 12.6 Botswana 20.1
Uganda 109.6 Mauritius 324.3 Namibia 12.2 Namibia 21.3
Mauritius 106.6 PNG 296.2 South Africa 12.9 Zimbabwe 22.5
Botswana 88.6 Ghana 290.9 Kenya 15.5 Nigeria 24.3
Burkina Faso 40.1 Kenya 277.6 Zimbabwe 17.9 China 24.8
Soutii Africa -79.9 Zimbabwe 182.7 Philippines 19.4 Indonesia 26.67
Singapore -643.3 Burkina Faso 178.9 Tanzania 28.4 Tanzania 26.8
Nigeria -2079.7 DRC 133 Nigeria 28.9 Kenya 29.1
PNG 18.9 Tanzania 117.2 Ghana 40.8 Ghana 39.9
Uganda 112.2 Uganda 68.5 Uganda 83.6
Namibia 111 DRC 1892.8 DRC 1135.1
Countries Mean
SAV
Countries Mean
INV
Countries Mean
CUA
Countries Mean
LRI
Singapore 44.2 Singapore 39.2 Singapore 9.6 Morocco 7.4
China 37.2 China 36.79 Botswana 4.9 Singapore 7.69
Botswana 35.6 Thailand 34.3 China 0.5 China 8.62
Malaysia 34.8 Malaysia 34.1 South Africa 0.2 Malaysia 8.86
Korea 33.3 Korea 33.1 Nigeria -0.2 Burkina Faso 10.1
Indonesia 32.1 Indonesia 30.56 India -1.6 Korea 10.86
Thailand 30.2 Botswana 28.3 Burkina Faso -2.3 Pakistan 11.3
South Africa 25.4 Mauritius 25.9 Mauritius -2.5 PNG 12.48
India 24.1 Sri Lanka 25.5 Indonesia -2.7 Botswana 12.51
Mauritius 21.9 PNG 23.94 Ghana -2.9 Thailand 13.93
Nigeria 20.2 India 23.51 Uganda -3.2 Sri Lanka 14.15
Kenya 19.7 Burkina Faso 23.4 Kenya -3.3 Mauritius 16.24
Philippines 19.6 Morocco 23.3 Zimbabwe -3.4 India 16.36
Namibia 18.1 Philippines 22.58 Pakistan -3.4 Nigeria 17.2
Zimbabwe 17.8 Kenya 22.8 Philippines -3.7 South Africa 17.95
PNG 15.2 South Africa 21.4 Morocco -3.8 Namibia 17.95
Morocco 14.21 Zimbabwe 19.8 Malaysia -4.1 Philippines 18.43
Sri Lanka 13.7 Namibia 19.7 Thailand -4.9 Kenya 20.55
Tanzania 13.5 Pakistan 18.8 Sri Lanka -5.3 Indonesia 21.3
Pakistan 12.2 Uganda 11.9 PNG -6.6 Zimbabwe 22.2
DRC 11.2 Nigeria 11.6 Tanzania -10.4 Ghana 26.5
Ghana 5 Ghana 10.4 Uganda 26.6
Burkina Faso 2.8 DRC 9.5 Tanzania 29.9
Uganda 0.1 DRC 59.1
Notes: CAA is capital account expressed in millions of US Dollars; INR is total international reserves expressed in millions of SDRs; 
P is inflation rate; GMS is the growth rate of money supply; SAV is saving expressed as a percentage of real GDP; INV is 
investment (proxied by gross capital formation) expressed as a percentage of GDP; CUA is current account (in millions of US Dollar) 
is expressed as a percentage of GDP; and LRI is the lending rate of interest rates. African economies are in bold. PNG is Papua New 
Guinea.
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics (1998)
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Table 1.8 Macroeconomic Performance of African Economies in the Global
Countries Mean
(EXR)
Countries Mean
(GRR)
Countries Mean
(EXP)
Countries Mean
(CON)
Countries Mean
(PGDP)
PNW 1.0637 China 9.99 Singapore 168.2 Singapore 55.8 China 10.11
Singapore 1.8473 Botswana 8.96 Malaysia 67.4 China 62.8 Korea 8.37
Botswana 2.026 Singapore 7.85 Botswana 64.2 Botswana 64.5 Singapore 7.73
South Africa 2.560 Korea 7.79 Namibia 58.2 Malaysia 64.7 Thailand 7.46
Namibia 2.560 Thailand 7.32 Mauritius 57.6 Korea 66.8 Malaysia 7.04
Malaysia 2.5973 Malaysia 7.07 PNG 44 Indonesia 67.9 Indonesia 6.08
China 4.7008 Indonesia 6.29 Thailand 33.3 Thailand 69.8 India 5.77
Morocco 8.161 India 5.82 Korea 32.8 South Africa 74.6 Pakistan 5.51
Nigeria 9.606 Pakistan 5.69 Sri Lanka 29.5 India 75.9 Botswana 5.23
Mauritius 14.761 Uganda 5.08 Philippines 27.78 Mauritius 78 Sri Lanka 4.69
India 20.1674 Mauritius 4.84 Kenya 27.7 Nigeria 79.8 Mauritius 4.54
Philippines 21.5117 Namibia 4.78 South Africa 26.9 Philippines 80.4 Namibia 3.99
Pakistan 22.4000 Sri Lanka 4.77 Zimbabwe 25.2 Kenya 80.5 PNG 3.97
Thailand 26.1292 Zimbabwe 3.93 Nigeria 25 Zimbabwe 82.2 Uganda 2.92
Kenya 29.120 Burkina Faso 3.57 Indonesia 24.39 Namibia 84 Philippines 2.31
Sri Lanka 37.2930 PNG 3.51 Morocco 23.3 PNG 84.8 Morocco 1,24
Tanzania 225.9 Kenya 3.39 China 16.47 Morocco 85.8 Burkina Faso 0.73
Burkina Faso 363.300 Morocco 3.26 Ghana 15.3 Sri Lanka 86.1 Nigeria 0.5
Ghana 530.7 Ghana 3.05 Pakistan 14.81 Pakistan 87.8 Zimbabwe 0.21
Korea 823.1 Tanzania 2.97 Burkina Faso 12.8 DRC 88.8 Ghana -0.17
Uganda 1006.5 Philippines 2.73 Tanzania 12.7 Ghana 94.9 Kenya -0.77
Indonesia 1754.5 Nigeria 2.33 Uganda 8.3 Burkina
Faso
97.2 Tanzania -0.87
DRC 1301.1 South Africa 1.78 India 7.81 Uganda 100.4 South Africa -1.08
DRC -3.08 DRC -5.2
Countries Mean
MOS
Countries Mean
G O C
Countries Mean
T A X
Countries Mean
B U D
Countries PY (US $) 
1999
Singapore 80.1 Nigeria 7.8 Uganda 5.4 Botswana 10.5 Singapore 22072
China 73.7 Philippines 9.3 DRC 7.2 Singapore 6.1 Korea 8871
Malaysia 72.8 Sri Lanka 9.4 India 10.4 Korea -0.6 Mauritius 3638
Thailand 63.9 Indonesia 9.6 Korea 15.6 Indonesia -0.7 Botswana 3625
Mauritius 57.1 Uganda 9.6 Indonesia 16.5 China -0.8 Malaysia 3613
South Africa 56.1 Ghana 10.2 Singapore 16.6 Namibia -1.6 South Africa 3067
India 44.4 Korea 10.5 Sril Lanka 17.6 Ghana -1.7 Thailand 2000
Korea 38.5 DRC 10.8 Kenya 19 Uganda -2.9 Namibia 1734
Chile 37.8 India 10.9 Mauritius 19.1 Mauritius -3 Morocco 1263
Philippines 35 Singapore 10.3 PNG 19.1 PNG -3.1 Philippines 1032
PNG 34 Thailand 11.1 Malaysia 20.4 South Africa -4.6 Sri Lanka 836
Kenya 33.2 Mauritius 12.3 Zimbabwe 22.6 Malaysia -4.7 China 798
Indonesia 31.5 Pakistan 12.6 South Africa 23.9 India -6.9 PNG 759
Sri Lanka 31.2 China 12.9 Botswana 26.9 Kenya -7 Indonesia 674
Tanzania 28.5 Malaysia 14.5 Namibia 27 Zimbabwe -7.6 Pakistan 487
Nigeria 28 Burkina Faso 15 Nigeria -7.7 Nigeria 473
Botswana 26.9 Tanzania 16.3 Sri Lanka -9.7 India 453
Zimbabwe 25.4 Morocco 16.7 DRC -12.4 Ghana 400
Namibia 21 Kenya 17.6 Kenya 355
Burkina Faso 19.8 South Africa 18.2 Uganda 301
DRC 15.9 Zimbabwe 20.1 Burkina Faso 234
Ghana 15.6 Namibia 22.5 DRC 116
Uganda 9.1 Botswana 24.8
Notes: EX R  is nominal exchange rate defined as local currency per US Dollar; GRR is growth rate of real GDP; EXP is exports 
expressed as a percentage of GDP; CON is consumption expressed as a percentage of GDP; PGDP is real growth rate of per capita 
GDP; MOS is money supply which include money plus quasi-money and expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP; TAX is tax 
revenues in local currency expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP; and GOC is government consumption expressed as a 
percentage of nominal GDP; PY is per capita income expressed in US dollars; BUD is budget deficit/surplus expressed as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. The source of PY is the United Nations International Labour Office (1999).
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics (1998)
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2.1 Historical Background of Macroeconometric models
Following the seminal work by Tinbergen (1939) who built the first macro econometric 
model of Holland, many researchers have built models in both developed and developing 
countries23. In the 1950s, Klein (1950), and Klein-Goldberger (1955) constructed several 
models o f the US economy. Before the 1960s, econometric models were built and 
seriously applied in the U.S., Holland, Canada and U.K. In the mid-1960s, Klein (1965) 
challenged econometricians to construct macro econometric models for developing 
countries. As a response, latter models were built for a number of countries, such as, 
Japan, India, Israel, Greece, South Korea, Malaysia, etc. Since the 1960s, official 
agencies around the world have constructed many large-scale econometric models 
(LSEM). At the end of the 1960s, Lawrence R. Klein pioneered project LINK (linking 
national models to form a model of the whole world).
In addition, many researchers and academics have also tried to build their own models, so 
as to contribute to the frontiers of knowledge in model building. Klein (1965, 1971) 
stressed the great need to build models for developing countries. As a response, various 
models based on developing countries were built by UNCTAD (1968), the Polak-IMF 
Model (Polak, 1957; and Robichek, 1967), the World Bank Model (World Bank, 1988; 
Holsen, 1989), IMF (1977, 1987), and Khan, Montiel and Haque (1991). Another useful 
study was undertaken by Fair (1994) who tested macroeconometric models. Other 
empirical work on model building in developing countries was advanced by Aghevli 
(1977) for Indonesia, Otani and Park (1976) for Korea, and Atta (1979), for Ghana24.
Chapter 2 Model Specification
23 Klein (1950) constructed models of the US economy. In a recent study (Reinhart, 1990), constructed a 
model for seven diverse developing countries: Chile (1976-87), Ghana (1969-87), Honduras (1969-87), 
Korea (1969-87), Myanmar (1969-87), Pakistan (1976-87), and Tanzania (1969-87).
24 The macro econometric model builder in a developing country faces several practical and conceptual 
difficulties if the objective is to construct a large-scale econometric model (Atta, 1979). The most important 
of these are: (a) problems posed by inadequate theoretical foundations for the economy being modelled; (b) 
problems of insufficient stock of knowledge about macro econometric modelling of developing countries; 
(c) and problems presented by shortcomings of the data base.
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It should be recognised that a macro econometric model is a useful tool available to 
policymakers to fully understand the structure of the economy and to deepen knowledge 
about the functioning of interdependent institutions in developing countries. Despite 
difficulties involved in the construction of models in developing countries, researchers 
should never undervalue the importance and relevance of such models towards the full 
understanding of developing economies and the solving of fundamental developmental 
issues.
Nevertheless, despite the problems associated with the construction of large scale 
econometric models for developing economies, “useful inferences can be made, and 
analysis of the development or growth process becomes clearer ,in the framework of 
...model” (Klein, 1971 p. 158). This argument is likely to become more convincing as 
data on them has been accelerated in order to rapidly accumulate a “fund of experience” 
necessary for the construction of models which would serve the needs of policy makers 
(Sastry, 1975). According to Hendry (1995), a key problem in empirical econometrics 
concerns matching economic theories with observed data features to develop quantitative, 
empirically relevant models. All models are not bom equal, and we seek those, which are 
useful in practice for understanding economic behaviour, for testing economic theories, 
for forecasting the future25, and for analysing economic policy (Hendry, 1995). Whitley 
(1994) reports that macroeconomic models are used routinely for forecasting the 
direction of the economy and for the analysis of alternative economic policy options. Yet 
they tend to differ in their prescriptions and because they are not easily interpreted on 
account of their size, they are often not easily understood by non-modellers (Whitley, 
1994). Granger and Newbold (1983) argued that models may also be used for purposes 
other than forecasting. For example, they may be viewed as vehicles for the explanation 
of, or testing of theories about, macroeconomic behavior.
McKibbin and Vines (2000) report that there is a thriving debate on the usefulness of 
different kinds of models. This debate has been about big versus small models, structural 
versus reduced-form models, theoretical versus data-intensive models, forward-looking
25 Forecasting involves a simulation of the model forward in time beyond die estimation period.
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versus backward-looking models, static versus dynamic models, and models that impose 
inter-temporal budget constraints versus those that do not. Taylor (2000) has shown 
differences in models used by different central banks in the developed countries. 
According to Atta (1979), large-scale econometric models are usually the products of 
combined efforts of several professional econometricians, research assistants, and special 
agencies. In the construction of a model, the sample period, data availability, stock of 
knowledge about macro econometric modelling, and institutional features of the economy 
are important factors which determine the objectives of a macro econometric model26.
Policymakers and researchers should recognise the importance of constructing macro 
econometric models especially for developing countries. A model is useful because it is 
the only way to effectively study all the sectors of the economy as an interdependent 
system and to gain greater insight into the functioning and structure of the economy. 
Through model building, both the supply-side and the demand-side of the economy are 
modelled and useful inferences can be made. All markets from the goods market through 
the labour market to the money market are simultaneously investigated and vice versa. In 
recent years, models are increasingly used as tools of policy making in the public and 
private sector.
Macro econometric models aid in the assessment of the likely effects of alternative public 
and private policies before they are implemented. Through the use of models, booms and 
slumps in the business cycle can be predicted, the direct and indirect impact of policies 
on economic fundamentals can be studied and the future of the overall economy can be 
forecast. Consequently, models are used to study the likely effects of a change in one 
variable on other variables over time both in the short and long run27. Following the
26 The main problem in econometric modelling of time series is discovering sustainable and interpretable 
relationship between observed economic variables (Hendry, 1995).
27 According to Hendry (1995), econometric models have four main roles in economic. Firstly, they are 
data summaries. Secondly, econometric models allow us to interpret empirical evidence. Thirdly, 
econometric models play an important role in evaluating the relative explanatory powers of several 
competing economic theories. Finally, econometric models are the primary vehicle for the accumulation 
and consolidation of empirical knowledge about how economies function. The earliest and still one of the 
most important applications of econometric techniques is to macro econometric models (Intriligator, 1978).
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Asian financial crisis of 1997, a model was used to simulate the crisis (McKibbin and 
Vines, 2000), to see if the model could generate the scales of adjustments in stock 
markets and foreign-exchange rates, as well as the sharp declines in economic activity, 
that actually occurred.
Despite the usefulness of macro econometric models, the models are subject to some 
limitations. For example, when a model is simulated it is assumed that the estimated 
coefficients of the model are fixed and constant, however, in the real world these 
coefficients are likely to change over time. Many policy instruments in operation might 
differ from the parameters in a macro econometric model. Forecasting errors are 
inevitable because the values of exogenous variables might be wrongly predicted, a mis- 
specified model might be used for policy purposes, and the extrapolated residuals might 
be generated through judgmental errors. In carrying out forecasting, revised published 
data are increasingly used. Jorgenson (2001) reports that the resurgence of the American 
economy since 1995 has outrun all but the most optimistic expectations. Economic 
forecasting models have been seriously off track and growth projections have been 
revised to reflect a more sanguine outlook only recently.
The inability of macro econometric models to forecast accurately the event and impacts 
of the global petroleum crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80 has raised a great deal of debate as 
to the efficacy of macro econometric models28. Lucas (1976) argued that when there is a 
change in policy the estimated parameters will change and will alter the behaviour of the 
economy. Under rational expectations, the convergent path to the steady state will change 
(including the slope and the height of this path). This necessitates the need to amend 
extrapolative coefficients so as to reflect the change in slope, and also to model the initial 
jump to the new path. It is here assumed that individuals in the economy understand all 
policies instantly and perfectly and because of easy availability of new information, there 
is a perfect and immediate respond to all policies. This critique is known as the Lucas’
28 The OECD Economic Outlook Report (2000) projected that interest rates in 2001 may rise moderately in 
most OECD countries. Given the current fall in interest rates in these economies the projection is not 
consisted with evidence in 2001.
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critique. The Lucas critique implies that estimated macroeconomic models are not 
suitable for policy analysis.
However, despite the limitations faced by models, Sims (1986) and Hoover (1990) have 
shown that models are useful for forecasting and policy analysis. The latter argues that 
forecasting models are usable for policy evaluation provided we keep in mind the 
underlying assumptions of the models. Although actual policies change, it is assumed 
that the a priori (ex ante) probability distribution (of all possible policies) does not 
change. Absolute structural changes may take place but there is no deep relative 
structural change despite the choice o f different actual policies ex post. In support of 
usefulness of macroeconometric models, McKibbin and Vines (2000) confirm that over 
the past decade, macroeconometric models have proved to be powerful aids to the 
understanding of major global events. Wren-Lewis (2000) supports the view that 
macroeconometric models are relevant.
2.2 Problems faced in Constructing Macro-Models of African Economies
Model builders face a number of problems when constructing macro-models of African 
economies. These problems are data shortcomings, ill-equipped research facilities, 
poorly-defined policy instruments, interest rate control and fixed exchange rates, lack of 
knowledge of African economies, and increasing macroeconomic instabilities and 
political unrest. The structure of African economies is completely different from that of 
developed countries, which requires different and cautions interpretation of econometric 
results.
2.3 Behavioural Functions of the Model
Consumption
Modelling the consumption function is vital because the properties of the consumption 
function determine the potency of fiscal policy in any macroeconomic model. That 
disposable income is a determinant of consumption is well supported by earlier 
researchers such as, Keynes (1936), Duesenberry and Modigliani (1949), Brown (1952),
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Ando, Bmmberg and Modigliani (1963), Friedman (1957). Many empirical studies by 
Branson and Klevoric (1969), Deaton (1978), Justen and Wachtel (1972) and Townend 
(1976), have demonstrated that consumption is also influenced by inflation, which justify 
the inclusion of real interest rate in the specified consumption function. The dissimilarity 
of consumption in developing and developed world advanced by Gersovitz (1988) and 
Deaton (1989) argued that households in developing countries are larger, share resources, 
affected by external shocks and operate at near-subsistence income levels. If this 
observation is true for these economies, then we should expect interest rate to exert 
insignificant effect on consumption. In the present study, therefore, the main 
determinants of consumption are hypothesised to be disposable income and real interest 
rate.
Investment
Investment is an important determinant of a country’s productive capacity, which has 
been extensively investigated in the past. In the naive accelerator model advanced by 
Clark (1917) and generalised as the flexible accelerator model by Koyck (1954), the level 
of investment is determined by the level of output. In the cash flow model of Grunfeld 
(1960), investment depends on the level of profit; and is influenced by tax policies, 
capital prices and the rate of interest, in the neo-classical model developed by Jorgenson 
(1963). According to Hall and Taylor (1988), much of investment occurring this year- is 
the result of decisions made last year, the year before, and even the year before that. 
Other determinant of investment is the availability of credit. Rama (1993) and Chhibber 
and Dailami (1993) included a credit variable in the investment function for developing 
countries to capture the effect of financial repression. Leff and Sato (1988) and Oshilcoya 
(1994) have confirmed a positive and significant impact of credit on private investment. 
In support of these studies, Taylor (1983), argued that in developing nations with a poorly 
articulated financial system, credit is an important source of funds for firms.
Exports
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, exchange rate problems have been at 
the centre of policy debates in the developing world. The collapse of many exchange
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rates in Asian economies, following the East Asian crisis in 1997, has revived interest in 
exchange rate policies in developing countries. Evidence reveals that LDCs have suffered 
economic misfortunes during the 1980s. This include the debt crisis (Cline, 1983), the 
disappointing outcome of the Southern Cone experiments with free market policies 
(Corbo et al., 1986), and the dismal performance of Africa’s agricultural sector (World 
Bank, 1984), which is attributed to inappropriate exchange rate policies.
In the past 15 years, many developing countries have encountered many problems such as 
exchange rate volatility and misalignment29. The imposition of severe import tariffs, 
import licenses, and other fonns of exchange, trade and capital controls have hampered 
an attainment of the equilibrium real exchange rate especially in the developing 
countries. The aim of these distortions was to avoid the balance of payments deficits 
resulting from real exchange rate overvaluation and macroeconomic imbalances. This has 
led to excess volatility in real exchange rates, real exchange rate misalignment and loss of 
international competitiveness of the tradable sectors in many countries especially in Sub- 
Saharan Africa.
The real exchange rate is an important relative price signalling intersectional growth in 
the long run. Edwards(1986a, 1986c), and Edwards and Van Wijnbergen (1986,1987) 
have shown the relevance of the real exchange rate to export promotion; Diaz-Alejandro 
(1984) based on experience of Latin America argued that real exchange rate 
misalignment and especially overvaluation is detrimental to an export-oriented 
development strategy; whilst Cabellero and Corbo (1989) stressed the importance of real 
exchange rate stability for export promotion. Developing countries in recent years have 
been experiencing increasing balance of payments difficulties that, in much instances, are 
attributable to their foreign exchange regimes. In a typical situation, the government 
maintains an exchange rate fixed at an unrealistic level30. To achieve a sustainable
29 In this study real exchange rate misalignment is defined as sustained deviations of the actual real 
exchange rate from its long equilibrium level. If the actual real exchange rate is below the equilibrium real 
exchange rate value, there is a real exchange rate overvaluations. If, on the other hand, die actual real 
exchange rate exceeds the equilibrium real exchange rate, there is an undervaluation.
30 In June 1988 the International Monetary Fund classified the developing nations’ exchange regimes as 
follows: 88 had a pegged nominal exchange rate; 4 countries had “limited flexibility”; 4 adjusted their
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macroeconomic equilibrium and high economic growth rate in the long run it is necessary 
for both monetary and fiscal policies to be consistent not only with the chosen nominal 
exchange rate regime but also with the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Overvalued exchange rates undermine exports, harm agriculture, stimulate imports, 
destabilise the capital account and often precipitate debt crisis, and do not help to curb 
inflation (Pfeffermann, 1985). That exchange rate overvaluation is detrimental to 
economic growth is also supported by Fischer (1987), Dombusch (1993a), Harberger 
(1994), and Islam and Chowdhury (1997). Petrie (1993) and hital (1992) confirmed that 
realistic and competitive exchange rates adopted in Asia and which were successfully 
adjusted with complementary fiscal and monetary policies have solved balance of 
payments problems and generated export growth which contributed to the spectacular 
success o f many Asian newly industrialised economies. According to Dombusch and 
Kuenzler (1993), multiple exchange rate regimes adopted in some developing countries 
have resulted in the misallocation of resources, rent seeking, corruption and budget 
problems.
Evidence shows that since the 1980s through the 1990s, many developing countries have 
experienced a contraction of real exports. This fall in real exports has been attributed to 
both internal and external factors affecting the developing nations. External factors are 
the severe global recession of the early 1980s, persistent volatility of the U.S. dollar and 
increasing protectionism in many industrialised countries. Internal factors which appear 
to have exacerbated real exports are: the persistent fall in commodity prices, worsening 
debt crisis, increasing external dependence in the development process and huge capital 
flight from the developing countries. Many developing countries are price takers in world 
markets and sell primary products at any price prevailing in the world market. In support 
of the latter view, Agenor and Montiel (1996) argue that developing countries tend to be 
open and to have little control over the prices of the goods they export and import. 
Therefore, the supply of exports is determined by supply conditions present in the
parity according to a set o f indicators; 21 had a managed floating system; and only 10 had an independently 
floating system (International Financial Statistics, July 1988).
46
domestic economy. The capacity to produce in the export sector is determined by the 
level of domestic income. An increase in domestic income will increase the supply of 
exports while a fall in domestic income will reduce exports. Given the low incomes level 
in many developing countries, it appeal's to be extremely difficult to expand exports 
unless export concentration is shifted to industrial goods.
Earlier studies by Cheneiy and Strout (1966) and by Maizels (1968) argue that products 
imported and exported by developing countries are relatively insensitive to changes in 
prices while Houthakker and Magee (1969) include price variables as determinants of 
imports and exports in the empirical work on developing countries. Khan (1974) found 
that prices do play an important role in the determination of imports and exports of 
developing countries. Houthakker and Magge (1969) estimated an export demand 
function, which depends on real world income and real value of exports for a number of 
developing countries. Since the 1980s throughout the 1990s, many developing countries 
have faced a declining foreign demand for their exports. Without export diversification, 
this trend is likely to continue in 21st century31. In 1990 developing nations as a group 
accounted for only about one quarter of world exports and imports (Agenor and Montiel, 
1996).
Clearly, this discussion so far, cast doubt on the effectiveness of exchange rate policy in 
promoting exports in developing countries, and it appears to suggest that foreign income 
is not a major determinant of exports in these economies. These hypotheses have received 
considerably attention in the present empirical work. Given the problem of data 
shortcomings, the export function specified in the current study includes real exchange 
rate and foreign income as appropriate regressors.
31 Many developing countries continue to rely heavily on one or two primary commodities for the bulk of 
their export earnings, and primary commodities (including fuel and energy) constitute on average, about 
half of export revenues of developing countries (IMF Staff Papers, 2001)
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Imports
Developing countries are import-dependent economies and have relied heavily on the 
importation of capital goods, intermediate producer goods, factor inputs, and consumer 
goods to expand their industrial base and to meet their developmental needs. As a result 
of bottlenecks in developing economies, attempts by the authorities to accelerate the 
development process have led to a more rapid expansion of demand than supply in the 
domestic factor markets. In non-petroleum, poor developing nations, import demands 
have in recent years increasingly exceeded the capacity to generate sufficient revenues 
from the sale of exports. Therefore, this has resulted in a large trade deficit, deteriorating 
terms of trade, growing foreign debts, and increasing capital flight. A combination of 
these factors in the past years, has exacerbated the slowdown in economic growth, 
worsened poverty, increased unemployment, raised the level of unproductive 
employment and augmented underemployment in both the industrial and agricultural 
sector.
The agricultural sector has lagged dramatically behind the industrial sector, resulting in 
growing economic disparities and inequities; and increasing import dependence of these 
economies on the outside world. Therefore the poor nations of the world rely heavily on 
external resources in the development process. The modelling of the import sector is 
motivated by the fact that, in these economies, there is a great need to develop industrial 
self-reliance, reduce luxury imports and reduce the current technological dependence on 
the developed economies. The imports sector in developing countries has been modelled 
extensively by Houthakker and Magee (1969), Learner and Stem (1970), Magee (1973), 
Khan and Ross (1974a) and Edwards (1989). To reduce imports, developing economies 
should expand domestic production by pursuing sound macroeconomic policies32. In the 
present study, imports is determined by the real exchange rate and the level of domestic 
income.
32 Some indicators of sound macroeconomic policies are low budget deficit, low inflation, positive real 
interest rate, and competitive real exchange rate.
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Money Demand
Theoretical work on the demand for money by Fisher (1911), Pigou (1917), and Keynes 
(1930, 1936) maintains that the main determinants of the demand for money are the rate 
of interest and income. On the other hand, in the inventory theoretical approach 
developed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956); and the modem quantity theory of 
money revived by Friedman (1956); brokerage fee and the rate of inflation, respectively, 
are assumed to exert influence on money demand. Given these theoretical debates about 
the determinants of money demand, demand for money has been at the centre of 
empirical work in recent years.
Given the degree of diversification of the financial system in many developing countries, 
the main determinants of the demand for domestic currency are well documented. The 
main determinants of money demand in LDCs are inflation rate, which captures 
substitution effects between money and real goods, and the rate of depreciation of the 
(official or parallel) exchange rate, which captures currency substitution effects (Agenor 
and Montiel, 1996).
Domestic interest rates are excluded either because alternative financial assets are 
assumed not to be available, so that the choice of asset holdings is limited to either 
money or real assets, such as commodity inventories or consumer durable goods. This is 
because government regulations associated with financial repression imply that such rates 
tend to display little variation over time, so that their potential effect is difficult to 
determine econometrically. hi studies by Fair (1987) interest rates were significant and 
rightly signed in one country out of seven developing countries. In more recent studies, 
on Brazil by Arrau et al. (1995), and on Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, the effects of 
interest rates on money demand were significant. Based on a study on Morocco, Hoffman 
and Tahiri (1994) argue that a foreign interest rate is also a relevant opportunity cost of 
holding domestic financial assets. In the present study, nominal interest rate and income 
are assumed to be the main determinants of money demand in these economies.
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It is well known that many Sub-Saharan African economies are dominated by the 
agricultural sector. An increase in the productive capacity of the agricultural sector tends 
to increase output in the whole economy of many countries. Therefore, output supply is 
mainly influenced by the agricultural sector. Evidence reveals that many African 
economies are characterised by a low manufacturing base of less than 30% of the gross 
domestic product, and a level of manufactured exports of less than 50% of total exports. 
Hence they are not industrialised. The lack of economic diversification as a necessary 
condition to achieve industrialisation has increases the importance of the agricultural 
sector in these economies. In theory, if  agricultural growth lags behind, food shortages 
will occur and food prices will be driven up, contributing to inflationary pressures that 
will make a nation’s products less competitive on international markets. Therefore, 
supply shocks, originating primarily from the agriculture sector in the form of droughts 
and floods, are prevalent in developing countries. Supply shocks to agriculture have 
macroeconomic consequences on the domestic economy and tend to be inflationary in 
many African economies33.
According to Hossain and Chowdhury (1996), when agricultural supply shocks are 
negative, they lower output and employment and raise agricultural prices. It follows that 
inflation is the main macroeconomic consequence of supply shocks in African economies 
due to the dominant of agriculture sector in these economies. Consequently, changes in 
the rate of inflation will have a significant impact on the supply capacity of the economy 
in many African economies. There is a growing consensus that the relatively high 
inflation experienced since the 1980s, has partly contributed to the lacklustre growth 
performance of most African economies. A relatively low and stable inflation has played 
a positive role in economic growth in the newly industrialising economies of Asia during 
the past two decades or so ( Hossain and Chowdhury, 1996).
It is a well-established fact that developing countries exhibit substantially higher rates of 
inflation than the major industrial countries. When the domestic economy is suffering
Inflation
33 According to Mankiw (2000), supply shocks have a direct impact on the price level.
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from persistent inflationary pressures, economic policies to curb inflation are likely to 
become incredible, and thereby contribute to policy uncertainty34. Rogoff (1985) suggests 
that a “conservative” central banker, who is anti-inflation, will restore anti-inflationary 
policy credibility. According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), “weak” policymakers can 
combat inflationary expectations more effectively, by “tying their hands” when joining a 
fixed-exchange-rate arrangement. Evidence has shown that many developing countries 
tend to maintain large, unsustainable fiscal deficits; and face borrowing difficulties in the 
domestic financial sector as a result of the non-existence of well developed bonds 
markets. Consistent, with Agenor and Montiel (1996), inflation is therefore, primarily 
caused by the recourse to money creation by governments to fund fiscal deficits. Haan 
and Zelhorst (1990) report empirical evidence that supports a strong positive long-run 
relationship between budget deficits and inflation in high-inflation countries in seventeen 
developing nations. Given the existence of inadequate govermnent revenues in poor 
countries, many LDCs have traditionally relied on money creation as a source of income 
for the government faced with low tax base35.
Studies by Darrat and Arize (1990), Dombusch et al. (1990), Jorgensen and Paldam 
(1986), and Montiel (1986), attribute the other causes of inflation in the short run to 
exchange rate depreciation. That political stability influences the rate of inflation is 
advanced in the work of Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). The later study 
found that political instability is associated with relatively high inflation. In addition, 
Hossain and Chowdhury (1996) found that high inflation has caused lacklustre growth 
performance in Latin American economies, while low inflation triggered high growth in 
Asian economies. Persson and Tabellini (1990) report that political instability has 
inflationary consequences; and Edwards and Tabellin (1991) found that Latin American 
economies are relatively more politically unstable compared with Asian economies. The
34 Policy uncertainty has been an important factor triggering currency substitution, capital flight, exchange- 
rate crises, and the collapse of private investment, in many instances (Agenor and Montiel, 1996).
35 See, for example, Agenor and Montiel (1996), who demonstrates that the primary cause of inflation is 
money creation . According to Thirlwall (1989), money creation generates forced savings through a rise in 
inflation which either redistribute income from classes with low propensity to save to classes with high 
propensity to save, or transfer income form the holders of money to the government through inflation tax.
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later observation partly explains low inflation in Asian economies and high inflation in 
Latin America and Africa.
High inflation due to money financed fiscal deficits in a repressed financial sector leads 
to negative real interest rates, and encourages inefficient utilisation of investment funds, 
so that the portfolio of investments would be dominated by inefficient, poorly selected 
projects and the productivity of investment will suffer. Romer (1996) reports that 
empirically, there is a strong negative association between inflation and investment, and 
between inflation and growth. In the long nm, governments that follow policies 
detrimental to growth, such as protectionism and large budget deficits, are likely also to 
pursue policies that result in inflation (Sala-i-Martin, 1991b). De Gregoria (1993) also 
supports these findings that high inflation reduces the rate and productivity of investment. 
Without expanding the industrial base in developing countries, these economies will 
remain the importers of not only capital goods but also of inflation. The latter view is 
shared by Kirkpatrick and Nixson (1977), that many developing countries tend to import 
inflation because they depend heavily on imported capital goods.
Robinson (1962) shows a link between monetary expansion, inflation, and economic 
growth; while Mundell (1965, 1971) demonstrates the inflationary tax link. Cagan (1956) 
and Khan (1980) have found that there is a rate of inflation at which the government can 
maximise its inflation tax revenue. Tanzi (1989) reports that the real value of tax revenue 
in developing countries is reduced by inflation due to the tax systems, which are income 
inelastic, coupled with long collection lags. The existence of inadequate tax revenues, 
coupled with the temptation by governments in LDCs to maximise inflation tax revenue, 
is a major economic problem characterising these economies, and hence tends to trigger 
policy uncertainty and eventually macroeconomic instabilities. Clearly, the literature 
demonstrates the need to target inflation because the level of inflation in the economy 
influences the pace of the development process.
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Interest Rate
The traditional wisdom of the Keynesian and Neo-classical theories has been that low 
interest rates would promote investment spending. The Financial Repression Hypothesis 
(FRH) first formulated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and further extended and 
popularised by Fry (1982 and 1988), argues that developing economies are financially 
repressed. Accordingly, financial liberalisation will lead to a positive real interest rate, 
will expand and improve financial intermediation between savers and investors 
increasing the incentives to save and invest, and will promote economic growth and 
development especially in the developing countries. They argued that, in countries 
characterised by “financial repression”, raising nominal interest rates relative to inflation 
would increase saving and the supply of investable resources in an economy. The 
productivity of investment also rises as these resources are channelled into projects that 
have higher rates of return than hitherto.
According to the McKinnon and Shaw doctrine, financial repression arises mostly when a 
country imposes ceilings on nominal deposit and lending interest rates at a low level 
relative to inflation. The resulting low or negative real interest rates discourage savings 
mobilisation and the channelling of the mobilised savings through the financial system. 
This has a negative impact on the quantity and quality of investment and hence on 
economic growth. However, the theory of financial liberalisation, including raising 
interest rate to promote economic growth has been severely criticised. The studies by Van 
Wiynbergen (1983) Taylor (1983) and Dutt (1990) argue that the financial liberalisation 
model ignores the adverse effects that real high interest rates can have on costs and the 
level of demand in an economy, which may lead to stagflation.
According to the post-Keynesian Structuralist, a rise in nominal interest rates will 
increase the costs of firms by raising borrowing costs and the costs of financing working 
capital. Consequently, the impact of a rise in interest rates on saving could be either 
positive or negative and is a controversial subject among economists, which needs 
empirical verification. This is because a rise in the real deposit rate of interest may 
increase savings by making future consumption cheaper relative to current consumption
(substitution effect). At the same time, a higher real deposit rate of interest may reduce 
the savings necessary to purchase a given amount of future consumption (income effect). 
Because of this theoretical ambiguity about the critical role interest rate plays in the 
development process, therefore, modelling the impact of interest rate on consumption and 
investment is of crucial importance.
Employment
An increasing unemployment of labour in recent years has led to an explosion of both 
theoretical and empirical work on the labour market42. The labour market is modelled 
because it is the engine of growth, the determinant of the well-being of the society and 
the supplier of output. Many researchers have modelled the labour market by 
investigating the labour supply functions so as to detennine the factors influence the 
supply of labour. Following Leuthold (1968) who argued that the labour supply function 
for husband and wife differs, Gronau (1977) and Becker (1965) distinguish between work 
in the home and leisure, and maintained that married women have a more elastic labour 
supply function than to men. This is because their marginal product in the home is likely 
to be less sensitive to hours spent in domestic work than in the case with men. Heckman 
(1974) and Weis (1972) shows that the individual works most at ages when wages are the 
highest (i.e. consumes least leisure when it is most expensive)43. Hall (1980), using data 
on output per hour over the business cycle, shows that workers tend to put in extra effort 
during booms and take it easy during slumps. In their work on family labour supply, 
Kosters (1966), Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) found that an increase or decrease in 
the wife’s leisure affects the husband’s labour supply by changing his non-labour income. 
Labour supply is affected by time allocation between market work, home work and 
leisure (Gronau, 1977). According to Boskin and Hurd (1978) labour' supply depend on 
the life cycle of the individual because the hours of labour supply varies with wages over
42 Labour market refers to the market in which labour is bought and sold in order to increase domestic 
production and improve the wellbeing of the workers and the society at large.
3 Some economists, especially those of the ‘rational expectations’ school, believe that this intertemporal 
substitution is the explanation of unemployment, i.e. individuals, expecting future real wages to exceed 
present wages, take more leisure today -  making themselves voluntarily unemployed (see Lucas and 
Rapping, 1969). Of course similar considerations affect labour demand decisions. Hiring will depend on 
employers’ expectations about future wages and prices.
54
an individual’s working life, and are also affected by investment in human capital and the 
retirement decision.
Selected Macroeconometric Models
1939 - Tinbergen - Build the First Model- on Holland
1950s - Klein (1950) and Klein-Goldberger (1955) - Constructed
Models on US Economy
1957 -Polak (1957)-Polak-IMF Model
Early 1960s - Models were Built and Applied in the US, Holland, Canada
and UK
Mid-1960s - Klein (1965) - Challenged Econometricians to Construct
Models for Developing Countries
Late 1960s - Klein pioneered project LINK (linking national models to
foim a model of the world economy
1980s - World Bank (1988) - World Bank Model
Africa
1979 -Atta (1979)-Ghana
1990 - Murinde (1990) - Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania
1991 - Mhozya (1991) - Botswana
1993 - Dordimoo (1993) - Ghana
1995 -Bank o f Mauritius- Mauritius
2000 -McPherson and Rakovski (2000) - Zambia
2.4 Shortcomings of the Model of the Zambian Economy
There are macro econometric models on the South African economy, such as, the South 
African Reserve Bank Model, the World Bank Econometric Model, the Bureau for 
Economic Research Model, the Development Bank of Southern Africa Model and the 
World Bank CGE Model36. These models are not in the public domain (were not 
available) and could not be compared with the current model. The model developed in 
this study, therefore, was compared with the model on the Zambian economy, because
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the latter model has similar structure as the current proposed model. Despite the 
usefulness of the Zambian model, there are a number of shortcomings, which can be 
summarised as follows37 (see appendix c).
(1) The model excludes consumption and investment equations, and therefore, the 
importance of consumers and investors in the economy is neglected. Government 
spending has no effects on the real sector of the economy, which reduces the potency 
of fiscal policy to fight unemployment and affect the level of national income.
(2) The model has no debt equation. Given the prevalence of the debt problem in African 
economies, the model failed to allow the study of policy implications on the level of 
the debt.
(3) The model does not identify the policy instruments available to policymakers in the 
management of the economy.
(4) The model is static and so fails to allow for inertia in response to shocks.
(5) Exports are exogenous, which undermines the contributions of the exporting sector to 
the domestic economy.
Comparing this model, with the simulation model developed in chapter 4, the Zambian 
model is rather limited and not capable of handling dynamic policy simulation and 
forecasts.
2.5 Distinctive Features of the Proposed Model
The model constructed in this study has several distinctive features, which are 
summarised below.
(1) Policy instruments actually used by policy makers in each country (such as interest 
rates, exchange rate, government spending, taxes, and wages) are a part of the model and 
are clearly identified. In contrast to previous African macro-models, both the estimation 
and the simulation model are clearly distinguished. The effects of all policy instruments 
on the economy can be fully assessed.
36 De Jager (1998) and Smal (1995) provide interesting discussion of the South African Reserve Bank 
Model.
37 The models by Mhozya (1991), Murinde (1990), Bank of Mauritius (1995), and McPherson and 
Rakovski (2000) are reported in the appendix C-F.
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(2) Model simulation is not static, but rather dynamic in the sense that it incorporates 
both the long run and error correction properties of the model. Existing models tend to 
use only the long ran model in policy simulation. The current model recognizes both the 
long run properties and short ran dynamics of the model in explaining the behavior of 
economic agents in these economies.
(3) Most earlier African macro-models have failed to recognize the importance of a tax 
stabilization rule in model simulation. A tax stabilization rule is a comer stone of the 
proposed model38. Firstly, it shows the importance of financing of the debt, which is 
largely ignored in many African economies. Secondly, it allows the study of government 
spending and taxes on both domestic and foreign debt, which is increasingly not well 
assessed and fully anticipated, in the national budget of many countries. The debt 
identities introduced in the simulation model, enable policy makers to study the effects of 
government spending on taxes, which ties government spending to taxes. The latter issue 
has been widely overlooked in many African macro-models. Hence, government 
spending was wrongly assumed to have no effect on taxes and hence on the level of debt 
because the transmission mechanism has been lacking in many models.
(4) The position of the trade balance is associated with the level of external debt, which 
indicates that an improvement in the trade balance will ease external debt due to the 
availability of foreign exchange earnings, and vice versa. This link is important and 
ensures that, when the restoration of external balance is a policy target, external debt will 
be expected to fall, which stresses the importance of achieving an external balance.
(5) The model enables policy makers to study the effects of exchange rate devaluation not 
only on the trade balance, but also its effects on both domestic and foreign debt. This is 
vital because it highlights the importance of assessing devaluation effects on the 
indebtedness of the domestic economy. The latter issue has not received attention in 
African macro-models. Based on implications of the Marshall-Learner condition, the 
effects of devaluation have been centred on the trade balance only.
38 McCallum (1999), argues convincingly that since there is little agreement over the true structural 
economic model, a policy rule should be robust to the possibility that numerous models are correct.
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Demand Side
National income identity
Yt = C t + It + Gt + Xt- M t ( 1)
Consumption
log Ct = Po + P i IRt + P2 log DYt + Vjt (2)
Pi < 0; P2 >0-
Disposable income identity
DYt = Yt-T , (3)
Investment
log It = p3 + p4 IRt + p5 log Y, + v2t (4)
p4 < 0 ; P5 > 0 .
Real interest rate identity
IRt = NIR, -  A log DPt (5)
Exports
log Xt = p6 + p7 log FYt + p8 log Et + v3t (6 )
p7 > 0 ; p8 > 0
Imports
log Mt = p 9 + p , 0 log Yt + Pu IogEt + v4t (7)
P10 > 0; Pn < 0
Real exchange rate identity
Et = (NE,*FP,)/DPt (8 )
Money demand
log (MD)t = P12+ P13 log Yt + p14 log NIRt + v5t (9)
P13 > 0; pu < 0
Supply Side
Inflation
A log DPt = P15 + Pis log Yct + p17 log Yct.j + v6t (10)
Pis= 0; pig > 0; p17 < 0
Detrended output/output gap identity
Yct = Y t/Ynt ( 1 1 )
Natural/potential output
log Ynt = Pis + P19 t (1970) + v7t ( 1 2 )
P19 > 0
Employment
log EMt = p20 + P21 log Yt + p22 log Wt + v8t (13)
P21 > 0; P22 < 0
Real wage rate identity
Wt = log NWt - log DP, (14)
Table 2.1 Proposed Macro Econometric Model
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Table 2.2 Definition of Variables of the Model
Variables Definition Endogenous
Variables
Exogenous
Variables
Policy
Instruments
C Real consumption expenditure *
DP Domestic prices (i.e., GDP deflator) *
DY Real disposable income *
E Real exchange rate *
EM Real employment *
FP Foreign prices (i.e., GDP deflator of G7) *
FY Real foreign income *
G Real government expenditure * *
I Real investment expenditure *
IR Real interest rate *
M Real imports expenditure *
MD Real money demand *
NE Nominal exchange rate per U.S. dollar * *
NIR Nominal interest rate * *
NW Nominal wages * *
T Real tax revenue * *
t Time trend (to proxy technical progress) *
Vj Error term on equation i
W Real wage rate *
X Real exports expenditure *
Y Real income/output *
Yc Detrended output *
Y„ Natural output *
2.6 Proposed Macro Econometric Model
The model specified in table 2.1, is a macro econometric model of a small open economy. 
This model is specified for four Southern African economies: Botswana, Mauritius, 
Namibia and South Africa. These economies are small in the sense that Sub-Saharan 
African economies are price takers in the world markets and their share output in the 
world economy is insignificant. The model is constructed in line with the principle o f 
parsimony, which states that a model must be kept as simple as possible39. Consequently,
39 A model can never be a completely accurate description of reality; to describe reality one may have to 
develop such a complex model that will be of little practical use. Some amount of abstraction or 
simplification is inevitable in any model building (Gujarati, 1995). According to Friedman (1953), “a 
model is important if it ‘explains much by little...” This proposition by Milton Friedman requires the 
inclusion of few key variables in the model that fully describe the reality. Macroeconomic analysis of 
developing countries is different from standard industrial country macroeconomics. Applying theoretical 
results to real-world settings is a difficult task and requires taking carefully into account individual-country 
circumstances. Developing economies share a number of features not often found in industrial-country 
macroeconomic models, so a somewhat different family of models is required for developing-country 
macroeconomic analysis ( Agenor and Montiel, 1996).
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the model is consistent with institutional characteristics of African economies, and is 
constrained by limited data on these economies. There are 14 endogenous variables, 14 
equations, 8 exogenous variables, and 5 potential policy instruments: taxes, government 
spending, and the interest rate, the exchange rate and nominal wages40. There are 6 
accounting identities. Despite the simple structure of the model, important features of 
these economies are well captured. The variables explained by the model are endogenous, 
and those explained outside the model are exogenous. To identify the model, the "order 
condition" requires that the number of exogenous variables excluded from the equation 
must not be less than the number of endogenous variables included in that equation less 
one. Hence the order condition is satisfied and the model is identified, meaning that the 
parameters of the model can be estimated.
Equations (1) through (14) are assumed to describe the general structure of the modelled 
economies, with the demand side explained by equations 1-9, and the supply side by 
equations 10-14. The model developed above is an attempt to construct a macro 
econometric model for these economies and reflect the institutional characteristics of a 
small open economy. The model is aggregated because any attempt to construct a more 
disaggregated model for Southern African economies is constrained by the limited 
availability of data. Equation (1) is a national income identity. Income is broken down by 
expenditure components into consumption, investment, government, and the trade 
balance (exports minus imports), which constitute the real aggregate demand for 
domestic output. In equation (2), consumption function is specified to depend positively 
on disposable income (income minus taxes), but negatively on the domestic real interest 
rate. Equation (3) is the disposable income identity. Investment in equation (4) is a 
positive function of real domestic income; but a negative function of the domestic real 
interest rate. Equation (5) is a real interest rate identity. The formulation of an aggregate 
export function given by equation (6), postulates the level of exports to increase due to 
rising foreign income (average income of G7 economies) and the depreciation of the 
local currency. Equation (7) describes the import function, which depends positively on 
the level of domestic real income and negatively on the depreciation of the exchange rate.
40 These policy instruments have been used in the past in these economies and are still in force.
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The real exchange rate identity is defined by equation (8), where a rise in the exchange 
rate implies exchange rate depreciation.
The money market is captured by equation (9). The money market is assumed to be in 
equilibrium, and therefore money demand equals money supply. The money demand 
depends positively on real domestic income and is inversely related to the domestic 
nominal interest rate. According to equation (10), deviations of output from trend are 
postulated to cause inflation41. Equation (11) defines the detrended output identity as the 
difference between the log of actual output and the log of natural output42. In equation 
(12), natural output is hypothesised to be a function of a constant and time trend. Time is 
a proxy for technical progress. In the recent past, the importance of technical progress as 
an important determinant of output supply is more pronounced in both empirical and 
theoretical work43. Hence its omission in the supply fimction can cause a severe distortion 
of regression results44. Therefore this equation is a important supply side equation and 
confirms the exogeneity of growth in the model. Because of linearity in the logs of the 
variables in the model, the model specified is a constant elasticity (i.e., log-linear ) 
model. In equation (13), employment is hypothesised to depend positively on income 
and negatively on wages45. The real wage rate identity is defined by equation (14). 
Equations (1) to (14) fonn a simultaneous equation system. Consequently, estimating the 
parameters of the model (excluding equation 12) using OLS, the estimators will be 
biased, inconsistent and the statistical tests will be invalid. This problem of simultaneity 
is exacerbated by the endogeneity of some regressors. Using a instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation technique can mitigate the problem of simultaneous equation bias in the 
model. However, equation (12) satisfies the usual assumptions of OLS, and is estimated 
by the OLS.
41 This equation is based on the Lucas supply function and its derivation has been shown in the next 
section.
42 Detrended (or cyclical) output is the residual obtained from estimating log of output as a fimction of a 
constant and time tr end; and log of natural output is the fitted value from the estimated regr ession.
43 Countries experiencing a faster rate of technological progress will experience an equilibrium real 
exchange rate appreciation (Balassa 1964).
44 In the new endogenous growth theory, technical progress is endogenously determined
45 In the specified employment function, time trend is not a regressor. Hence the effect of neutral technical 
progress on labour productivity is not captured.
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Equation (10) can be interpreted as follows. Changes in the rate of inflation depend 
positively on current cyclical output but negatively on lagged cyclical output A rise in 
cyclical output in immediate period will be inflationary, because of incomplete 
adjustment and imperfect information on economic agents. However, when adjustment is 
completed as a result of inflationary expectations, and the previous level of cyclical 
output is taken into account, a rise in lagged cyclical output will reduce the rate of 
inflation. Therefore, in this model a rise in cyclical output today is expected to increase 
inflation whereas a rise in lagged cyclical output is expected to reduce inflation. The 
supply side of the model captured the inflationary expectations on the domestic economy, 
in the process of output determination.
2.7 Derivation of the Inflation Equation
Following Lucas (1973), the supply function can be defined as follows.
Yt = Ynt + 8(P t - P ? ) ,8 > 0 ,
Where Yt is output, Yn is the natural rate of output, Pt is the price level, and Pe is the 
expected price level. The value of 8 indicates how much output responds to unexpected 
changes in the price level. The lower the value of 5 , the lower the effect of unexpected 
inflation on output; and the larger the value of 8 , the higher the effect of unexpected 
inflation on output. When expected inflation equals actual inflation, output is at its 
natural rate. Output is below its natural rate when expected inflation is above actual 
inflation; and above its natural rate when expected inflation is below actual inflation.
Defining the above aggregate supply function in log-linear form yields,
log Yt = log Ynt + 8 (log Pt -  log PU  (15)
Define detrended output, Yct is the difference between actual output and natural output to
obtain,
log Yt- lo g  Ynt = log Yct, (16)
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Where Yct is output deviation from trend. Using equation (16), rewrite equation (15) as 
follows:
log Yct = 5 (logPt - lo g P ^ )  (17)
Equation (17) says that the deviation o f output from trend is due to differences between 
the actual and expected price level. Solving for Pt from equation (17) yields,
log Pt = -7 log Yct + log P ? (18)o
Assume that the formation of expectations is adaptive and is given by,
log P *_ log P m = a (log Pt -  log P U ) (19)
Where 0< a <  1, and a is the coefficient of expectations. Rewrite equation (19) as,
log P * = a log Pt + (1 - a) log P (20)
Equation (20) shows that the expected rate of inflation at time t is a weighted average of
the actual rate of inflation at time t and its value expected at time t-1, with weights of a
and 1- a, respectively. Substitute (20) into (18), to obtain the following inflation equation.
(1- a) logP t= 4 loS Yct + (1- a) lo g P ^  (21)o
Lag equation (18) by one period, multiply it by 1- a, to get,
(1- a) log Pt.j = i ^ l o g  Y0t-i + (1- a) log P et_x (22)o
Subtract equation (22) from (21), and rearrange to obtain,
( l - a )  logPt- ( l - a ) lo g  Pt-! = i l o g Y ct-i-2 .1 o g Y ct.,o d
+ log P f_, - IzSL log P l ,  (23)
Simplifying equation (23), and solving for Pt) yields the following inflation equation, with 
P replaced with DP.
A logDPt= \ , log Yct- - lo g  Ycn  (24)(l-a)o o
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For empirical purposes equation (24) is specified as equation (10) in the model, with a
constant P15 added. Hence pi6 = -—-—  which expected to be greater than zero and 617 =( l - o j j
expected to be less than zero.
Equation (24) says that price instability is caused by the discrepancy between actual and 
natural output. Accordingly, a rise in actual output (Yt) above natural output (Ynt), will 
lead to inflation. To ensure price stability (thus maintaining low and steady price level) 
policy makers should reduce variations in cyclical output (Yct). The main policy target 
of this model, which the domestic monetary authority can control is inflation. To stabilise 
prices, policy makers should set log Yct to zero which means minimising fluctuations of 
output from trend. When actual output equals natural output, inflation will stabilise. It 
implies that if  log Yt > log Ynt then log Yct > 0, and it will lead to a rise in A log DPt 
(inflation). Similarly, if  log Yt < log Ynt then log Yct < 0, and it will lead to a fall in A log 
DPt (deflation). Clearly, inflation is a policy target, which can be manipulated by the 
monetary authority46. In favour of this policy target, Wren-Lewis (2000) report that the 
piupose of macroeconomic policy is to ensure that the economy achieves non- 
inflationary, stable growth. As evidence shows, an independent central bank with a clear 
mandate for price stability enhances macroeconomic performance (Cukierman et al, 
1992).
2.8 W orking of the Model
The working of the model is as follows. Suppose the economy is in a recession and the 
objective of the economic policy is to avoid economic slowdown, and the monetary 
authority decide to slash the rate of interest. A fall in nominal interest will lead to a 
decline in the real interest rate and consequently investment is stimulated. Low
46 The inflation target of the UK government is 2.5 per cent and of the Eur opean Central Bank is 2 per cent. 
On 23 February 2000 tire South African Minister of Finance announced in the Budget Speech that the 
government had decided to set an inflation target range of 3 to 6 per cent for the year 2002. Cecchetti 
(2000), reports that Fry et al (1999) divides countries into three groups on the basis of their monetary 
policy regime: exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, or inflation targeting. Accordingly, 12 
industrialised, 12 transitional, and 21 developing economies have adopted some form of inflation targeting 
over the past decade.
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production costs in the exporting sector due to low interest rates in the economy, implies 
that exports will become more competitive. Imports will be discouraged due to the 
availability of domestic supply at lower prices than before. A fall in the real interest rate 
will discourage importers from importing while encouraging exporters to export, due to 
cheap loans from the domestic financial sector in financing exports. There will be a shift 
in foreign demand to domestic exports and a rise in domestic demand from importable to 
domestically produced goods, and eventually exports will expand and imports will 
contract. Consequently the level of income will be expanded and the expansionary 
income effects will be transmitted to the supply side of the economy. Simplifying the 
supply side of the economy yields the derivation of the final inflation equation specified 
below. Using equation (11) substitute equation (12) into equation (10) to obtain,
A log DPt = Pi5 + P l6 log Yt - Pl6 ( Pl8 + Pl9 t + V7t) + Pl7 log YM 
“pl7 CP 18 + pl9 t (-1) + V 7t-i)+  V6t
= (Pl5“ Pl6 Pl8 — P17 PlS ) - (Pl6 Pl9+ Pl7 Pl9 ) t + Pl6log Yt + Pl7log Yt-l
+ V6t- Pl6 V7t“ Pl7 Vyt-i
A log DPt = Xo + XI t + P16 log Yt + Pn log Y t-1 + v* (25)47
XI < 0, and v * is autocorrelated.
Equation (25) confirmed that changes in output supply would affect inflation. A rise in 
output will increase inflation. Accelerating inflation will have two effects on the 
economy, first by appreciating the real exchange rate, which has a negative impact on 
income, and second by reducing real interest rate (second round effects), which has a 
positive impact on income. Depending on the relative strengths of real exchange rate 
effects and real interest rates effects on income, income may increase or decrease. In this 
model it is postulated that the real interest rate effects will dominate the real exchange
rate effects. Hence income is expected to rise. As income continue to rise, this multiplier
47 where Xo~ (Pis - Pi6 Pis - Pi7 Pis), Xi~ (Pie P19 + P17 Pi9)> and v , -  v6t- Pis V7t- P17 V7t-i.
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process will be repeated so on and so forth until actual output approaches natural output. 
As a result, fluctuations in detrended output will be close to zero. Minimum fluctuations 
in detrended output will move inflation towards its equilibrium level. Hence price 
stability will be restored. Income will be at its equilibrium level, but at a higher level than 
before a cut in interest rate. Eventually, the economy will be in equilibrium48.
In conformity with the conventional wisdom, the model maintains that a supply side 
approach of maintaining price stability by using monetary policy will bring about 
financial development and thereby stimulate economic growth. The importance attached 
to monetary policy is a consequence of past experiences of many African economies in 
the use of monetary policy to stabilise the domestic economy. Historically, the conduct of 
monetary policy has been characterised by excessive growth of money supply, which has 
triggered large, unsustainable government fiscal deficits, accelerating inflation, depleted 
international reserves, and increasing macroeconomic instabilities. In the model nominal 
interest rates and nominal exchange rates are exogenous. Because many central banks in 
the developing countries are not independent from other agencies of government, the role 
of a central bank in promoting price stability is widely undermined in these economies. 
Given the prevalence of price instability in many African economies, real interest rates 
and real exchange rates are not at their long run equilibrium levels. In the real world real 
interest and exchange rates are highly volatile due to significantly external shocks, which 
severely affect these economies.
Other causes of volatility are domestic economic mismanagement and the pursuance of 
unsound macroeconomic policies. For this reason, nominal interest rates and exchange 
rate in this model are exogenously determined. The model therefore, stresses the 
importance of pursuing a policy of inflation targeting in order to promote price stability 
as a development objective in the 21-century. A sound interest rate policy will foster 
price stability and cure exchange rate misalignments. The model does not undermine the 
importance of fiscal policy in stimulating output. However, as evidence shows, this
48 Clearly, the policy of price stability (achieving a low and stable rate of inflation) by reducing the current 
high levels o f nominal interest rates in these African economies will promote economic activities.
66
policy in many African economies has not been very effective and it has been widely 
used in vain in the past. The use of fiscal policy has resulted into excessive taxation of the 
private sector, increasing subsidies to loss making state enterprises. Other consequences 
are huge and unwarranted domestic borrowing by the government, and unproductive and 
high government spending. The conducts of fiscal policy have triggered macroeconomic 
instabilities and tend to undermine the important role the private sector plays in the 
acceleration of the development process.
Given the fact that the model does not rale out the possibility of using the two policies 
simultaneously, the model maintains that fiscal policy should be used only to 
accommodate (support) monetary policy. This is because, in this model, it is argued that 
once price stability is achieved the use of fiscal policy automatically will also be 
effective. Given the administrative and institutional constraints in tax collection, coupled 
with limited domestic and international financing options of governments fiscal deficits 
in these economies, fiscal policy follow monetary policy. These are because most 
government finances are made mostly through money creation. When there is price 
stability, a policy of fiscal restraint to cease the money creation process in order to 
finance the fiscal deficits will reduce the size of the deficit. Eventually fiscal finance will 
improve, thus making the conduct of fiscal policy more potent. A favourable fiscal stance 
is likely to create a conducive climate, which will promote the potency of monetary and 
exchange rate policies.
2,9 Data Period
Given the limited availability of data on African economies, the estimation period is 
1970-96. During this period many African countries witnessed both external and internal 
shocks. The oil price hikes of the 1970s had negative contagion effects on these 
economies. The early 1980s, is characterised by rising world interest rates, world 
economic recession, commodity price drops, capital flight from developing nations, and 
severe drought in Sub-Saharan Africa. The mid-1980s were followed by an increasing 
adoption of stabilisation and structural adjustment programs advocated by the IMF and 
the World Bank in Africa. In the early 1990s, many African economies were exposed to
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the increasing volatility of foreign capital inflows. During this period capital inflows to 
Africa fell, and surges of foreign capital inflows to Latin American and Asian economies 
were observed.
Since the mid-1990s many African economies have faced an increasing debt crisis. Debt 
service payments have consumed a high portion of total export earnings of many African 
economies, and hence mitigated against efforts to accelerate the development process in 
African economies. Economic problems experienced in the early 1980s and 1990s had a 
negative impact on economic revival of many African economies. On the other hand, the 
events of mid-1980s and mid-1990s, in the form of structural adjustment programs and 
debt relief initiatives for highly indebted African economies have played a significant and 
positive role in restoring macroeconomic imbalances and generating economic growth in 
many African economies. Therefore, the period 1970-1996 is unique to African 
economies and central to a better understanding of developmental problems experienced 
in these economies.
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3.1 Testing for Stationarity and Cointegration, and Estimated Results
This chapter presents and analyzes econometric results49 of the macroeconometric model 
developed in chapter 2 (table 2.1).
Testing for Stationarity
Using as an example, the consumption function specified in the model is as follows50.
logC t=po + pi log IRt + p2 DYt + st (1)
where C is the regressand, DY and IR are the regressors. To avoid a spurious regression, 
the Dickey and Fuller (1979), unit root test was utilised to ascertain whether the time 
series are stationary or not. Table 3.1 reports the results of stationarity tests and is self- 
explanatory. To determine the order of integration, the time series were tested first in 
levels and second in first differences of the variable. The results of the stationarity test 
indicate that many variables are nonstationary because the computed tau statistics are less 
than the MacKinnon critical value o f -2.9907. Clearly, the existence of a unit root in the 
white noise error-term is not rejected. The variables denoted I (1) are integrated of order 
1, and were nonstationary in levels, but are stationary in first differences51. By the same 
token, the variables denoted I (0), are stationary.
Testing for Cointegration
To test for cointegration, the Engle-Granger cointegration test (1987) was applied. Based 
on the regression residual obtained from estimating the long run model (1), to test for 
cointegration using the Engle-Granger test, the following regression is estimated.
Avit = vu - 1 + st (2)
49 Table 3.6 and 3.7 presents econometric results.
50 The same methodology was applied in the estimation of all other equations of the model, except the 
growth and inflation equations, which are only long-run equations.
51 Nonstationary variables were made stationary by differencing them once.
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where A is the first difference operator and vu is the regression residual obtained from 
estimating equation (1). From table 3,2, the cointegration test shows that the variables are 
cointegrated. In the presence of non-cointegrated variables, equation (1) will yield a 
spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Given that the variables are 
cointegrated, then the following error correction model is estimated.
A log Ct = Po + Pi Alog IRt + p2 A DYt+ p3 Alog Ct-i + P4 EQ -1 + st (3)
where EQ  is the error correction term and st is a disturbance term. The error correction 
term is calculated as,
EQ  = Q  - Q v = vu (4)
where Q  is the actual value of C in period t and Crf is the fitted value of Q  estimated in 
equation (1). A particular advantage of the error-correction mechanism is that the extent 
of adjustment in a given period to deviations from long-run equilibrium is given by the 
estimated equation without any further calculation (Baneijee, Dolado, Galbraith and 
Hendry, 1994).
The error correction term (EC) is the equilibrium error, and hence, is included in the error 
correction model in order to move the system back toward its long-run equilibrium. The 
coefficient p4 on the error correction term (EQ-i) captures the adjustment toward the 
long-run equilibrium and the other regressors capture the short-run disturbances. Error- 
correction terms were used by Sargan (1964), as a way of capturing adjustments in a 
dependent variable which depend not on the level of some explanatory variable, but on 
the extent to which an explanatory variable deviated from an equilibrium relationship 
with the dependent variable (Baneijee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry, 1994). The 
dynamic version of the long-run relationship of equation (1) is specified as an error 
correction model in equation (3). Therefore, the error correction model utilizes 
information in the error term of the long-nm model to approximate deviations from the
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equilibrium and represent the short-run response necessary to move the system back 
toward its equilibrium.
Estimated Results
Four Southern African countries were estimated (1970-96): Namibia, Mauritius, 
Botswana, and South Africa. Given the endogeneity of some regressors in the model, the 
OLS estimators will be super-consistent but not efficient because of simultaneity. Using 
an instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique, can mitigate the problem of 
simultaneous equation bias in the model. Therefore, the Instrument Variable method was 
used to estimate the long run model and an error correction model. In the estimation, the 
exogenous variables were used as valid instruments.
A number of diagnostic tests to validate the results were used and the results of the error 
correction model are presented in table 3.3. These tests are the Ramsey’ Reset test (1969) 
for misspecification, Xff(l); the Bera and Jarque normality test (1980) for the normality 
of the residuals, %n(2); and the heteroscedasticity test, xii(l)- The F-statistic test for joint 
significance of regressors was employed. The selection criteria, such as, the Akaike 
Information Criterion, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, and Hannan-Quinn Criterion were 
used to select the order of DF/ADF. The DF and ADF are the orders of the Dickey-Fuller 
and Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Except 
real interest rates, all the variables are expressed in logarithms.
At 21 and 23 degrees of freedom, the critical t-statistics at 10% significance level, are 
1.721 and 1.714, respectively. At 2 degrees of freedom, the critical value of the x2 test at 
10% significance level is 13.816. Based on diagnostic tests, the estimated models have 
the correct functional forms, the disturbance terms are homoscedastic and not 
autocorrelated, and the residuals are normally distributed. At 5% significance level, the 
critical F-statistics at 4 and 21 degrees of freedom is 2.84. The computed F-statistics are 
significant in all estimated equations (except money demand equation for Namibia), 
suggesting that the estimated coefficients are jointly significant. However, the computed 
F-statistics axe low, which is attributed to the problem of insufficient degrees of freedom.
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Table 3.1 Results of Stationarity Tests
Countries Variable 
Name 
in levels
Test statistic, 
ADF(l)
Variable Name 
in first difference
Test
statistic,
ADF(l)
Order of 
integration
Namibia log C -5.3145 AlogC -4.0600 1(0)
log DY -3.3869 A log DY -3.9211 1(0)
IR -3.0616 A IR -3.6834 1(0)
log I -1.6148 A log I -9.1307 1(1)
log Y -3.3200 A logY -3.0009 1(1)
log E -1.3586 A log E -4.0538 1(1)
log FY -5.3653 A log FY -3.8815 1(0)
log DP -0.4104 A log DP -3.4990 1(1)
logMD -2.5154 A log MD -3.0768 1(1)
log NIR -1.4163 A log NIR -3.4917 1(1)
logX -3.5170 A logX -4.6631 1(0)
log M -1.4302 A logM -4.3518 1(1)
log EM -0.0197 A log EM -3.5017 1(1)
log W -2.1802 A log W -3.0506 1(1)
Y ct -1.0725 A R L Y 1(1)
South
Africa
logC -0.3651 AlogC -4.4139 1(1)
log DY -0.2882 A log DY -5.3808 1(1)
IR -2.5258 A IR -4.4197 1(1)
log I -1.7623 A log I -4.6442 1(1)
log Y -0.6180 A logY -5.7811 1(1)
log E -3.1614 A log E -4.5670 1(0)
log FY -5.3653 A log FY -3.8815 1(0)
log DP -1.2702 A log DP -3.1556 1(1)
logMD -1.2772 A log MD -3.1635 1(1)
log NIR -1.9588 A log NIR -3.4039 1(1)
log X -4.0745 A logX -5.5026 1(0)
logM -3.2556 AIogM -3.1334 1(0)
log EM -0.4544 A log EM -4.3224 1(1)
log W -1.2662 A log W -4.3463 1(1)
Yd -3.4091 A R L Y 1(0)
M auritius logC -0.5811 A logC -3.0822 1(1)
log DY -0.4142 A log DY -4.7701 1(1)
IR -2.1049 A IR -6.9938 1(1)
log I -4.8283 A log I -4.9176 1(0)
log Y -0.5079 A logY -4.5259 1(1)
log E -2.5066 A log E -4.4136 1(1)
logFY -5.5975 A log FY -3.8815 1(0)
log DP -2.7553 A log DP -3.8217 1(1)
log MD -1.9242 A log MD -3.7596 1(1)
log NIR -1.3915 A log NIR -3.4975 1(1)
log X -0.7504 A logX -4.1622 1(1)
logM -1.6973 A logM -4.5160 1(1)
log EM -1.1313 A log EM -3.9589 1(1)
log W -0.7383 A log W -4.3550 1(1)
Yct -3.7970 A R LY 1(0)
Notes: The Akaike Information Criterion, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and Hannan-Quinn Criterion were 
used to select the order of the Dickey-Fuller Statistics. The Dickey-Fuller statistic at 5% significance level 
(as computed by MacKinnon, 1991) is -2.9907.
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Table 3.1 Results of Stationarity Tests Continued
Countries Variable 
Name 
in levels
Test statistic, 
ADF(l)
Variable Name 
in first 
difference
Test statistic, 
ADF(l)
O rder of 
integration
Botswana log C -2.0315 A logC -3.3380 i(i)
log DY -2.5175 A log DY -3.9919 KD
IR -4.1015 A IR -6.2742 1(0)
log I -1.4844 A log I -4.3120 KD
log Y -3.4005 A logY -3.6167 1(0)
log E -2.2976 A log E -4.3736 i(i)
logFY -5.5975 A log FY -3.8815 1(0)
log DP -0.0663 A log DP -4.8124 1(1)
log MD -1.2840 A log MD -3.4330 1(1)
log NIR -2.4458 A log NIR -4.1629 1(1)
logX -1.2611 A log X -3.3964 1(1)
logM -0.7631 A log M -3.5185 1(1)
Y ct -1.7247 A R LY 1(1)
log EM -0.1748 A log EM -3.8434 1(1)
log W -2.6794 Alog W -4.9164 1(1)
Table 3.2 Results of Cointegration Tests
Functions of the 
Model
Namibia Botswana M auritius South Africa
Consumption -5.212 -4.333 -4.296 -5.055
Investment -4.156 -6.216 -4.291 -4.319
Exports -4.245 -9.279 -5.689 -8.948
Imports -7.317 -4.130 -3.596 -5.265
Money Demand -0.676 -4.122 -4.215 -4.972
Employment -6.236 -5.251 -5.597 -4.932
The Dickey-Fuller Statistic (as computed by MacKinnon, 1991) of ADF(l) is -4.1142. Engle, R.F. and 
Yoo, .S (1987), report critical values (5%) for cointegration tests for 50 observations and 3 variables of 
-4.11 (DF) and-3.75 (ADF). For 2 variables, the critical values are-3.67 (DF) and-3.29 (ADF).
Table 3.3 Results of the Diagnostic Tests of the Error Correction Model
Functions of the 
Model
Test
Description
Namibia Botswana Mauritius South Africa
Consumption F-statistic 4.67 6.01 4.97 13.94
Xafl) 2.45 1.29 0.07 1.15
Xn(2) 0.69 2.63 2.06 0.38
Xi.O) 3.78 4.13 0.17 1.07
DW Statistic 1.92 2.67 2.73 1.05
Investment F-statistic 5.97 5.26 6.95 8.65
XnO) 1.64 0.18 3.84 0.04
Xn(2) 6.50 1.82 6.71 1.08
Xh(l) 8.04 0.15 2.24 0.38
DW Statistic 2.74 2.87 1.51 2.43
Exports F-statistic 4.76 5.08 4.69 8.11
. IP 0.12 1.54 4.67 1.190.16 0.42 2.01 4.06
M'l) ___ 2.27 0.71 0.09 0.01
DW Statistic 2.62 1.94 2.41 2.33
Imports F-statistic 4.58 6.12 5.63 5.32
Xfid) 1.01 0.83 0.93 1.24
Xn(2) 0.35 0.91 0.99 4.66
Xh(l) 0.49 6.07 0.61 4.51
DW Statistic 2.36 2.22 2.63 2.35
Money Demand F-statistic 0.62 5.12 2.98 8.39
XnO) 1.11 0.95 0.18 0.39
Xn(2) 0.69 1.08 0.96 2.16
Xh(l) 3.71 1.42 7.19 0.27
DW Statistic 1.83 3.07 3.22 1.47
Employment F-statistic 5.12 4.89 5.81 4.95
zi'idi 2.40 4.02 5.02 3.73
‘ 2................. 1.82 0.85 0.79 0.08
Xud) 7.70 0.08 0.14 0.69
DW Statistic 2.35 1.11 1.18 1.04
Notes: Xfr(l) is a raisspecification test, %n(2) is a normality test, and XhO) is a heteroscedasticity test.
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Table 3.4 Results of Contemporaneous Correlation Tests of the SUR Model
Functions/
Countries
Values of 
system log- 
likelihood
Values of
equations
log-
likelihood
Values of
equations
log-
likelihood
Values of
equations
log-
likelihood
Values of
equations
log-
likelihood
Computed
x2
Namibia Botswana Maiuitius South
Africa
Consumption 137.72 18.10 29.31 25.67 62.99 3.30
Investment 119.53 29.07 21.89 7.81 42.06 37.40
Exports 141.16 59.03 5.42 9.71 48.51 36.98
Imports 99.88 31.22 18.51 15.67 25.98 17.00
Money Demand 99.15 6.61 14.82 17.41 46.32 27.98
Inflation 138.64 32.72 25.63 24.71 50.37 10.42
Natural output 138.67 15.47 13.98 31.70 58.79 37.46
Employment 71.54 4.15 8.18 17.24 22.63 38.68
SUR is the seemingly unrelated regression model.
Table 3.5 Results of Poolability Tests of the Panel Data Model
Functions of the Model RSS
(UM)
RSS
(RM)
Computed F-statistic
Consumption 0.7842 1.3284 7.05
Investment 1.3691 3.1287 13.18
Exports 2.1488 7.6773 26.27
Imports 1.3696 2.5859 9.10
Money demand 2.0455 3.4972 7.26
Inflation 5.3379 25.722 39.04
Natural output 1.2346 5.7907 37.71
Employment 3.1807 7.0343 12.37
Notes: RSS (UM) refers to residual sum of squares of unrestricted model given by equation 5. RSS (RM) 
refers to residual sum of squares of restricted model given by equation 6.
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While recognising the suitability of the Instrumental Variable (IV) to estimate a 
simultaneous-equation model, the TV estimation method (as well as the 3 Stage Least 
Squares method) has an advantage of taking into account the simultaneity in the model52. 
However, it does not tell us whether the disturbances across countries are correlated or 
not. To model both individual country effects and contagion effects (i.e., taking into 
account the correlation of disturbances across countries) the relevant method is the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. Therefore the SUR method was applied 
in order to provide vital information on whether individual country’s shocks are 
transmitted to other countries or not. The test for contemporaneous correlation was 
implemented as follows.
The hypothesis being tested is that 
Ho : CJ{2 ~  O i3 =  (T23 =  rt i4  =  (J24 = 0 3 4 =  0 
Against
At least one of cry is not equal 0, i < j
ay refers to contemporaneous covariance between the shocks in the estimated equations 
of the model of countries 1 to 4. To test the above hypothesis, the following log- 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is computed.
LR (H0/ Hi) = 2(LLu -  LLR)
Where LLu and LLR are the maximised values of the log-likelihood function under Hi 
(the unrestricted model) and under Ho (the restricted model), respectively. The restricted 
model refers to the estimated results obtained using the OLS method and the unrestricted 
model refers to the estimated results based on the SUR method. LLu is the value of the
‘system log-likelihood’; and LLR is the sum of equations log-likehood values of the
3.2 Testing for Contemporaneous Correlation
52 Given this shortcoming in IV estimation method, the computed system log-likelihood and equations log 
likelihood based on the application of the SUR and OLS methods, respectively, were used in the test for 
contemporaneous correlation.
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estimated equations for the 4 countries, respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis that 
there is no contemporaneous correlation between the countries was tested and the results 
are presented in table 3.4. The log-likelihood ratio (LR) close to zero indicates that the 
restrictions are invalid whereas a value greater than 0, indicates that the restrictions are 
valid.
The 95 percent critical value of the %2 distribution with 6 degrees of freedom is 12.59. 
The computed %2 statistics are greater than the critical x2 value. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that there is no contemporaneous correlation between the countries is rejected. 
The conclusion is that there is contemporaneous correlation of disturbances between the 
four countries. Therefore, the results do not reject the notion of contagion effects across 
countries. However, it rejects contagion effects of consumption and inflation across 
countries only. The results have important implications for the great need of 
macroeconomic policy co-ordination among these countries. Clearly, econometric results 
show that these economies are highly interdependent. For example, investment decisions 
in one country are significantly affected by investors' behaviour in the other countries.
Available evidence suggests that Namibia and Botswana face imitation lag and therefore 
tend to imitate most of infrastructure and superstructure from South Africa. On the other 
hand, most of imports from abroad to the region are imported via South Africa, and then 
re-exported to Namibia and Botswana. An increasing financial deepening and widening 
of the financial sector, witnessed in the region in the recent years, was due to bureaucratic 
expertise exported mainly from South Africa. This is because South Africa is the 
cosmopolitan city in the region and most of commercial banks in individual countries 
have their headquarters situated in South Africa. These results are clearly in favour of the 
current negotiations and dialogues in Southern Africa aimed at fostering economic 
integration in the region. These findings appear to suggest that policymakers in the region 
should have macroeconomic policy co-ordination at the forefront of policy discussions. 
In the face of rapid integration of world economies and emerging trade blocks in the 
developed world, these countries cannot function successfully in the global economy
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without co-ordinating economic policies across countries, and hence economic 
integration in the region is inevitable53.
3.3 Testing for Poolability
The test for poolability is the test of whether pooling is justified or not. To test for 
poolability, the panel data model,
y it = W itP  + dj + Vit 
(only intercepts are different)
is tested against the general model
yit= w it Pi + di + vit 
(all coefficients different)
where all the parameters Pi differ between countries. The null hypothesis that pooling is 
justified is given by
H0: pi = P, i=l, ...,n
and imposes (n-l)k restrictions on the fixed effects model. Assuming that v ~ N  (0, Int), 
the following F-statistic is used to test whether pooling is justified or not. The number of 
estimated parameters is given by k, n is the number of slope coefficients, T is the number 
of pooled observations. Since there are four countries to be pooled for the period 1970 to 
1996, it follows that n = 4, T = 26, and k = 3.
SSRr - SSRu n{T- k)
F((n-l)k, n(T-k))
SSRu (« -l)k
53 The Euro launched in 1999 is a clear signal that Western Europe is becoming more integrated than in the
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where SSRU is the sum of squared residual from estimation of the unrestricted (general) 
model and SSRr is the sum of squared residuals from the restricted (panel data) model. 
Using the consumption function as an example, the unrestricted model is specified as 
follows:
log Q  = po + Pi IRi + P2 log DYj + p3 dj + P4 d2 + Ps d3 + p<> dilRj + P7 d2lRi + p8 dsIRj 
+ PqdiDYj + piod2DYi + Pn dsDYj + vi (5)
where di, d2 and d3 are country specific intercept terms.
The restricted model is of the following form.
log Cj = po + PiIRi + P2 log DYj + P3 di + P4d2+ Psd3 + vn (6)
The null hypothesis is that P6 ~ P7 — . * - — Pu = 0
Against the alternative hypothesis that p3 is not equal 0 or p4 is not equal 0, etc.
The results of the poolability test are reported in table 3.5. At 5% significance level, the 
critical F value at 9 and 92 degrees of freedom is 2.04. For all equations, apart from 
inflation equation54, the computed F-statistics are greater than the critical F-statistic. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that pooling is justified. The conclusion is that 
pooling is not justified. The findings that pooling is not justified have important 
implications that all intercept terms are not the same. It means that these countries are 
different and therefore the long-run models are different for different countries. It 
implies that intercept terms varied across countries and country specific effects are 
important. These findings suggest that the behaviour of economic agents differ 
significantly across countries. From a policy perspective, it means those policies in these
past.
54 Pooling for the inflation equation is justified, because inflation is imported across countries, which is 
consistent with evidence on these economies.
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Table 3.6 Estimated Results of the Long Run Model
Countries/
Functions
Namibia Mauritius Botswana South Africa
Consumption
Constant 0.36 -0.11 1.40 3.93
(0.29) (0.78) (0.17) (0.32)
Disposable income 0.94* 0.98* 0.74* 0.64*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Real interest rate -0.06 0.48* -0.27 0.15
(0.61) (0.25) (0.23) (0.10)
GR'2 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.97
Investment
Constant 1.23 -3.81 1.15 -7.53
(0.38) (1.73) (0.24) (0.68)
Income 0.70* 1.24* 0.73* 1.51*
(0.04) MM6> (0.02) (0.05)
Real interest rate -0.47 -0.17 -0.06 -0.61*
(0.43) (0.55) (0.30) (0.22)
GR*2 0.95 0.82 0.96 0.97
Exports
Constant 4.30 1.81 -10.82 5.49
(0.22) (1.09) (1.01) (0.23)
Foreign income 0.34* 0.74* 1.71* 0.53*
(0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02)
Exchange rate 0.10* 0.01 0.08 0.01
(0.02) (0.26) (0.22) (0.06)
GR’2 0.98 0.78 0.93 0.96
Imports
Constant 4.15 -1.70 1.45 -1.43
(0.47) (0.97) (0.26) (0.97)
Income 0.47* 1.21* 0.75* 1.01*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Exchange rate -0.09 -0.39* -0.01 -0.11
(0.09) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11)
GR'2 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.88
Monev Demand
Constant -0.76 -6.37 -1.32 2.53
(1.56) (3.55) (0.57) (0.62)
Income 0.89* 1.54* 0.96* 0.73*
(0.15) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04)
Nominal interest rate -0.11 -0.06 -0.19* -0.03*
(0.14) (0.24) (0.10) (0.02)
GR’2 0.82 0.96 0.96 0.96
Inflation
Constant 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Detrended output -0.61 -0.55 0.09 0.26
(0.36) <0.4® (0.36) (0.42)
Detrended output 0.61 0.54 -0.19 -0.09
(lagged one period) (0.33) (0.28) (0.31) (0.26)
GR'2 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.22
Natural Outout
Constant 7.42 9.58 6.53 12.05
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01)
Time 0.06* 0.04* 0.10* 0.03*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
G R 2 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.99
Employment
Constant -4.37 -9.31 -0.31 -11.42
. ..... (2.31) (0.56) (1.19)
Income 1.35* 1.52* 0.81* 1.89*
(0.12) (0.26) (0.04) (0.16)
Real wage rate -1.58* -0.31* -0.89* -1.48*
(0.45) (0.13) (0.23) (0.63)
GR'2 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.93
Notes: The * refers to significance of estimated coefficients and standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 3.7 Estimated Results of the Error Correction Model
Estimated Functions Countries Regressors Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Errors GR'2
Consumption Namibia Constant 0.02 0.03
A D Y 0.43* 0.21
A IR(-1) -0.62 0.61
A C(-3) 0.24* 0.06
V  t(-l) -0.40 0.31 0.36
Mauritius Constant 0.02* 0.01
ADY 0.38* 0.12
A IR(-U 0.31 0.49
ACC-1) 0.16 0.26
V ,(-I) -0.04* 0.02 0.33
Botswana Constant 0.03 0.06
A DY(-2) 0.08 0.65
A IR(-l) 0.60* 0.26
A C (-l) 0.40 0.55
V ,(- l) -0.50 0.72 0.29
South Africa Constant 0.01 0.01
A D Y 0.34* 0.09
A IR 0.21* 0.09
A C (- l) 0.13 0.29
v.(-i) -0.84* 0.24 0.43
Investment Namibia Constant 0.01 0.02
AY(-1) 0.11 0.48
A IR 0.09* 0.05
A I(-l) 0.78* 0.42
V 2(- l) -0.07 0.26 0.25
Mauritius Constant 0.08* 0.04
A Y ( - l ) -0.07 0.55
A IR 0.34 0.49
A K-l) -0.09 0.35
V2(-l) -0.49* 0.21 0.21
Botswana Constant 0.02 0.04
A Y 0.40* 0.20
AIRf-1) -0.15 0.34
A K_ > 0.05 0.42
V2(-l) -0.04* 0.01 0.32
South Africa Constant 0.08 0.05
AY(-2) 0.10 1.15
A IR(-1) -1.30* 0.38
A K-l) -0.73* 0.29
v2(-l) -0.67 0.50 0.41
Notes: The change in the variable is denoted by A, DY is real disposable income, IR is real 
interest rate, I is real investment, Y is real domestic income, and Vi is the error term.
The * refers to significance of estimated coefficients.
Table 3.7 Estimated Results of the Error Correction Model Continue
Estimated
Functions
Countries Regressors Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Errors G R 2
Exports Namibia Constant 0.01 0.01
AFY(-2) 0.10 0.13
A E 0.06* 0.03
A X (- l) 0.22* 0.08
Va(-l) -0.14 0.31 0.26
Mauritius Constant 0.05* 0.02
AFY -0.37 0.29
AE(-l) -0.30 0.25
A X (-l) 0.16* 0.06
v3(-i) -0.02 0.11 0.29
Botswana Constant 0.08* 0.03
AFY 0.05 0.30
A E -0.22 0.15
A X(-2) 0.03 0.29
V3(-l) -0.31* 0.12 0.55
South Africa Constant 0.01 0.04
AFY 0.03* 0.01
A E 0.03 0.10
A X(-2) 0.45* 0.09
v3(-i) -0.84 0.52 0.24
Imports Namibia Constant 0.02 0.02
A Y (- l) 0.04 0.39
A E(-l) -0.27* 0.13
A M(-2) 0.28 0.45
V4(-l) -0.33 0.26 0.29
Mauritius Constant 0.03 0.04
A Y (- l) 0.11 0.30
A E -0.14* 0.07
A M (-l) 0.34* 0.14
V4(-l) -0.11 0.17 0.24
Botswana Constant 0.02 0.01
A Y 0.02 0.21
A E (- l) -0.03 0.12
A M(-l) 0.57* 0.28
V4(-l) -0.22* 0.12 0.37
South Africa Constant 0.01 0.02
A Y 0.44* 0.18
A E -0.03 0.10
A M(-2) 0.36* 0.18
v4(-i) -0.22 0.18 0.26
Notes: FY is real foreign income, E is real exchange rate rate, X is real exports, Y is real 
domestic income, M is real imports, and Vj is the error term. The * refers to significance 
of estimated coefficients.
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Table 3.7 Estimated Results of the Error Correction Model Continue
Estimated
Functions
Countries Regressors Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Errors G R 2
Money demand Namibia Constant 0.11* 0.02
A Y -0.44 0.26
A NIR 0.01 0.05
A MD(-2) -0.18 0.14
Vs(-1) 0.21* 0.08 0.35
Mauritius Constant 0.01 0.05
A Y 0.30* 0.16
A NIR -0.04 0.30
A MD(-l) 0.62* 0.27
Vs(-l) -0.19 0.18 0.21
Botswana Constant 0.02* 0.01
A Y 0.37 0.48
A NIR -0.06 0.22
A MD(-l) 0.28* 0.15
Vs(-1) -0.08 0.24 0.19
South Africa Constant 0.02* 0.01
A Y 0.03 0.35
A NIR -0.05* 0.02
A MD(-2) 0.29 0.27
Vs(-1) -0.62* 0.29 0.43
Employment Namibia Constant 0.04 0.08
A Y(-2) 0.02* 0.01
AW -0.52 1.01
A EM(-l) 0.53* 0.18
V .(- l) -0.02 0.14 0.24
Mauritius Constant 0.03 0.04
A Y 0.33* 0.06
AW -0.23 0.21
A EM(-2) 0.62 0.56
V»(-l) -0.02 0.43 0.38
Botswana Constant 0.01 0.07
A Y 0.14* 0.06
A W(-l) -0.25 0.47
A EM (-l) 0.79* 0.41
V ,(- l) -0.11 0.24 0.34
South Africa Constant 0.01 0.02
A Y 0.17* 0.04
AW -0.38 0.48
A EM(-l) 0.61 0.44
Vs(-l) -0.12* 0.03 0.24
Notes: Y is real domestic income, MD is real money balances, NIR is nominal interest rate, 
EM is real employment, W is real wage rate, and Vj is the error term. The * refers to 
significance of estimated coefficients.
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countries should be country specific and should reflect institutional structure of the 
economy in question, and should not be generalised across countries55.
3.4 Consumption Function Results
From table 3.6, for all sample countries, the estimated coefficients associated with 
disposable income are correctly signed and significant. The coefficient of the disposable 
income variable measures the marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Economic theory 
postulates that the MPC lie between zero and one. Evidence based on marginal 
propensities to consume obtained for all the countries is completely in conformity with 
the theory. For the four economies, changes in interest rate are inelastic, which shows 
that inelasticity of consumption to interest rate changes is a distinctive feature of these 
economies. The coefficient of interest rate has correct sign for Botswana and Namibia, 
but not significant. The findings that no sensible and significant relationship of real 
interest rate and real consumption is evident, is consistent with Keynes’s conjecture that 
consumption depends primarily on income and not on the interest rate.
Consistently with these results, a negative interest rate effects on consumption in ten of 
twelve Latin American countries is reported by McDonald (1983), and has been 
confirmed on six African countries by Leite and Makonen (1986). In contrast to a priori 
theoretical expectations, interest rate has unexpected sign for South Africa, but is not 
significantly different from zero56. On the other hand, positive and significant interest rate 
effects on consumption are evident in Mauritius.
In line with evidence, countries with high mean consumption (% of GDP) over the period 
1980-1996 have both the highest estimated marginal propensities to consume. Annual
55 Table 3.6 presents the econometr ic results of the long- run model and the results of the error correction 
model are given in table 3.7.
56 According to Sachs and Larrain (1993), the effect of the interest rate on saving and consumption is 
unclear both theoretically and empirically. A higher interest rate increases the present price of consumption 
relative to the future (the substitution effect), and thus provides an incentive to increase saving. However, if  
the household is a net lender, the interest rate rise also raises lifetime income, and thus tends to increase 
consumption and decrease saving (the income effect). The substitution effect is usually assumed to be 
stronger than the income effect, and therefore saving responds positively to a rise in the interest rate. Some 
empirical evidence has supported this, but the results are for the most part inconclusive. In studies by Fair 
(1987) interest rate was significant and rightly signed in one country out of seven developing countries.
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average consumption of 64% in Botswana, 74% in South Africa, 78% in Mauritius, and 
84% in Namibia, is consistent with estimated MPC’s obtained for these economies. 
Botswana and South Africa are the low consumption economies and have the low 
marginal propensity to consume. Similarly, Namibia and Mauritius are high consumption 
economies and have high marginal propensity to consume. Clearly, a contributing factor 
to a relatively low saving rate of 18% in Namibia and 21% in Mauritius has been partly 
caused by the high MPC’s evident in these economies. By the same token, Botswana and 
South Africa display a higher savings rate of 35% and 25%, respectively.
Despite the similar features of the Botswana and Namibian economies, such as, the same 
level of national income, exports of agricultural products and diamonds, similar 
population size, little inflation and interest rates differentials and harmonised taxes; there 
is a notable difference in their marginal propensities57. This is because Botswana, as a 
conservative country live below its means, which has triggered high savings in this 
African tiger economy. On the other hand, Namibia is enjoying luxury consumption and 
live beyond its means, which is increasing dissavings in the former South African colony. 
The evidence here is not definitive, but suggest that countries with same level of income 
coupled with similar tax regimes (and identical population size) are likely to witness 
much dissimilar marginal propensities to consume, in particular when one country is 
savings and the other is dissaving.
3.5 Investment Function Results
All coefficients estimate have theoretically expected signs. In theory it is expected that 
the lower the marginal propensity to consume, the higher the marginal propensity to 
invest (MPI). The marginal propensities to invest in South Africa and Mauritius are unit- 
elastic, which suggest that the level of new investment will be a multiple greater than one 
of the change in income. Importantly, the taxation effect on investors cannot be ignored 
when explaining the marginal propensities to invest. As evidence shows, taxes (% of
In 1996, population size stood at 1.50 and 1.58 millions in Botswana and Namibia, respectively.57
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GDP) have annually averaged 27% in Namibia, 26% in Botswana, 23% in South Africa 
and 19.1% in Mauritius. The unit elasticity of income with respect to investment implies 
that due to low tax burden in these economies a rise in income by the same percentage 
change will produce a greater impact on investment in Mauritius and South Africa, but 
less in Namibia and Botswana.
It appears that the high tax burden on investment activities have triggered low MPI in 
Namibia and Botswana, thus explaining the high MPI obtained for South Africa (1.51) 
and Mauritius (1.24). These findings strongly show that a favourable taxation climate in 
Mauritius and South Africa has induced a higher demand for investment. Another 
explanation of these high marginal propensities to invest is as a result of strategic 
positions of South Africa and Mauritius. The latter economies enjoy massive foreign 
capital inflows and have well developed economic infrastructure and high quality 
superstructure, than Namibia and Botswana. It is well documented that foreign capital 
inflows (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Gupta and Islam, 1983; Khan and Haque, 1985) 
contribute positively to investment in developing countries by removing the domestic 
savings gaps or foreign exchange constraints. Huge foreign capital inflows in South 
Africa and Mauritius used to support domestic investment, explains also the high 
marginal propensity to investment obtained in these economies.
The effect of a rise in interest rate on investment is not significant in all countries, except 
South Africa. The significance of interest rate for South Africa is attributed to the high 
degree of financial intermediation (M2 as % GDP) in this powerful African economy58. 
There is a growing empirical support that a high degree of financial intermediation 
mobilises domestic savings to finance investment and increase the efficiency of 
investment (Gurley and Shaw, 1956; Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Patrick, 1966; 
Kitchen, 1993, King and Levine, 1992a). Evidence reveal that the degree of financial 
intermediation has annually averaged 57.1% in Mauritius, 56% in South Africa, 26.9% in
58 If financial intermediation fails to mobilise domestic savings, due to financial repression, absence of 
capital mobility, political instabilities, mismanagement of economies and bad economic policies in 
developing countries, this can lead to an increasing dependence of developing count ies on foreign capital
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Botswana, and 21% in Namibia. Furthermore, the level of financial deepening and 
widening in South Africa is much higher than in the remaining economies.
Therefore, the significance of an interest rate effect on investment in South Africa is 
associated with the strong industrial base and a sophisticated financial sector, coupled 
with a variety of financial services and increasing availability of financial information to 
investors. This is because the rapidly expanding industrial sector in South Africa uses 
domestic finance, which promote financial activities in the domestic financial sector. The 
interest rate effect on investment in Mauritius is not significant because this country has 
pursued policies of interest rate control in the early 1970s, and has not yet liberalised its 
financial system like South Africa. In addition, Mauritius faces high degree of exchange 
rate risk and the prevalence of high interest rates is not an incentive to potential investors 
to participate in the money and capital markets59.
The findings conclusively confirmed that income is a major determinant of investment in 
these economies meaning that high levels of incomes are transformed into high 
investment spending. Consistently, with this evidence, Kuznets (1973) has empirically 
confirmed the strong association between investment and long-term growth performance. 
Measuring income in millions, the estimated regression says that, holding other things 
constant, for every 1 million increase in income, investment will increase by 1 249,200 
million in Mauritius; 1 518,100 in South Africa, 700 050 thousands in Namibia and 738 
670 thousands in Botswana.
The findings that interest rate has no effect on investment is interesting. It suggests that a 
lower interest rate in all countries (except South Africa) will not significantly reduce the 
cost of capital to firms that invest in plant and equipment (business fixed investment); 
reduce the cost of borrowing to homebuyers (residential investment) and reduce the cost 
of holding inventories (inventory investment). This result support earlier studies by
inflows as the means of financing domestic investment. Alternatively, if such foreign capital inflows are 
not forthcoming, there may be shortage of funds to finance investment.
59 In 1996, the nominal interest rate stood at 20.8% in Mauritius, 18.1% in Namibia, 15% in South Africa 
and 14.5% in Botswana. The nominal exchange rate against the US dollar in 1996, was 17.9 (Mauritius), 
4.68 (South Africa), and 3.64 (Botswana).
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Keynesian structuralist, Van Wijnbergen (1983), Taylor (1983), and Dutt (1990) that 
interest rate in developing countries does not influence investment.
Surprisingly, the interest rate effects on investment in Botswana and Namibia are not 
significant. Given the fact that Botswana and Namibia have neither pursued policies of 
financial repression nor credit rationing in the past, the insignificance of interest rate in 
the present study may be explained by a number of factors. First, these economies are 
dominated by the mining sector, and most of these are foreign owned. Domestic interest 
rates are not a significant consideration for these companies, which can borrow on 
international money markets. Mining is also a long-term undertaking with probably little 
sensitivity of investments to short-term movements in interest rates. Second, investments 
in commercial agriculture were shielded from interest rate movements by high subsidies. 
Thus, huge investments by foreign companies in the mining and agricultural sectors are 
made with little consideration of the domestic interest rate.
Third, local investors in these economies are receivers of government subsidies and 
therefore movements in interest rates do not exert much influence on the behaviour of 
local investors. Unlike in the other countries, Botswana is blessed with increasing 
government subsidies to fanners, small-scale industries, and subsidised health and 
educational seivices, which has in recent years made local investors to be less sensitive to 
movements in interest rates.
As the results show, the estimated income elasticity with respect to investment is 
significant for all the countries. These results support the accelerator model of 
investment, which maintained that income is a major determinant of investment. In the 
absolute convergence hypothesis, poor countries are expected to grow faster than richer 
countries. Econometric evidence appears to suggest that a rise in income exerts little 
influence on investment in a relatively fast growing economies (Botswana and Namibia) 
while the impact of a rise in income on investment is greater in slow growing economies 
(Mauritius and South Africa). Thus, the income elasticity of investment in Botswana is 
lower than in Mauritius, because Botswana is a relatively richer country. Botswana
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displays a relatively higher investment (% of GDP) and if we assume that investment in 
Botswana has reached its optimal and potential level, then the low elasticity of income 
with respect to investment is well explained. Based on cross-country evidence, 
investment as a percentage of GDP, has averaged 28.3% in Botswana, 25.9% in 
Mauritius, 21.4% in South Africa, and 19.7% in Namibia.
Previous empirical work on developing countries has provided little evidence to confirm 
that real interest rates exert significant influences on real investment. This is because of 
institutional characteristics of developing economies, which differs significantly from 
those of developed economies. In classical theory, it is assumed that if a firm is willing to 
pay the cost of capital, the financial markets will ensure the availability of funds. To raise 
funds in financial markets a firm has to obtain loans from banks, or sell bonds to the 
public, or sell shares in future profits on the stock market. When films in these African 
economies, are unable to raise funds in financial markets, the existence of financing 
constraints can prevent firms form undertaking profitable investments.
Given the underdeveloped nature of financial markets, firm faces financing constraints in 
these economies. It implies that investments to fund new capital goods are financed by 
current earnings only. It follows that, as a result of financing constraints, firms determine 
their investment on the basis of their current cash flow rather than expected profitability, 
which explain the significance of real income as a major determinant of investment in 
these economies. Faced with financing constraints investment decisions are based on 
current income and not changes in the rate of interest, which explain the insignificant of 
real interest rate on investment in Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius. Importantly and as 
theoretically expected, in all the sample countries, investment spending is inversely 
related to the real interest rate.
3.6 Exports Function Results
As econometric results reveal, all estimated coefficients have correct signs. As expected, 
econometric evidence confirmed an overwhelmingly statistically significant relationship 
between foreign income and exports in all countries. Following an increase in foreign
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income, the estimated export function exhibit an increasing returns to scale in Botswana 
only. These results contradict the conventional hypothesis that rapid technological 
progress in the developed world has reduced foreign exports’ demand in the developing 
world. The unit elastic of foreign income with respect to exports is consistent with the 
level of export concentration of this economy. Botswana is a high quality diamond 
exporter, which historically tend to face high elasticity of foreign demand, and the high 
elasticity associated with foreign income is consistent with the level of export 
concentration in this economy.
All coefficient estimates are of expected signs. Clearly and as theoretically expected, 
foreign income is a major determinant of exports in these African economies suggesting 
that if foreign income is not forthcoming the growth in exports will be constrained. The 
significance of foreign income shows that in times of economic slowdown in the 
industrialised economies, export contraction in these African economies is inevitable. As 
the results indicate, it has been well observed that severe recession in the industrialised 
economies has a negative impact of growth performance in the developing world. The 
relatively lower elasticity of foreign income obtained for Namibia and South Africa can 
be attributed to economic sanctions and trade embargoes applied against these economies 
by the international community in the past, which had inflicted a negative impact on the 
expansion of their exports in international markets60. These trade embargoes and 
sanctions explains why these two economies display similar foreign income elasticities of 
0.34 (Namibia) and 0.53 (South Africa), and thus, why these economies have enjoyed 
less foreign demand for their exports, than Botswana and Mauritius.
Estimated results indicate that exchange rate depreciation has significantly failed to boost 
exports in the sample countries, except Namibia. The exchange rate depreciation effect is 
significant in Namibia, blit not in the other economies. Available evidence confirms that 
exchange rate depreciation in nominal terms of the Mauritius Rupee, Namibia Dollar and 
Botswana Pula and South African Rand against the US Dollar per annum was 14%, 2.5% 
and 2%, respectively, during the period 1980-97. Botswana has a stronger currency and
60 Namibia was a colony of South Africa, until independence in 1990.
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its exchange rate depreciation effect (although insignificant) is relatively higher than in 
economies with weaker currencies. These findings indicate that the depreciation of the 
exchange rate exerts much greater effect on exports in the economy with a relatively 
stronger currency. These results were as expected. It was expected that foreign demand 
for hard a currency will exceed the demand for a soft currency (i.e., the Mamitius 
Rupee), and consequently exchange rate depreciation will significantly boost exports in 
Botswana. Similarly, it was expected that exchange rate depreciation will not be 
significant in Namibia, because the Namibia dollar is pegged to the South African rand.
The insignificance of the exchange rate is attributed to the dominance of mineral exports 
in these economies. Exchange rate depreciation to expand exports has been constrained 
by the lack of export diversification in these economies. These results are not surprising, 
and are consistent with evidence in the management of exchange rate policies in 
developing countries. It is a well-established fact that policymakers in developing 
countries typically face difficulties when using the exchange rate as a policy instrument. 
This is because many countries have historically adopted fixed exchange rate policies and 
in many instances, real exchange rates have tended to be overvalued. In contrast to the 
major industrial countries, the vast majority of developing countries have not adopted 
flexible exchange rates.
3.7 Imports Function Results
Based on econometric evidence, all estimates are correctly signed. The regression results 
indicate that the marginal propensity to spend (MPS) on imported goods is in excess of 
unity for South Africa and Mauritius. This is because South Africa has a well-developed 
infrastructure, coupled with a more advanced industrial sector, and therefore relied 
heavily on foreign imports of factor inputs needed in its fast expanding manufacturing 
sector. The high marginal propensity to import obtained for South Africa, is in line with 
evidence, because South Africa manufactures most of its industrial and consumer goods 
locally, unlike in the remaining economies, and therefore faces a high domestic demand 
for imports of factor inputs.
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The geographical location of these countries and the level of industrial development can 
explain the low MPS on imported goods for Namibia and Botswana61. The latter 
economies are neighbours and have almost the same industrial base and similar 
population size, both depend heavily on South Africa for imports, unlike Mauritius62. 
Since Botswana is a landlocked country, its less strategic location may have contributed 
to low domestic demand for importables. Given the homogeneity of the population in 
Botswana locally produced traditional food is in high demand. Historically, Botswana is a 
conservative country and believes less in luxury consumption63. The fact that Namibia is 
about 40% surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, and given this comparative advantage in 
trade, this economy had faced prolonged political instabilities, which had resulted into 
depletion of its foreign reserves and hence contributed to foreign exchange constraints.
Due to foreign exchange constraints, Namibia has experienced a low domestic demand 
for importables. On the other hand, Mauritius is an island, and faces less transportation 
costs in international trade, which has increased its accessability to overseas markets. 
Mauritius is more open to international trade and has pursued outward-export trade 
policies, than the other economies. Consequently, its domestic demand for imports is 
much higher than in Namibia and Botswana. Economic sanctions applied against South 
Africa have reduced imports in Botswana and Namibia, but not in Mauritius. This 
explain why the estimated marginal propensity to import is low in Namibia and 
Botswana.
This high dependency on imports, as confirmed by empirical evidence, had worsened the 
position of external balance in Mauritius. As shown by evidence, spectacular growth 
performance of Botswana was partly caused by excellent export performance but not 
imported factor inputs to support the expansion of local industrial base. Successful
61 Since Namibia and Botswana have a much lower industrial base, are high import-dependent economies, 
and import most of their consumption goods from South Africa, it was expected that the marginal 
propensity on imported goods will be in excess of unity.
62 One notable difference is that Botswana became independent in 1976 and Namibia only attained 
independence in 1990. This implies that Botswana had better access in the past to products in international 
markets.
63 Unlike Namibia and Mauritius, at present Botswana is without its own TV station, and get its news from 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation.
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government policies (subsidies to farmers) in support of local food production have 
contributed to low domestic demand for imported food in Botswana. It is these low 
imports combined with high exports that have triggered a persistent current account 
surplus in Botswana64. It is well confirmed by econometric evidence that imports depend 
positively and significantly on real domestic income in all three countries. Economic 
theory tells us that, for exchange rate depreciation to reduce imports, the domestic 
economy should exhibit a high demand for imports. Given the existence of low domestic 
demand for imports in Namibia and Botswana, exchange rate depreciation failed to 
depress imports in these economies.
Massive exchange rate depreciation of the Mauritius currency suggests that realistic and 
competitive exchange rates in this economy should be adopted, and successfully adjusted 
with complementary fiscal and monetary policies in order to solve balance of payments 
problems and generate export growth. However, it was expected that this excessive 
depreciation of the Mauritius currency will significantly reduced imports. As expected by 
theory, the exchange rate effects had significantly affected the import-competing sector 
due to the high import-dependency of this economy, as revealed by unit-elasticity of 
domestic income with respect to imports. The effect of exchange rate depreciation is 
significant in Mauritius only.
Assuming that the Botswana Pula is an African hard currency (as it is) because of its 
exports concentration, then changes in the exchange rate should had have inflicted a 
significant effect on its exports. But because exports concentration (i.e., diamonds) 
which constitute more than 60% of Botswana’s exports is tied to contractual obligations 
in terms of the quantity of diamonds to be exported over an agreed period of time, 
exports might be less sensitive to variations in the exchange rate. Importantly, the failure 
of exchange rate policy to influence exports and imports in Botswana casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of exchange rate policy in this economy. If the Botswana Pula is
64 Evidence shows that the mean current account surplus was 4.9% per year in Botswana during the period 
1980-96, thus the only African economy to witness a significant improvement in the current account 
whereas all other African economies have experienced a persistent deterioration in the current account.
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overvalued, then exchange rate misalignment is not expected to have a significant impact 
on exports and imports. The fact that Botswana has the world highest quality diamonds, 
the strong foreign demand for the Botswana Pula might have caused this currency to be 
overvalued65.
Similarly, given the importance of the South African economy in world trade, and the 
fact that exchange rate policy appears to have no impact on imports and exports, the 
South African Rand is overvalued66, however, the Mauritius rupee is not overvalued, but 
rather undervalued. If the Rand is not overvalued, then economic sanctions and 
embargoes on this economy have made exchange rate policies impotent, which explains, 
why the exchange rate effect on imports and exports are insignificant. In contrast to the 
situation prevailing elsewhere, South Africa has an advanced economy and an efficient 
infrastructure. This prosperity has been built primarily on the basis of its vast mineral 
resources. The trade sanctions imposed by most developed countries against South Africa 
also disrupted its economy, causing exchange rate misalignment of the rand, which 
explains the insignificance of exchange rate policy in boosting exports and depressing 
imports. The evidence here is not definitive, and the conclusion is that the exchange rate 
in these economies appears to be ineffective in influencing export and imports, which 
raises the question of whether exchange rate devaluation will be effective or not. The 
effects of exchange rate devaluation on the economy as a whole, has received attention in 
chapter 6.
3.8 Money Demand Function Results
Clearly, empirical interest in demand for money functions arises because the stability and 
the size of elasticities with respect to interest rate and income are of crucial importance 
for the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. Econometric evidence for all
However, the current account has slightly improved by only 0.2% in South Africa in the same period. 
Namibia and Mamitius recorded a persistent current account deficit during the same period.
65 As the prominent economist, Robert Lucas once stressed, as reported by Mankiw (2000) that, “as an 
advice-giving profession we are in way over our heads.” Economics is a young science, and there is still 
much that we do not know. Economists should be cautious when offering policy advice because of this 
ignorance.
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countries confirms that money demand is a positive and significant function of real 
domestic income. The insignificance of real interest rate suggests that a transactionary 
and precautionary demand for real balances is dominant in Namibia and Mauritius. That 
the holdings of real money balances are also for speculative purposes in South Africa and 
Botswana is confirmed by the significance of nominal interest rate on money demand. 
The insignificance of interest rate for Namibia might have been caused by political 
instabilities, which prevailed throughout the study period until its independence in 1990. 
This is because in an economy characterised by political uncertainty, the currency risk of 
holding a domestic currency have prompted many potential investors and locals not to 
engage in any significant speculative transactions in the Namibian currency. Another 
explanation is due to the absence of a central bank in Namibia until 1990, which has 
contributed to a high currency risk of holding a Namibian currency, and thus reducing the 
importance of speculative demand for money. The insignificance of speculative money 
demand in Mauritius, is attributed to the high exchange rate risk associated with the 
Mamitius rupees. Massive exchange rate depreciation of the local currency might have 
negatively affected the speculative money demand, thus resulting in insignificant interest 
rate effect on money demand.
Estimated results show that money demand is a positive function of income, but a 
negative function of interest rate in these economies. Because South Africa has a more 
well-developed financial sector than the rest of the economies, as expected the 
speculative demand for money holdings in this economy is more sensitive to changes in 
interest rate than in economies with a relatively under-developed financial sector. This 
finding is consistent with recent studies on money demand on developing countries, 
which have confirmed that the interest rate is a significant determinant of money demand 
in those upper-income economies with well developed financial institutions and more 
diversified financial services. In studies by (Arrau et al., 1995); the effects of interest rate 
on money demand was significant in only those developing countries with more 
advanced financial institutions. Unlike in South Africa, in the remaining economies, the
66 This sentiment has strong support from economist in South Africa, and the continuing depreciation of die 
Rand since 1998 until late 2000, is being seen by currency strategist as an appropriate trend to restore 
equilibrium real exchange rate.
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accessibility of economic agents to financial information, especially in rural areas where 
the majority of people live, is very limited. As a consequence, the most important 
effective demand which exists in these economies, is the demand for physical assets and 
less demand for financial assets, which explains the insignificant role attached to interest 
rates as a determinant of money demand. Therefore, the speculative demand for money is 
non-existent in Namibia and Mauritius.
3.9 Inflation Function Results
In addition to the problem posed by insufficient degrees of freedom, the dependent 
variable of the inflation equation is in first differences, which explains the poor fit of the 
inflation equation. Despite the insignificance of estimated coefficients for these 
economies, this equation is necessary and transmits the repercussion effect of income on 
the rest of the economy. Clearly, as the results show, before we can reject or support this 
estimated inflation equation, there is a great need to subject this estimated function to 
more empirical testing on developing economies, and clearly show the direction of future 
research. Therefore the results based on this inflation function should be interpreted more 
cautiously.
More importantly, in any model building, there are some equations, despite their poor 
statistical performance, which are vital for the construction of the model and to explain 
the functioning of the economy. Despite the poor perfonnance of this inflation equation, 
this equation camiot be excluded from the model. Its exclusion will result into a 
breakdown of the model. Thus, we should never undermine the importance of this 
equation in the model, but rather we should test it more. When simulating the model, the 
effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on inflation are transmitted via this equation. 
Following a rise in nominal interest rate, income is expected to fall, detrended output to 
decrease. Thus inflation will be affected. Hence, estimating the following reduced 
inflation equation would yield good estimates67.
A log DPt = Xo + Xi t+ Pie log Yt + {317 log YM + vt
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3.10 Employment Function Results
All coefficient estimates have expected signs and are significant. Income and wage 
elasticity of unity is obtained for Namibia and South Africa, but not for Botswana. 
Income is also unit elastic in Mauritius. The significance of all estimates has important 
policy implications. These results indicate that income and wage policies can be 
successfully applied to affect the level of employment. Given the low level of 
employment in these economies, employment targeting should be in the forefront of 
policy debates. Clearly, in all countries, employment is a positive function and significant 
function of income, but a negative and significant function of wages.
3.11 Natural Income Function Results
The estimated growth equation reveal both the instantaneous (at a point in time) growth 
rate and the compound (over a period of time) growth rate. The slope coefficients 
obtained from the estimated growth equation means that income has been increasing at 
the rate of 10.2%, 6.8%, 4.7% and 3.1% per annum, for Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius 
and South Africa, respectively. The compound rate of growth of income is 10,7%, 7.1%, 
4.9%, and 3.2%, for Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa, respectively. The 
compound growth rate is obtained as the antilog of the slope coefficient minus 1, and the 
instantaneous rate of growth is obtained by multiplying the estimated slope coefficient by 
100.
These econometric results on growth performance are in conformity with available data 
evidence on these economies. The mean growth rate of real income computed earlier in 
this study indicated that the growth rate per annum over the period 1980-97 has averaged 
8.96% (Botswana), 4.84% (Mauritius), 5.78% (Namibia), and 1.78% (South Africa). 
Clearly, econometric evidence has over-predicted the growth rate for Botswana, Namibia, 
and South Africa, but under-predicted for Mauritius. Cautiously, these minor differences 
in results can be attributed to the fact that the mean growth rates were computed not for 
the estimation period (1970-96). If the computations were for the same period, the growth 
equation may have produced much similar results. Nevertheless, the closeness of these 
results suggests that the growth equation explains the growth performance extremely well
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and the model has a good fit. These results have important implications that we should 
never undervalue the important information embodied in econometric results and the 
usefulness of econometric models in explaining the reality.
Importantly, that Botswana has experienced a spectacular growth performance is 
econometrically well confirmed. As expected, the main conclusion based on these results 
shows that technical progress has a positive and significant effect on growth performance 
in these economies. Importantly implications of these findings suggest that as capital- 
deficit and labour-surplus economies, capital-saving technological progress is highly 
needed in these economies. Efforts to improve the quality of existing physical and human 
resources, increase the quantity of these same productive resources, raise the productivity 
of resources through invention, innovation and technological progress should be 
intensified.
3.12 Results of the Error Correction Model
Table 3.7 reports the results of the error correction model. The small sample problem 
coupled with first differences of estimated equations explains the low generalized 
adjusted coefficient of determination obtained for most of equations. On the other hand, 
the use of instrumental variable method reduces the significance of estimated 
coefficients. The consumption results reveal that disposable income is significant for all 
the countries except Botswana. The significance of disposable income is compatible with 
the estimated results of the long run model. These findings confirm the importance of 
disposable income in influencing the behavior of consumers both in the short and long 
ran. Apart from Namibia, past levels of consumption exerts no significant effect on the 
current level of consumption. The error correction term is significant for Mauritius and 
South Africa, which confirm that the equilibrium error is eliminated each year and the 
system adjusts towards equilibrium in these economies.
Consistent with the results of the long ran model, interest rate has expected sign on 
investment in all countries. This negative interest rate effect on investment implies that 
changes in the level of interest rate will have desirable results on investment. It means
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that the best way to affect the level of income through interest rate changes in these 
economies is by influencing the behaviour of investors rather than consumers. Unlike in 
the long run model, foreign income has no significant effects on exports in all countries, 
with exception to South Africa. It implies that a rise in foreign income will not 
immediately increase foreign demand for imports from these economies apart from South 
Africa. Given that these economies are exporters of primary commodities, it follows that 
a rise in foreign income will first result in the importation of non-primary commodities, 
such as high tech goods and services from other countries. This possibility explains why 
foreign income has positive and significant effects on exports only in the long run.
The significance of foreign income for South Africa is consistent with evidence because 
South Africa’s export are more diversified and are in great foreign demand than in the 
remaining economies. Clearly, exports in the previous period is significant in all 
countries (excluding Botswana), which confirm that exports is a long term undertaking 
and current exports decisions as expected, are influenced by the levels of exports in the 
past. Consistent with the results of the long nm model, exchange rate effects are 
significant only for Namibia. Given that Namibia is the only country with a pegged 
exchange rate system, the significance of exchange rate is well explained. Consistent with 
long nm results, exchange rate depreciation significantly reduces imports in Maiuitius. 
Unlike, in the long run model, exchange rate effects have become significant for 
Namibia.
These findings indicate that exchange rate depreciation has greater short run effects, 
however, with little effects in the long nm. Clearly, inespective of whether is in the long 
nan or short run, exchange rate depreciation exerts no significant influence on both 
exports and imports in Botswana and South Africa. Income effects on imports are 
significant for South Africa only, which suggest that a rise in domestic income increases 
foreign imports in the relatively large economy than in small economies. This is because 
South Africa is a richer economy and hence can easily afford to import much faster in the 
short run than poorer economies. In line with exports results, past levels of imports are
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also significant. Important message here reveals that the past levels of both exports and 
imports determine the current levels of exports and imports.
From the money demand equations, interest rates have expected sign for all the countries, 
but significant only for South Africa. The significance of error correction terms implies 
that there are adjustments towards equilibrium in Namibia and South Africa. On the other 
hand, money demand in the previous period contributes positively and significantly on 
current money demand in Mauritius and Botswana. In the latter economies, there is no 
significant adjustment towards equilibrium, which indicate that the equilibrium error 
(discrepancy between the actual and the long run or equilibrium) value of money demand 
is not eliminated each period. The estimated employment equation demonstrates that all 
the coefficients have predicted signs. Unlike in the long- run model, real wage rate effects 
are not significant in the error correction model. This is because when the costs of labour 
increases, it takes time for employers to adjust their employment decisions and hence to 
retrench workers. In all the countries, income effects on employment are positive and 
significant. Clearly, a rise in domestic income will increase employment both in the short 
and long- run.
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Chapter 4 Historical Simulation 
Background
In simulation the estimated version of the model is solved in each time period. This 
calculation is necessarily iterative, but starting values for each period are available from 
the solutions in the preceding period. A common choice is the Gauss-Seidel method, 
which calculates what are effectively trial and error solutions in a sequential loop round 
the equations; this process will generally converge, provided reasonable stalling values 
are used68. One purpose of simulation is to evaluate the model (how well it fits the actual 
data). For this one needs to do historical simulation. Historical simulation involves a 
simulation of the model to reproduce the data that are already known. Provided that the 
simulated values are close to the historical values, this “goodness of fit” of the model 
implies that the unknown future data will be forecasted with minor forecast errors and a 
high degree of accuracy, however, such fitting does not necessarily imply good 
forecasting.
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) argued that the ability of a model to forecast well could 
depend on the method used to estimate its coefficients. Forecast reflects the skill and 
expertise of the modeller. As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) put it, if the model's 
estimated parameters have large standard errors, the standard error of forecast will be 
large. It is a well-established fact that any forecasting model will not exactly reproduce 
the actual data as a result of errors made in forecasting, but a good model is expected to 
reproduce forecasted values, which are close to the actual values and with minimal 
forecast errors. According to Osborn and Teal (1979), forecast errors are due to (1) errors 
in predicting the values of exogenous variables; (2) errors in the specification of the 
model; (3) revisions to published data using in making the forecast; (4) judgemental 
errors in the extrapolation of residuals.
In order to improve the forecast perfonnance of the model, the residuals in the model are 
adjusted. Whitley (1994) argued that residual adjustment are made for a variety of
68 In the simulation of this model, the Gauss-Seidel method was used. Granger and Newbold (1986) who 
urged that structural form of equations be generally solved numerically support this method too.
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reasons: to take account of model misspecification; to allow for known or expected 
factors that are not included in the model; or to ensure that ‘plausible’ or ‘consistent’ 
results are obtained. Osborn and Teal (1979) have suggested mechanical rules that can be 
used to project the residuals into the future. That forecasters’ judgement has a strong 
impact on the forecasts is well supported by Turner (1990), McNees (1991). Forecasts 
depend on the adequacy of the model and accuracy of the forecaster’s judgement.
Therefore, there are various ways of judging this “goodness of fit” of the model based on 
model errors and hence to evaluate the model is of crucial importance for policy 
implications. According to Whitley (1994), models can be evaluated in a variety of ways. 
They can be judged on their ability to explain past data (consistency with past data), their 
relevance to economic theory (consistency with theory), their relevance for policy 
analysis (policy relevance), their forecasting performance, or their relation to other 
models (comparative performance). Table 4.1 provides a summary of the measures of 
accuracy of the model. Four measures were employed to evaluate the simulation 
performance of the model. These measures are mean percent prediction error (MPE), 
mean absolute percent prediction error (MAPE), root mean squared absolute percent 
prediction error (RMSAPE) and Theil's U-statistic69. For a detailed discussion of the 
Theft's inequality coefficient, see Theil (1961, 1966). The simulation performance of the 
model is shown in figure 4.1- 4.6.
There is some controversy about whether one should look at static or dynamic solution 
errors. To perform static simulation, the actual values of the lagged variables in solution 
are used, hi contrast, to perform dynamic simulation the solutions for the current 
endogenous variables are computed using the calculated values of the endogenous 
variables in previous periods70. Whitley (1994) reports that there is some dispute about 
whether dynamic or static simulation should be used as a diagnostic tool in model 
evaluation.
69 To validate the simulation performance of the model, these criteria were utilised.
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Although Chong and Hendry (1986) and Pagan (1989) have questioned the use of 
dynamic simulation as a diagnostic device, it is still popular among model-builders. 
Accordingly, the dynamic model errors will just be a correlated transformation of the 
original structural errors from a linear model. Mariano and Brown (1991), who maintain 
that dynamic simulation is a useful diagnostic device and is valid in a non-linear model 
reject the view by Pagan (1989) that dynamic simulation provides no extra information.
In general, simulation can be done either within sample or out of sample period. When 
the model is simulated, the time paths for the endogenous variables generated by the 
model are checked whether the actual time paths are approximated or not. If the 
simulated time paths do not differ significantly from the actual time paths, then the 
simulation model has a good fit. Hence the simulation model can be used to perform 
policy simulations and forecasting. According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), 
simulation models have been widely used in the design of public policy. The model is 
simulated in order to test and evaluate the model, use the model for historical policy 
analysis and forecasting. To evaluate the model's ability to replicate the actual data71, 
historical simulations were performed.
4.1 Distinctive Features of the Simulation Model
In this section, a dynamic simulation model, which combines the coefficient estimates of 
the long run and error-correction model is constructed and then historically simulated. 
The structure of the model is explained below. To allow the use of the simulation model 
in the design and formulation of public policy, the macro econometric model specified in 
table 2.1, has been augmented by some (non-behavioural) equations. A debt identity is 
introduced into the model so as to study the implications of changes in policy instruments 
on the level of debt72. Debt is divided into domestic debt, hypothesised to be influenced
71 Given that simulated (rather than actual) values for the endogenous variabels in a given period serve as 
inputs in solving the model into the futur e, the simulation of the model becomes dynamic.
72 Flemming (2000) report that the United States achieved its third consecutive federal budget surplus—a 
record $237 billion—in fiscal 2000. The string of surpluses has allowed die Treasury Department to begin 
to pay off the national debt. This exemplary evidence should motivate African economies to kick off 
paying then domestic and foreign debts. It implies that macroeconometric models should be used in order 
to assess the effects of financing debts on the domestic economy.
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by fiscal stance, and foreign debt, affected by the position of the trade balance. In 
recognition of the importance of stabilising the debt in the long run a tax stabilisation rule 
is imposed73. Therefore, the specified simulation model is a clear departure from the 
simple Keynesian world in which a rise in government spending has a positive effect on 
income without debt creation.
Unlike in the present study, Taylor (2000) reports a monetary policy rule, in which 
interest rate is a fimction of the inflation rate, the deviation of output from potential 
output, exchange rate, lagged exchange rate and lagged interest rate. Accordingly, when 
inflation is above target the real interest rate is raised and reduced when output fall below 
its fiill capacity level. The demand (i.e. output) shocks and inflation shocks are the two 
kinds of shocks, which affect the system and the real interest rate is the only one 
instrument available to cope with these shocks. Neither kind of shock can be removed in 
the immediate period, but the interest rate can be used to remove the output shock more 
quickly than the inflation shock. A savings identity is incorporated into the model in 
order to trace the consequences of a rise in government spending or tax cut on savings.
A trade balance identity is included in the model in order to assess the effects of nominal 
exchange rate devaluation on the trade balance. The foreign debt identity says that the 
level of foreign debt is hypothesised to depend negatively on the trade balance. An
73 Fair (1999) studied the effects of a fiscal policy rule for stabilisation on the US economy and concluded 
that the stochastic simulation results suggests that the tax rate rule would be a considerable help to 
monetary policy in its stabilisation effort. The Taylor rale first introduced in Taylor (1993) is an important 
policy rule, which requires policymakers to follow rales with clear objectives.
1 0 4
4.2 Specification of Simulation Model74
National income identity 
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + TBt
Trade balance identity 
TBt =Xt-Mt
Consmnption
A log Ct = |3o + Pi A IRt + p2 A log DYt +ai A log Ct-i + yi
* {(log Cm - (*Po + 'Pi IRm + ’P2 log DYt-i )}
Disposable income identity 
DYt =Yt-Tt
Savings identity 
St = DYt -Ct
Foreign Capital biflows identity 
FCIt = It — St
Tax Stabilisation rule 
Tt = A.*DDt-i
Domestic Debt identity
DDt = (1+ IRt)*DDt-i + Gt - Tt
Foreign Debt identity 
FDt = (l+IRt)*FDt-i -TBt
Investment
A log It = p3 + p4 A IRt + p5 A log Yt + a2 A log In + y2
* {(log It-l - ( 'p3 + 'P4 IRt-i + 'Ps log Yt-l )}
Real interest rate identity 
IRt = NIRt - A log DPt
Exports
A log Xt = pg + P7 A log FYt + Ps A log Et + a3 A log Xt_i + y3
* {(log Xt-i - ( 'p6 + 'p7 log FYm + ’Ps log Em )}
74 where 'p0 refers to the estimated coefficient of the long run model, p0 is the estimated coefficient of the 
error-correction model and similarly the same applies to other parameters), * is a multiplication sign and 
to y5) are adjustment coefficients (i.e., coefficients of error correction terms) towards equilibrium. The 
coefficients of lagged dependent variables in the error correction model are denoted by a i to a.5
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Imports
AlogMt = P9+Pio A log Yt + Pn A logEt+a4 A logMt-i + Y4
* {(log Mu - ( 'p9 + 'Pio log Yt_i + 'Pn log Et- i)}
Real exchange rate identity 
Et = (NEt*FPt)/DPt
Money demand
A log (MD)t = P12 + P13 A log Yt + P14 A log NIRt+ a 5 A log (MD)t-i + 7 5  
*{(log MD)t_i - ( 'p12 + 'Polog Yt-i + 'pi4log NIRm )}
Inflation
A log DPt = p 15 + Pi6log Yct + P17 logYct-i
Detrended output/output gap identity 
Yct =Y t/Ynt
Natural/potential output
log Ynt =  PisKo +  P 1 9 K1 1(1970)
Employment
log EMt = p20 + P21 log Yt + p22 log Wt + a6 A log EMt-i + ye
* {(log EMt-1 - ( 'p20 + 'p21 log Yt-l + 'p22 log Wt-1 )}
Real wage rate identity 
W = log (NW) - log (DP)
where TB is trade balance, S is savings, DD is domestic debt, FD is foreign debt, FCI is foreign capital 
inflows, EM is employment, W is real wage rate, and NW is nominal wages. The tax stabilisation 
coefficient (k ) equals 0.25, meaning that a quarter of last year’s cumulated debt will be raised in taxes. The 
logic of this rule is explicable. This fiscal rule ensures that debt cumulated last year is serviced, however, 
debt creation increases the tax burden75. When the tax rale is in place, taxes are no longer exogenous. A 
rise in government spending will increase the domestic debt, and hence it will raise taxes. This rule is vital 
and ensures an adjustment of taxes in line with changes in government spending. Without this adjustment, 
the fiscal deficit will widen and hence it will be difficult to service and stabilise the domestic debt in the 
long ran. Clearly, this tax rale will encourage the fiscal authority to strive towards fiscal responsibility and 
the repayment of the domestic debt.
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improvement in the trade balance is expected to increase inflows of capital from abroad. 
This is because a rise in foreign capital inflows would reduce the reliance of the domestic 
economy on external finance. Falling domestic demand for external finance, coupled with 
availability of foreign exchange earnings would contribute positively toward the 
reduction of foreign debt. Similarly, an improvement in the fiscal stance of the 
government is expected to reduce domestic debt whereas the domestic debt would 
increase with a rise in government fiscal deficit. There are two effects of a rise in 
government spending on employment: an income effect and a wage effect. Both the 
income effect and wage effect on employment are positive. Because government 
spending increases income, employment is expected to rise. On the other hand, because 
government spending is inflationary, the real wage rate is expected to fall and hence 
contribute positively towards employment creation. Therefore, the conduct of fiscal 
policy is crucial in the attainment of employment objectives. It is for this reason, why a 
deteriorating fiscal stance of the government will make it difficult for the government to 
promote employment.
According to the real interest rate identity, a hike in the nominal interest rate would raise 
the real interest rate, crowd-out investment and reduce domestic income. Falling income 
would reduce detrended income and decelerate inflation. A deceleration in inflation 
would exert effects on the real exchange rate through the real exchange rate identity. In 
addition, a rise in domestic interest rate is expected to contribute positively to both 
domestic and foreign indebtedness of the domestic economy. The real exchange rate 
identity shows that nominal devaluation would lead to the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Hence exports and imports would be affected, and thereby affecting 
domestic income, trade balance and foreign debt. It is sufficient to note that in this 
simulation model, changes in policy instruments (G, T, NE, NIR)76 would exert effects 
on the level of income, and both domestic and foreign debt. The foreign capital inflow 
identity allows the study of the effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on the 
inflow or outflow of capital. In reality and in the face of devaluation, the movement of
76 Policy instruments are defines as follows. G is real government spending, T is real taxes, NE is nominal 
exchange rate, NIR is nominal interest rate, and NW is nominal wages.
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capital depends on whether devaluation generates expectations of further devaluation or 
not.
4.3 Model Solution
The equations of the model can be solved either as individually single equations (single 
equation solution) or simultaneously as a system of equations (dynamic model solution). 
The first solution technique does not take into account the feedback from other equations 
in the model and solves each equation singly by using actual rather than forecast values 
of regressors. The information on all other equations is taken into account in the second 
solution technique. In the latter technique, the solution is period by period and the 
solution of the equations is simultaneous, and past solution values are used as lagged 
values in subsequent periods. It is generally expected that the forecast values on results 
based on single equation solution are more likely to fit the historical data very well 
compared to dynamic model solution. As a result of the dynamic structure of the model 
that arises when individual equations are combined and dynamically solved, dynamic 
model solution may lead to poor performance in forecasting the historical data. In present 
study the model was dynamically solved.
When significant coefficients are obtained in the error correction model, for example by 
allowing lags, some coefficients estimate were greater than unity, thus causing the model 
to blow up. In addition, the estimation method posed other serious problem. Because the 
instrumental variable method was employed to estimate the model, the use of instruments 
in the face of insufficient degrees of freedom reduces the significance of coefficients in 
the error correction model. After the model was dynamically solved, it was then 
subjected to different types of simulation experiments. These are historical simulation 
and permanent shock simulation77. To assess the simulation performance of the model, a 
number of criteria were employed.
77 Permanent shock simulations are discussed in chapter 5-8.
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Table 4.1 Measures of Accuracy of the Simulation Model
Functions Measures Namibia Botswana Mauritius South Africa
Consumption (C)
MPE -1.08 -0.7 5.54 -0.7
MAPE 12.45 5 8.05 4.41
RMSAPE 15.41 6.54 10.83 5.09
Theil's U-statistic 0.0947 0.5668 0.3546 0.4918
Investment (I)
MPE 0.36 -4 -3.79 0.8
MAPE 7.09 6.89 11.87 6.38
RMSAPE 8.34 8.95 13.51 8.37
Theil's U-statistic 0.6055 0.8954 0.1962 0.7758
Exports (X)
MPE 0.15 -0.23 -3.72 -0.15
MAPE 1.39 5.83 6.39 3.35
RMSAPE 1.81 7.20 7.53 4.67
Theil’s U-statistic 0.5859 0.6059 0.9981 0.4890
Imports (M)
MPE -0.64 -1.18 2.63 0.66
MAPE 5.64 4.25 7.27 4.03
RMSAPE 7.38 5.67 9.07 4.93
Theil's U-statistic 0.9364 0.6246 1.0577 0.7268
Money Demand (MD)
MPE -3.52 -5.31 -1.49 -0.29
MAPE 15.01 10.43 11.51 3.05
RMSAPE 19.17 12.50 12.66 3.74
Theil's U-statistic 1.0336 0.9337 0.4086 0.1675
Income (Y)
MPE -0.36 -1.05 -0.35 0.04
MAPE 6.78 3.35 8.4 4.57
RMSAPE 7.78 4.21 9.41 5.54
Theil's U-statistic 0.8551 0.3700 0.9904 0.1272
Notes: MPE and MAPE are in percentages. MPE = mean simulated percent error, and MAPE = mean simulated absolute percentage 
error, RMSAPE = root mean squared absolute percent error. Percentage error = ((Observation - Forecast)/Observation)*100. Where 
Ys is simulated value and Ya is actual value.
4.4 Evaluation of the Simulation Performance of the Model
The information contained in table 4.1 is self-explanatory, and a small error and low U- 
statistic are indicators of good simulation performance. Evaluating the whole model, 
Botswana has witnessed the smallest simulated errors and hence a well-designed and 
better working simulation model, followed by South Africa, Namibia, and Mauritius. 
Given the relatively low prediction errors and U-statistics obtained for these economies, 
we can confidently and definitively conclude that the performance of the model for all 
countries is good. These findings validate the model and suggest that the model would 
not give misleading results when the model is used in policy analysis78. When U = 0, it
78 Consequently, the model was used in policy analysis and the discussions o f the results are reported in 
chapter 5-8.
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shows that simulated and actual value are equal, meaning that the simulation model has a 
perfect fit. When U < 1, the model has good fit and its simulation performance is 
excellent. The root-mean-square (mis) simulation error for the variable Yt is defined as
where Yts is simulated value of Yt, Yta is actual value, and n is the number of periods in the 
simulation. The rms error is a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its 
actual time path. Other simulation error statistics are as follows.
rms percent error =
i  N V s — V a 
1 1 * t
\2
y«
Mean simulation error = — J] ( f /  -  Yta )
N /=!
Mean percent error
1 N V s V a 
— 1 V"1 It 11
" Yf“
Another useful simulation statistic related to the rms simulation error is Theil’s inequality 
coefficient, defined as,
4.5 Results of Historical Simulation
The macro econometric model was estimated for the period 1970-96, but due to the 
presence of lags in the error correction model, the model could only be solved from the 
period 1973 onwards. To solve the model, actual data for 1970-72 were used as initial 
conditions for the endogenous variables, but the values for the endogenous variables 
beyond the period 1972, were determined by the simulation solution of the model79.
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Since all the historical data for all variables of the model were available, to perform ex 
post or historical simulation, the simulated and actual values of endogenous variables are 
compared in figures 4.1- 4.6. This comparison is vital to validate the model and to 
determine whether the model replicate the historical values or not80.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that for Namibia the model has under-predicted consumption 
and investment in the beginning of the period, but then persistently over-predicted after 
the mid-1980s throughout the 1990s, hence failing to track actual data. In contrast, the 
model does well in forecasting the historical data for Botswana throughout the simulation 
period, for both consumption and investment. Large fluctuations in the simulated values 
of consumption and investment are evident in South Africa, which indicate the failure of 
the model to forecast turning points in the actual data. The period 1987-95 is 
characterised by small-simulated errors, which confirms a good data fit in this period for 
Mauritius.
Based on figure 4.3, there are small differences between the actual and simulated values 
for exports, which reveal a good performance of the simulated exports equations for all 
the countries. As shown in figure 4.4, a sharp fall and rise in imports in Namibia in the 
mid-1980s is well tracked, whilst the model confirms a relatively poor data fit for 
Mauritius. Compared with other equations of the model, the money demand equations are 
not satisfactory for Namibia and Mauritius. For the latter countries, due to the presence of 
large forecast errors, the actual and simulated series continue to diverge in the 1990s, 
whilst converging for Botswana and South Africa. Consistent with the evidence, the 
nominal interest rate effect in the estimated money demand function was significant in 
South Africa and Botswana, but not in the remaining two countries. Clearly, the 
significance of nominal interest rates explains these simulation results. By the same 
token, the exchange rate effect was significant in the export function for Namibia only,
79 The model is solved for endogenous variables and not exogenous variables.
80 Solid lines are actual values and dotted lines are simulated values.
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and according to figure 4.3, ex post simulation of exports in Namibia appears to be far 
better than in other countries.
Last but not least, figure 4.6 reports the historical simulation of real income. A good 
forecast of actual data is seen for Botswana, which suggests that the model have a good 
fit. A close look at the ex post simulation of real income for the remaining countries, 
suggest that the relatively poor forecast of consumption and investment in these 
countries81, compared with Botswana, might have caused this poor fit in real income. On 
average the model appears to fit the data well in the early 1970s untill mid-1980s, but this 
was followed by a poor tracking of actual data in the mid-1980s throughout the 1990s. 
This observation is explicable because the latter period is characterised by a number of 
macroeconomic instabilities, such as the debt crisis and volatility of foreign capital 
inflows in the developing world.
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Figure 4.1 Historical Simulation of Cousumption
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Figure 4.2 Historical Simulation of Investment
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Figure 4.4 Historical Simulation of Imports
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Figure 4.5 Historical Simulation of Money Demand
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Figure 4.6 Historical Simulation of Real Income
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Chapter 5 Policy Simulations: Interest Rate Policy 
Background
Following the work of Adelman and Adelman (1959), models are used to assess the 
potential consequences of various policy alternatives or to "simulate" the behavior of 
endogenous variables under particular assumed time-paths for the exogenous variables . 
hi this model, the policy simulations are easy to perform because the policy instruments 
are included in the model. Policy simulations are to do with subjecting the model to 
shocks, hi many cases, as argued by Whitley (1994), the policy instrument may not be 
part of the model, if there is a new policy, or if the policy change is similar but not 
defined by an included exogenous variable. Following Chow (1975) policy targets can 
be achieved by varying policy instrument variables in order to meet the objective
• oofunction . Alan Budd (1998) supports the current view, who suggests that, policymakers 
move interest rates in such a way as to make their forecasts of their inflation and output 
match up with their targets. That is, they adjust their instrument to make sure that the 
expected future state of the economy follows along a path that meets their objectives. 
Counterfactual simulations consider how the economy might have behaved in the past if 
some alternative policy or exogenous environment had existed (Whitley, 1994).
According to Tinbergen (1952) rule there must be as many independent effective policy 
instruments as there are independent targets. To facilitate adjustments to policy 
instruments policy rules are developed. These can then be used to specify bow the 
authorities should react to shocks to the economy and what to do if there is a need to 
finance the debt. These rules can be forward looking, in the sense that they relate to 
expected deviations from target, or they can be backward looking and relate to known 
values of the target variables. Svensson (1999b) have distinguished between a target rule 
and an instrumental rule. Accordingly, an instrument rale is a statement that the interest
82 Hickman (1972) report a number o f exercises dealing with policy simulations.
83 The IMF (Finance and Development, March 2001) report that six countries in West Africa have set 
stringent convergence criteria in order to introduce a single currency in 2003. These targets are inflation 
rate o f less than 5 percent by 2003, and gross foreign currency reserves to cover six months' worth o f  
imports by the end o f 2003. Other targets include central bank financing o f the budget deficit limited to 10 
percent o f the previous year's tax revenue; and a maximum budget deficit-to-GDP ratio o f 4 percent by the 
end o f 2003
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rate will be raised or lowered by a specific amount following aggregate demand or 
aggregate supply shocks of a certain size. By contrast the statement that the policymaker 
adjusts the instrument such that inflation and/ or output will follow a certain specified 
path is a target rule. Target rules require instrument rales for implementation.
Thomas (1997) argued that while the use of macro-models in their simulation mode has 
obviously many attractions, the models also have important limitations when used to 
analyse the effects of changes in policy. Simulations are almost always performed under 
the implicit assumption that the estimated coefficients of a model are fixed and 
unchanging constants. Laury, Lewis and Ormerod (1978) have shown that the results of 
simulations may vary depending on the initial conditions of the simulation ran. For 
example, the effects of a nominal devaluation may improve the bade balance if the base 
data set begin in 1970, and may not improve the trade balance if the base data set is 
changed to 197384. Thomas (1997) reports that perhaps the most fundamental criticism of 
the use of macro-models for simulation studies is that of Lucas (1976)85.
Lucas and Sargent (1978) argued that macroeconomic models are not useful in guiding 
policy. They argued that the parameters in a macro-model may well vary with the policy 
in operation. Thus, while the short-term forecasting accuracy of a model may be 
adequate, it may be of little use for comparing the effects of alternative policies. It is 
relatively obvious that, if a policy remains in force long enough or has been tried on a 
number of previous occassions (e.g. successive exchange rate devaluations) then rational 
individuals will learn how the policy effects the economy and hence adjust their 
behaviour to allow for it. However, under rational expectations, even a sudden change of 
policy, provided it has sufficient credibility, will influence the behaviour of rational 
agents and hence lead to significant changes in the relationships in macro-models. 
Hoover (1990) and Sims (1986) in their convincing response to the Lucas’ critique, argue
84 Therefore simulation performed with the economy assumed to be in one state can by no means 
necessarily be assumed to apply when the economy is in some other state.
85 The Lucas critique infers that estimated macroeconomic models are not suitable for policy analysis.
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that the forecasting models are usable for policy evaluation provided we keep in mind the 
underlying assumptions of the models.
Interest Rate Effects
The rate of interest in the economy is one of the most important tools of macroeconomic 
policy and therefore interest rate policies play a critical role in the development process86. 
It is well recognised that the rate of interest performs several important functions by 
influencing the quality and quantity of savings and investment in the economy and 
thereby the overall economic growth. While the process of financial liberalisation is 
intensified in African economies, it is of utmost importance to assess the effects of 
freeing interest rates (a rise in interest rates) on these economies.
Given the tendency in many developing countries to control the rate of interest, in this 
section, the effects of a one- percent rise in nominal interest rate on the economy is 
presented and discussed. It is well known that a soimd conduct of interest rate policy is a 
prerequisite in fostering macroeconomic stability and accelerating the development 
process in any economy. In this simulation model, a rise in nominal interest rate is firstly, 
expected to depress consumption and investment spending and thereby reducing the level 
of national income. Secondly, as income falls, output deviating from the trend would 
decrease and hence resulting in decelerating inflation. Thirdly, it has a debt worsening 
effect of increasing the costs of servicing the debt both domestically and internationally, 
with consequent implications of increasing tax collection efforts in order to finance the 
debt.
5.1 Interest rate effects on consumption and investment87
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on consumption
Figure 5.1 shows that a rise in interest rate has reduced consumptions in all countries, 
except in Mauritius, where it appeal's to have contributed positively to consumption. The 
positive effects observed in the estimated consumption function for Mauritius cause this
86 Based on the recent performance of the Japanese economy, McKinnon and Ohno (2001) have shown that 
inappropriate interest rate policy has adverse economic consequences.
87 In the presentation of the results in this study, the Y-axis represents the % changes from base.
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positive interest rate effect on consumption. This correlation demonstrates that the 
simulation results depend critically on the properties of the estimated regression. Clearly, 
consumers in Namibia and Botswana are more badly-off. Unlike in other countries, 
transfer payments in Namibia and Botswana constitute a major portion of overall 
consumption. Therefore a rise in interest rate exert large adverse effects on transfer 
payments which explain a much greater fall in consumption in the latter economies88.
These results appear' to suggest that, following a rise in interest rate, consumers carry the 
burden of interest rate hike more severely than investors in Namibia and Botswana do. 
These striking similarities in the latter economies can be explained in terms of their 
import composition. Imports are dominated by consumption goods and a fall in income 
arising from high interest rate exert greater depressing effect on consumption than on 
investment, which explain the large crowding-out of consumption, hi contrast, because 
South Africa is a more self-reliant economy and is a regional superpower, investment 
goods dominate its imports, and therefore falling imports associated with lower income 
have larger depressing effects on investment than consumption.
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on investment
As shown in figure 5.2, a negative relationship between interest rate and investment is 
well confirmed in all countries. The period 1973-85 is characterized by a positive effect 
on interest rate on investment in Mauritius, hi fact, there are two interest rate effects on 
investment, (1) the direct effects of interest rate on investment; and (2) the indirect 
second round effects of interest rate on investment via its effect on income. As noted 
earlier, the positive relationship of interest rate and consumption observed in Mauritius, 
has increased income and therefore contributing to positive indirect effects. Based on 
these simulation evidence, the above-mentioned period is dominated by the indirect 
effects, and afterwards the direct effects has crowded-out investment in Mauritius, hi 
South Africa, the observed crowding-out effects have remained around 1.5% throughout
88 As interest rate increases, the supply of government services and goods becomes more costly and 
therefore reduces transfers payments to consumers.
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Permanent Shock Simulation: Percentage changes from the base line 
Figure 5.1 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on consumption
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Figure 5.2 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1 %) on investment
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the entire period which are greater than the initial increase in interest rate. Contrasting 
interest rate effects on investment are reported in Namibia, with smaller crowding out 
effects on less than 0.1 per cent in the 1970s to mid-1980s, and much greater effects in 
the 1990s, however, above 1 per cent.
With the exception of Botswana, falling investment recorded in the 1990s shows an 
existence of interest rate risk for long term investors in these economies. On the other 
hand, long term investors face low interest rate risk in Botswana due to the less severe 
interest rates effects in the 1990s. These results suggest that a favourable investment 
climate in the form of low interest rate for short-term investors exists in Namibia, 
Mauritius and South Africa, whereas long term investors are much better off in 
Botswana. In these economies, Botswana is the low interest rate economy and uniquely, 
interest rate effects are downward. This tell us that long term investors face low interest 
rate risk than short term investors, and because mining is long-term undertaking it has 
resulted in huge investment in the mining sector in Botswana. The high investment rate 
observed in Botswana is explained by huge investment in this economy by long term 
investors.
In addition, interest rate effects have remained more stable in the 1980s and 1990s, but 
not in the 1970s, which is compatible with existing evidence. In early 1980s, structural 
adjustment and stabilization policies of the IMF and the World Bank were advocated in 
the developing world. A speedy and appropriate reaction from Botswana by pursuing 
sound economic policies has promoted macroeconomic stability in this economy, and 
therefore resulted in much lower interest rate effects on both consumption and 
investment. Comparing the relatively interest rate effects on consumption and investment, 
large crowding-out effects on consumption are evident in Namibia, whilst thse effects are 
greater on investment in South Africa. Interest rates show insignificant effects on both 
consumption and investment in Mauritius.
Because Mauritius is the high interest rate economy, it was expected that interest rate 
effects would inflict a severe cut in consumption and investment spending. The fact that
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the government has pursued policies of interest rate control in the 1970s, coupled with 
unwillingness of the monetary authorities to ensure a frequent adjustment in interest rates 
might have contributed to financial repression. Therefore it has reduced the potency of 
interest rate policy in influencing the demand side of the economy. As evidence shows, 
nominal interest rate was kept constant at 6 per cent in the period 1970-76.
5.2 Interest rate effects on real income
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on real income
Since a rise in interest rates has effects on consumption and investment, it also exerts 
effects on the level of national income through the national income identity. A combined 
effects of the behavior of consumers, investors, and importers; emanating from their 
reactions to the changes in nominal interest rate on the level of national income are 
shown in figure 5.7. Accordingly and as theoretically expected, income in all economies 
has declined. Except in South Africa, the behavior of consumers is dominant suggesting 
that these economies are more influenced by consumers’ decisions. However, 
consistently with its strong manufacturing capacity, the South African economy is driven 
by investors’ decisions. As simulation results indicate, the level of national income fell 
by less than the rise in interest rate in all economies, but the effects are on the rise and 
have exceeded 1 per cent in Namibia which confirmed the presence of interest rate shock 
in this economy.
These results suggest that a rise in nominal interest rate would have more and long 
lasting, disastrous effects on the Namibian economy, but less in other economies. The 
interest rate effects on the Namibian economy since the mid-1980s throughout the 1990s 
has remained highly volatile, an indicative of the vulnerability of the economy to external 
shocks. These findings support the present structure of the Namibian financial sector. The 
Namibia dollar is pegged to the South African rand and therefore the monetary 
authorities cannot pursue, and independent (if any) monetary policy, which is making the 
domestic economy more vulnerable to external shocks.
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For example, the Bank of Namibia can not unilaterally raise or cut nominal interest rates, 
unless the South African Reserve Bank has instituted similar interest rate policy changes. 
Thus the current scenario is not always in the interest of the Namibian economy. This 
peculiarity of the Namibian economy, therefore, explains why interest rate effects on 
income are dissimilar to the remaining economies. Another explanation for a massive 
reduction in income in Namibia is attributed to the huge costs on domestic debt caused by 
a high level of interest rate. This suggests that failing to collect sufficient taxes when 
interest rate is increasing, has not only worsened the domestic debt, but has severely 
reduced real income. Clearly, these findings show that it is not appropriate for Namibia to 
relax taxation when the economy is faced with an increasing level of domestic debt and if 
the economy is to pick up.
5.3 Interest rate effects oil money demand and inflation
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on money demand
As shown in figure 5.3, the simulation results confirmed an inverse relationship between 
nominal interest rate and the demand for money, in all economies. Speculative demand 
for real money balances will react more promptly and with increasing returns to scale to 
changes in the rate of interest in all economies, but not in Mauritius. This appropriate 
behavior of economic agents in these economies (excluding Mauritius) is vital in 
ensuring an effective conduct of monetary policy, and shows that the monetary 
authorities can affect activities in the financial sector. As available evidence has 
confirmed, speculative demand appears to have widely fluctuated in Mauritius. This is 
because this economy has witnessed persistent and massive exchange rate depreciation in 
nominal terms, against the US dollar during the period under study. The existence of 
exchange rate risk has therefore prompted an unstable speculative real money demand.
Stable demand for money evident since 1988 in South Africa is attributed to an 
increasing political stability, which emerged following the breaking news that the then 
president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, will be released from prison in the early 
1990s. After serving 27 years in captivity, he was released from jail in 1990 and became 
the president of South Africa in 1994. These findings confirm the importance of new
1 2 3
Figure 5.3 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on money demand
Figure 5.4 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on inflation
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information (news) in the money market, which tend to influence economic agents’ 
expectations, and thereby affecting economic activities either positively or negatively. A 
sharp surge of interest rate effects in 1979 in both Namibia and South Africa, 
demonstrates that the money markets in both South Africa and Namibia are more closely 
integrated than in other regional economies. This is because Namibia is a former colony 
of South Africa and the South African rand is a legal tender in Namibia. In addition, 
before Namibia became independent in 1990 central bank activities in Namibia were 
carried out by the South African Reserve Bank, and there is a free movement of capital 
between these two countries. A combination of these factors explained the similar interest 
rate effects evident in these economies.
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on inflation
In figure 5.4, the effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on inflation are shown89. As 
expected, inflation has decelerated in all economies, except in Mauritius. In the latter 
economy, the effects have caused spiraling inflation. These surprising results are 
interesting and confirm an unusual, positive relationship between nominal interest rate 
and inflation. Important lesson from these simulation results is that, given the high level 
of nominal interest rate in excess of 20 percent in this economy (and in many other 
developing economies)90, interest rate policy cannot be used to contain inflation. 
Therefore the use of interest rate policy by increasing interest rate to combat inflationary 
boom or reducing interest rate to counter the slowdown in the economy, is likely to be 
less effective in Mauritius.
Consequently, it appears to indicate that interest rate policy cannot be successfully 
applied to decelerate inflation in high inflation African economies, as in the developed 
countries. It is for this reason, why the model has set inflation as a policy target. 
Targeting inflation will lead to price stability and thereby promote financial development 
in African economies. Financial development will spur economic growth and accelerate
89 A hike in the nominal interest rate would raise the real interest rate, crowd-out investment and reduce 
domestic income. Falling income would reduce detrended income and decelerate inflation.
90 For example, nominal interest rate stood at 20.8% in 1996 in Mauritius, while it was only 14.1% in 
Botswana.
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the development process. More relevant and important, in recent empirical work on 
developing countries, Agenor and Montiel (1996) have argued that the functioning and 
structures of developing economies are completely different from those of developed 
economies. While these simulation results do not make much economic sense from a 
developed country point of view, the results are compatible with peculiar features of 
African economies, especially when the domestic economy is facing a two-digit inflation 
and interest rate of more than 20 percent per annum.
The message here clearly supports a policy of low interest rate in order to decelerate 
inflation and boost growth performance of these economies. Clearly, policymakers 
should reduce nominal interest rate so as to reduce the inflationary pressures in high 
inflation economies (in excess of 20 per cent), but not the other way around, as the 
conventional tradition in the developed world. New structuralists argued that developing 
countries need a separate macroeconomic model because prices are determined on a cost- 
plus as opposed to a market-clearing basis, and inflation reflects structural weaknesses 
and not just excess aggregate demand. Contractionary demand-side policies (i.e., raising 
interest rate) lead to falling output, employment and real income, rather than a declining 
rate of inflation.
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Figure 5.5 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on domestic debt
The simulation results for a high inflation economy (Mauritius) support the latter view, 
and indeed as confirmed by simulation evidence, inflation has accelerated. This 
acceleration of inflation is explained by policies of interest rate control pursued in the 
past in this economy.
5.4 Interest rate effects on domestic debt and taxes
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on domestic debt
Figure 5.5 shows those effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on domestic debt. In 
theory the cost of borrowed funds and of servicing future debts increases with a rise in 
interest rate, which in turn increase the net present value of domestic debt. While interest 
rate effects have increased government indebtedness in the period 1973-89 in all 
countries, these effects have stabilized in the 1990s, but much higher in the later period. 
An additional cost on the level of debt associated with a hike in interest rate is well 
confirmed in all countries. The cost inflicted has exceeded 5% in Namibia since the mid- 
1985s, whilst it has reached 5% after 1989 in Mauritius. Low cost below 5% has been
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witnessed in Botswana and South Africa. Importantly, a rise in interest rates has 
increased the debt by about 5 per cent.
Clearly, a policy of low interest rates will trigger debt sustainability. Unlike in other 
countries, upward interest rate effects on domestic debt is evident in Botswana from 
1983, despite sound economic policies implemented in early 1980s, in this African- 
“Tiger Economy”. Hence, insufficient tax collection efforts have failed to stabilize the 
debt. This is because Botswana enjoys relatively low tax burden and a hike in interest rate 
has not increased tax collections as in other countries (see figure 5.6). These results 
suggests the great need to stabilize the debt through a rise in taxes in order to contain the 
rising effects of interest rate on domestic debt in Botswana.
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 vividly demonstrates the risks associated with 
excessive bank lending to the private sector and the government when interest rate is low, 
and the problems of debt repayment difficulties and debt restructuring which emerge as 
the rate of interest is soaring. Given the process of financial liberalization underway in 
these African economies, it is essential to avoid severe indebtedness of the financial 
sector by ensuring adequate prudential supervision and regulation of the financial sector 
without excessive bank lending. If a rise in interest rate result in a temporary freeze in 
serving of domestic debts it will worsen the domestic debt, and hence it is vital to ensure 
debt sustainability in these economies.
Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate on taxes
Since a policy of interest rate hikes has the potential of worsening the debt, its 
implications of raising taxes is shown in figure 5.691. Following a one-percentage point 
increase in interest rate, taxes have increased by less than three percent in Botswana since 
1979; but have surged by less than two percent in South Africa. Since Namibia attained 
independence in 1990, the effects of a rise in interest rate on taxes have remained low and 
stable, which suggest that the government is not financing the debt through progressive 
taxation. These low tax collection efforts explain why a rise in interest rate has increased
91 In this model, taxes are only affected through the domestic debt. Hence, a rise in interest rates increases 
domestic indebtedness, which in turn increases taxes.
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Figure 5.6 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on taxes
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Figure 5.7 Effects of a rise in nominal interest rate (1%) on real income
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the domestic debt more in Namibia than in other economies. The upward interest rate 
effects on taxes in Mauritius is consistent with the high interest rate observed in this 
economy, implying that a severe tax burden on the economy is unavoidable, unless a 
policy of low interest rate is implemented. The inward interest rate effects on taxes in 
Botswana indicate that once an economy is facing low level of domestic debt, it requires 
corresponding low tax collection efforts to finance the debt. On the other hand, an 
outward interest rate effects on taxes in the remaining economies (excluding Botswana) is 
consistent with the high level of domestic debt experienced in these economies. 
Consistently with theoretical expectations, these simulation results confirmed that the 
higher the level of domestic debt, the higher the tax burdens on the economy, and vice 
versa.
An upward pressure of interest rate on taxes is not explained by the model, however, can 
be attributed to the nature of the taxation system in Mauritius. This is because Mauritius 
has a value added tax, and therefore the tax collection system is more efficient and its 
administration is less cumbersome, which explain an upward pressure of interest rate on 
taxes, because they are much easier to collect than in other economies. The reliance of 
the remaining economies on the use of GST (general sales tax) have always in the face of 
high interest rate implied an inadequate tax collection efforts, coupled with high 
incidences of tax evasions which explains the low interest rate effects on taxes in these
09 «economies . Evidence based on these simulation results confirms the link between taxes 
and the level of the debt. This link has important implications that a high debt results in 
high taxes. If more than a quarter of debt created in the previous period are financed 
through taxes the domestic economy would cripple. It means that to ensure sufficient 
injections in the economy in order to raise the efficiency of investment while reducing the 
tax burden on the economy, governments should maintain sustainable levels of debts and 
should leave within their means.
92 Value added tax (VAT) was implemented in 1999 in South Africa, and November 2000 in Namibia, 
however, it is still non-existent in Botswana.
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6.1 Controversies surronding an appropriate exchange rate policy for a 
developing economy
In more recent studies, the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries is 
analysed in terms of two approaches. The "real-targets" approach to exchange rate 
determination treat the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument, which can be 
varied, whereas the "nominal-anchor" approach suggests that the exchange rate be fixed 
to the currency of a low inflation country in order to import low inflation. According to 
Corden (1991), in the latter approach the exchange rate leads and fiscal policy (insofar as 
budget deficits are monetized) follows, whereas in the real-targets approach fiscal policy 
leads and the exchange rate follows, hi essence the fixed exchange rate system, as a 
contributor to fiscal and monetary discipline, is most suitable for countries which need it 
the least (Edwards, 1993b). It is argued that, in view of the frequency and severity of both 
external and internal shocks to which many developing countries are frequently 
subjected, the pursuit of real exchange rate targets could involve the risk of high inflation 
and macroeconomic instability (Hossain and Chowdhury, 1998).
Friedman (1953) argues in favour of a floating exchange rate system on the grounds that 
it would insulate economies from external shocks and allow governments to exercise 
more direct control over their money supplies, which would lead to lower inflation and 
lower volatility of domestic interest rates, hi contrast, Dombusch and Kuenzler (1993) 
advocate a ‘dual rate’ approach, one official and another free market-determined 
exchange rate, as a pragmatic device in cases of high capital mobility, which camiot be 
controlled effectively. Krugman (1979) argues that excessive domestic credit growth 
under a fixed exchange rate regime causes a loss of foreign reserves, and a sudden 
speculative attack against the currency. Aghevli et al (1991) suggest that a pegged 
exchange rate does not necessarily impose financial discipline if the government retains 
the option of periodically devaluing the currency. Given these controversies, it is not 
clear what type of exchange rate policy is more appropriate for a developing economy93.
Chapter 6 Policy Simulations: Exchange Rate Policy
93 Khan (1986) reports the determinants of real exchange rate in developing countries.
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Whatever exchange rate policy is adopted in a developing economy, there is another 
controversy about the effectiveness of nominal devaluation on the economy.
6.2 Controversies surrounding the effectiveness of a nominal exchange rate 
devaluation on the economy
Following economic upheavals in the 1970s in the developing world, one of the 
responses of the IMF and the World Bank was to advocate a policy of nominal exchange 
rate devaluation in order to improve the trade balance and restore macroeconomic 
stability94. In the context of industrial countries, Alexander (1952) urged that nominal 
exchange rate devaluation would improve the trade balance and hence this argument was 
generalized to developing countries. The Marshall-Learner condition states that, from an 
initial position of trade balance, for a devaluation to improve the trade balance the sum of 
the price elasticities of imports and exports must exceed unity. However, this static 
condition is derived on the assumption that, following devaluation, exporters reduce their 
foreign currency prices in line with the devaluation. In empirical formulations (and the 
real world), this does not hold.
Now it is possible for the trade balance to be improved even if the price elasticities sum 
to less than unity, as long as foreign prices change less than the exchange rate. The 
Marshall-Lemer may not be satisfied in the developing world because these economies, 
in addition to export concentration on primary commodity faces supply bottlenecks and 
structural rigidities, coupled with low foreign demand for their exports. Consequently, 
devaluation controversies emerged in the context of developing countries as a result of 
this “elasticity pessimism”.
Kingman and Taylor (1978) have successfully demonstrated that nominal devaluation in 
developing countries has contractionary effects on economic activity95. As Agenor and 
Montiel (1996) put it, although a nominal depreciation may improve the trade balance
94 The exchange rate plays a key role in the transmission of shocks in macroeconometric models (Whitley, 
1994).
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and the balance of payments, it is usually associated with a rise in the price level, which 
may turn into inflation and ultimately erode external competitiveness.
It has been argued that devaluation will reduce the demand for domestically produced 
goods as a result of the redistribution of income from sectors with high propensity to 
spend on goods to sectors with a lower propensity. Cooper (1971) mentioned the 
possibility of redistribution from the factors engaged in purely domestic industries to the 
factors engaged in export- and import-competing industries. The latter view suggests that 
exports and imports will change following devaluation, and hence the trade balance will 
be affected either positively or negatively. It is a well-established fact that imports and 
exports taxes are important revenues for many governments in developing countries. In 
support of the importance of trade taxes, Kragman and Taylor (1978) maintained that 
nominal devaluation that succeeds in depreciating the real exchange rate will increase the 
real tax burden on the private sector by increasing the real value of trade taxes, for given 
levels of imports and exports.
Another related issue to be affected by devaluation is the level of debt. The public sector 
in developing countries own most of the external debt. The existence of a foreign- 
currency denominated external debt in developing countries implies that devaluation 
would affect the external indebtedness of these economies96. In theory, if the external 
debt is owned by the public sector, a real devaluation will increase the real value of 
interest payments abroad and the government can finance a rise in debt service payments 
by increasing taxes. Alternatively, it can spend less, increase borrowing from the central 
bank or finance through foreign capital inflows from abroad. If the government increases 
taxes to finance the debt, disposable income will decrease and therefore devaluation will 
exert contractionary effects on the demand side of the economy. In favour of 
contractionary effects of devaluation, Branson (1986) and Buffie (1986b) maintained that 
a substantial portion of any new investment in developing countries is likely to consist of
95 Kingman and Taylor (1978) have identified a number of channels through which contractionary effects 
could arise. The contractionary effects are beyond the scope of this study and therefore will not be 
discussed further.
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imported capital goods. Hence a real depreciation will raise the price of capital in terms 
of home goods, discouraging new investment and exerting a contractionary effect 011  
aggregate demand. Taylor (1983) and Van Wijnbergen (1983a) conclude that devaluation 
affects the supply side of the economy and hence exert contractionary effects on the 
supply of domestic output by increasing the cost of working capital.
Empirical evidence provided by ICamin (1988) and Edwards (1989b), offer little evidence 
to confirm that devaluation are followed by significant contractions in output whilst the 
study by Sheehey (1986) appears to support the contractionary devaluation hypothesis for 
Latin America. Another study by Edwards (1986) on twelve developing countries reports 
that real-exchange-rate changes have a small contractionary effect in the short mn and in 
the long mn devaluation is neutral97. In the context of these issues surrounding 
devaluation, many policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa have maintained that exchange 
rate devaluation is stagflationary as a consequence of its contractionary effect on 
aggregate demand combined with the cost-push effects of rising import prices. More 
recently the Mexican peso crisis in 1994-95, the crisis in the Franc Zone in 1994, and the 
currency crisis in East Asia in 1997 and 1998, all of which culminated in large 
devaluation, have clearly demonstrated that nominal devaluation has a number of 
macroeconomic consequences on the economy.
Firstly, a nominal devaluation will reduce the price of exported goods while increasing 
the price of imported goods, and ultimately depressing imports and boosting exports. 
Hence, an improvement in the hade balance is expected. Secondly, generated foreign 
exchange earnings would provide additional budgetary support to finance the domestic 
debt, thereby reducing the level of domestic debt. Thirdly, a nominal devaluation would 
increase interest payments 011 foreign debt. If foreign exchange earnings are not 
forthcoming, it implies that the government has to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy in 
the form of high taxes in order to provide foreign debt servicing. Fourthly, if inflation is
96 A number of researchers, Edwards (1989b), and Gylfason and Risager (1984) have studied the effects of 
devaluation on the level of external debt.
97 Branson (1986), Gylfason and Schmid (1983), and Kamas (1992) provide evidence from macroeconomic 
models on the output effect of devaluation on real income,
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relatively low in the devaluing economy, a successful devaluation which shift domestic 
demand away from foreign produced to domestically produced goods, which would curb 
imported inflation and thereby deflate the domestic economy. Alternatively, if domestic 
demand on foreign goods remained unaffected following devaluation, high foreign 
inflation imported via imports would exert inflationary pressures 011 the domestic 
economy. Fifthly, if nominal devaluation succeeds in changing the real exchange rate, 
thereby increasing exports and reducing imports, the level of income would increase. As 
a result, devaluation will not have contractionary real output effects. The section below 
provides evidence of nominal exchange rate devaluation on four economies in Southern 
Africa. Based on the preceding discussion, the effects of nominal exchange rate 
devaluation on exports, imports, inflation, real exchange rate, domestic debt, foreign 
debt, taxes, and output are extensively investigated in this chapter.
6.3 Devaluation effects on trade balance and real exchange rate
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on exports
Because these economies price export in foreign currencies, and are price takers for both 
exports and imports, devaluation will not reduce world price but will increase the 
domestic currency price. Therefore, the domestic price elasticities of demand for imports 
and of supply of exports are the most important elasticities. The elasticity of export 
supply will be higher, the shorter the gestation period of production, the greater the 
domestic consumption of the good, the greater the degree of unutilised capacity, the 
greater the availability of investment finance, and the greater the mobility of other 
resources. The domestic price of imports may not rise to the full extent of the 
devaluation, or may even fall, if devaluation is accompanied by the removal of import 
controls that previously maintained import prices at artificially high levels.
While the impact of devaluation on the demand for foreign exchange depends on the 
domestic price elasticity of demand for imports, the impact 011 the supply of foreign 
exchange depends on the elasticity of supply with respect to increased profits in the 
export sector.
As shown in figure 6.1 a nominal devaluation of 5% has promoted exports in Namibia 
and Botswana only, but not in Mauritius and South Africa. In Botswana export 
contractions occurred in the period 1973-77 before expanding in the aftermath period. 
Not surprisingly, export expansion in Botswana coincides with the discoveiy of world 
high quality diamonds in the mid-1970s. Export of South Africa appeal's to have 
increased in the 1970 only, but then declined drastically in the 1980s throughout the 
1990s. This poor export perfonnance in the face of nominal exchange rate devaluation is 
attributed to the trade embargoes and economic sanctions applied against South Africa by 
the international community due to its apartheid policies and which were intensified in 
the early 1980s.
Because the Mauritius Rupee has undergone massive depreciation in the past, it appears 
to suggest that a devaluation of a weaker currency will not boost exports but rather would 
result in declining exports. Based on these results, there is no need to devalue an 
undervalued currency, which explains why exchange rate devaluations in many weak 
African currencies have in the past failed to promote exports. A notable difference is that 
the effects of exchange rate devaluation on exports in Namibia, Mauritius, and South 
Africa, are downward, not upward like in Botswana. These differences suggest that 
devaluation has caused greater short-term effects on exports (in the 1970s) in the former 
economies, but greater long run effects in the latter economy (after the 1980s).
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on imports
Figure 6.2 reports the effects of a nominal devaluation on imports. Compatible with a 
priori theoretical expectations, imports have declined only in Mauritius and South Africa, 
whereas they have increased in Namibia and Botswana. Since the latter economies are 
high import-dependent economies, an inelastic high domestic demand in these economies 
has remained unaffected by real exchange rate depreciation, and therefore imports have 
remained on the rise. On the other hand, because Mauritius and South Africa are not 
import-dependent economies, a decline in domestic demand for imported goods has 
reduced imports. Following the changes in both exports and imports in these economies, 
the trade balance can either improve or deteriorate.
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Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on trade balance
When a country is running persistent trade imbalances, a turning point from trade deficits 
to surpluses will be necessary to maintain solvency and sustainability. When the deficit is 
reduced without reducing domestic absorption and economic growth, the deficit is likely 
sustainable. When the deficit is reduced with reduction in domestic absorption and 
economic growth, the deficit is not sustainable. One option is to devalue the currency in 
an attempt to cure external imbalances. If nominal devaluation is effective in increasing 
export earnings and constraining imports, then the trade balance will improve. However, 
if it is ineffective, because of wage resistance, it will only eliminate currency 
overvaluation and deteriorate the hade balance. The effects of devaluation on the trade 
balance are reported in figure 6.3.
Namibia and Botswana have witnessed an improvement in the trade balance, whilst it has 
worsened in Mauritius and South Africa. These contrasting results reveal that while both 
imports and exports have increased following devaluation, external imbalances have been 
reduced in the former economies, suggesting the importance and dominance of exports 
promotion in improving the hade balance. Similarly, while both exports and imports have 
declined, it has contributed to external imbalances in the latter economies, suggesting that 
a fall in exports in the face of declining imports will only worsen the hade balance. 
Therefore, to improve the trade balance, devaluation must increase exports.
1 3 7
Permanent Shock Simulation: Percentage changes from the base line 
Figure 6.1 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on exports
Botswana
Figure 6.2 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on imports
Botswana
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Table 6.1 Exports and Imports Elasticities of Exchange Rate Devaluation 
(Estimation Model)
Countries Namibia Botswana Mauritius South Africa
Exports Elasticity 
(XE)
0.1 0.08 0.01 0.01
Imports
Elasticitiy (ME)
-0.09 -0.01 -0.39 -0.11
XE + ME
Sum of Trade
Elasticities
0.01 0.07 -0.38 -0.1
Marshall-Leamer 
Condition 
(XE+ME >0)
Satisfied Satisfied Not Satisfied Not Satisfied
Table 6.2 Exports and Imports Elasticities of Exchange Rate Devaluation 
(Simulation Model)
Countries Namibia Botswana Mauritius South Africa
Mean Exports 
Elasticity (XE)
0.35 0.26 -0.11 0.02
Mean Imports 
Elasticitiy (ME)
0.79 0.11 -0.12 -0.10
XE + ME
Sum of Trade
Elasticities
1.14 0.37 -0.23 -0.08
Marshall-Leamer 
Condition 
(XE+ME >0)
Satisfied Satisfied Not Satisfied Not Satisfied
Assuming a small country case, the Marshall-Lemer condition states that devaluation will 
improve the trade balance if the sum of domestic price elasticity of demand for imports 
and of supply of exports is greater than zero; and if the sum is less than zero, devaluation
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would worsen the trade balance. From table 6.1 and 6.2, the Marshall-Lemer condition is 
not satisfied in Mauritius and South Africa, but satisfied in Namibia and Botswana. These 
findings are consistent with the results shown in figure 6.3, in which devaluation has 
deteriorated the trade balance in the former countries, but improved in the latter 
countries. As long as these economies are assumed to be small case countries (as they 
are), the Marshall-Lemer condition is met in only two economies.
If the assumption of a small country case is relaxed, these findings are still consistent 
with the current view that, it is possible for the trade balance to improve98 even if the 
price elasticities sum to less than unity, as long as foreign prices change less than the 
exchange rate. From table 6.2, when the the Marshall-Lerner condition is defined in terms 
of elasticities in excess of unity, this condition is satisfied in the country which a follow a 
pegged exchange rate system (Namibia). Clearly, the short run benefits of pegging are 
well confirmed in Namibia. Hence, the devaluation has improved the trade balance in 
Namibia and Botswana only. If it was not export contraction in the early 1970s in 
Botswana before the discovery of diamonds, the Marshall-Lemer condition might have 
been satisfied in this economy.
Without a rise in exports in the face of falling imports, devaluation will only deteriorate 
the hade balance. Clearly, the importance of promoting exports in restoring external 
balance is well confirmed, and this simulation evidence indicates that these economies 
should diversify their exports and shift away from primary commodity exports to 
manufacturing exports and exports of services. Given the difficulties in achieving export 
expansion in the short nm, the focus will be on reducing luxury imports in order to cure 
external imbalances.
External imbalances are due to excess demand or deficient supply. It is a task of policy 
makers to choose between increasing supply to boost exports and reducing demand to 
depress imports. On the supply side, lags can operate in the adjustment process, 
particularly for these economies producing primary commodities. Lags may be quite long
98 Trade balance improved in Namibia and Botswana following devaluation.
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when the response being sought is the exploitation of a new mineral resource or the 
development of new crops with a relatively long growing cycle. Because many 
economies are import dependent conomies, most imports are factors inputs used to fuel 
domestic industries.
Reducing imports will have long-run adverse effect on the growth potential of these 
economies and is likely to reduce the productive capacity of the economy in the short run. 
Eventually it would result in macroeconomic instabilities and further worsening of the 
trade balance. The message here is clear that once an economy begins to suffer from 
external imbalances, the restoration of external balances is painful and difficult to 
achieve, and devaluation may not always be effective.
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on real exchange rate 
Evidence so far suggest that, other things being equal, devaluation will tend to have 
inflationary effects but that these will not prevent nominal devaluations from bringing 
about a depreciation in the real exchange rate (see figure 6.5). A nominal devaluation of 
5% has successfully depreciated the real exchange rate by abound 6% in the begimiing of 
1970 until late 1970s, in all countries (excluding Mauritius), and then depreciated by less 
than 5% throughout the period. Consistent with expectations, this downward real 
exchange rate effect reveals that a nominal devaluation exerts greater effects on real 
exchange rates in the short-run, but these effects are not much significant in the long run. 
That the effects of nominal devaluation are more powerful in the immediate period 
following devaluation is borne out by evidence, which suggest that the use of exchange 
rate as a policy instrument is potent in the short run.
This is because in the long run, the second round effects of devaluation are realized on 
the economy, and its effect becomes less and less significant. Since nominal devaluation 
is successful in influencing the real exchange rate in these economies, a sound conduct of 
exchange rate policy is crucial and should be promoted at all times. Because Mauritius 
has the weakest currency, and the rupee has experienced a massive depreciation against 
the US dollar in nominal terms in the same period, a nominal devaluation appears to have
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no significant impact on the real exchange rate. Clearly these simulation results indicate 
that a nominal devaluation would significantly depreciate the real exchange rate of a hard 
currency, but insignificant effects on a soft currency".
6.4 Devaluation effects on real income and inflation
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on income
According to figure 6.9 there is strong evidence to conclude that, in these Southern 
African economies, a contractionary effect of a nominal devaluation on real output is not 
supported by the data. Importantly, a nominal devaluation, whether it improve or 
deteriorate the trade balance, is not necessarily contractionary as has been asserted by 
earlier researchers on developing countries. Because a nominal devaluation has caused an 
enormous tax reduction more in Namibia than in other economies, it has, as a result, 
increased income more in Namibia and less in other economies. The important 
conclusion here is that a nominal devaluation has a positive impact on the level of 
economic activities and would result in accelerating output in these Southern African 
economies.
hi the real world, it is possible that countries might undertake active fiscal policy 
following devaluation. Figure 6.11 shows the effects of an expansionary fiscal 
accommodation (5%) of devaluation, on real income100. These combined policy effects 
have raised the level of income in Botswana and South Africa, but not in Namibia and 
Mauritius. The contractionary income effect of devaluation evident in Botswana and 
Mauritius in the early 1970s in the absence of fiscal accommodation is completely 
eliminated. From policy implications, it suggests that when devaluation is accompanied 
by an active fiscal policy, the adverse income effects of devaluation in the short run will 
be immediately eroded. This conclusion confirms why in the real world devaluation is 
often combined with expansionary fiscal policy in order to minimise its associated 
adverse income effects (evident in figure 6.9 for Botswana and Mauritius). Another
99 The South African Rand, Botswana Pula, and Namibia Dollar are African hard currencies, unlike the 
Mamitius Rupee.
100 If devaluation is accompanied by an expansionary fiscal policy, it will raise taxes.
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Figure 6.3 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on trade balance
Figure 6.4 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on inflation
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Figure 6.5 Devaluation effects (5%) on real exchange rate 
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Figure 6.7 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on domestic debt
South Africa
Figure 6.8 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on foreign debt
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Figure 6.9 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) on real income
Botswana
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Figure 6.10 Devaluation effects (5%) on foreign capital inflows
Botswana
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Figure 6.11 Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation (5%) accommodated by
fiscal expansion (government spending 5%) on real income
Botswana
sfb (A oSb qN qJ*oA oA dp ,Qp .Qp <#> .4*
important message appeal's to indicate that a policy of fiscal accommodation will contract 
the level of income in Namibia and Mauritius. Clearly, an active fiscal policy following 
devaluation might lead to higher income in some countries, but might result in lower 
income in other countries. The important message here is that the effects of devaluation 
accompanied by active fiscal policy are country-specific and cannot be generalised across 
countries.
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on inflation
Is an empirical question whether devaluation will have inflationary effects or not. If 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies are pursued following devaluation, devaluation 
will have inflationary effects. Pessimism over the values of both foreign and domestic 
trade elasticities casts some doubt over whether devaluation will improve the trade 
balance. Since these economies are likely to pursue expansionary fiscal and monetary
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policies following devaluation for the fear of its stagflationary effects and elasticity 
pessimism, inflation is likely to accelerate. As depicted in figure 6.4, devaluation has 
inflationary effects in Namibia, Botswana, Mamitius, but not in South Africa. Increasing 
imports in Namibia and Botswana might have caused an increase in the import of foreign 
inflation and thereby pushing up domestic prices. Alternatively a rise in foreign capital 
inflows (hence unsterilised) due to the effectiveness of devaluation in improving the trade 
balance have contributed positively to a rise in domestic inflation. A fall in exports in 
Mauritius has resulted in deteriorating trade imbalances, capital inflows (see figure 6.10), 
rocketing interest rates, and eventually increased the domestic prices. Like other 
countries, there is an increasing dependency on imports in Mamitius. If the declining 
imports have reduced domestic supply and hence created excess demand, then increasing 
inflation in Mamitius is attributable to excess demand in the economy.
In contrast, exchange rate devaluation has inflicted deflationary effects on the South 
African economy only, which suggests that in a powerful self-reliant economy with a 
strong industrial base and which is the region powerhouse, a nominal devaluation would 
not be inflationary, but rather deflationary. A significant fall in imports might have 
reduced the importation of high foreign inflation into South Africa. Since South Africa 
has import-substitutes, a decline in imports appears not to have reduced domestic supply, 
which explains why inflation has continued to decline in the face of devaluation. Unlike 
in other economies, it implies that the import-substituting industries and export 
competing industries in South Africa have implemented competitive hade strategies to 
weather the inflation risk associated with nominal devaluation. While inflationary effects 
of devaluation are well confirmed, inflation has increased by less than 1 per cent, 
however, declining by less than 1.5 per cent in South Africa. Clearly, the passthrough 
inflation effects of devaluation in these economies is relatively low, which indicate that 
devaluation will not lead to high inflation as is generally perceived.
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6.5 Devaluation effects on taxes and domestic debt
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on taxes
In theory, when foreign exchange earnings are forthcoming, the fiscal gap is expected to 
narrow and thereby relaxing government taxation efforts. The effects of a nominal 
devaluation on taxes are shown in figure 6.6. Inadequate foreign exchange earnings as a 
result of the deterioration in the trade balance have prompted a rise in taxes in South 
Africa. In Namibia and Botswana taxes were relaxed because improvement in the trade 
balance was expected to bringing about internal balance, and because these economies 
are facing sound fiscal balances. In the face of increasing external imbalances and signs 
of a rise in inflation, to counter economic slowdown, taxes were relaxed in Mauritius. 
Despite foreign exchange earnings, Botswana has raised taxes by less than 0.1 per cent in 
order to maintain its fiscal surpluses. Simulation results shows that devaluation can result 
in either falling or a rising in taxes but its effects are very little and below a quarter per 
cent. Clearly, nominal devaluation as expected, does not have much effect on taxes, 
unless the economy is facing an exchange rate crisis.
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on domestic debt
Provided that export expansion is greater than import contraction, exchange rate 
devaluation has a positive income effect in this model. An inflationary effect arising from 
a rise in income will reduce the real interest rate. A decline in real interest rate will 
reduce domestic debt and hence induce a fall in taxes. The effects of a nominal 
devaluation on domestic debt are reported in figure 6.7. Additional foreign exchange 
earnings arising from export expansion have improved government fiscal stance and 
hence contributed positively to a reduction in domestic debt in Namibia. Nominal 
devaluation has reduced the domestic debt in Mauritius, despite the deterioration in the 
trade balance. This inflationary effect of devaluation explains these discretionary taxes 
emanating from devaluation in Namibia and Mauritius. Therefore, a fall in taxes 
following devaluation might have stimulated investment, increased income, improved 
government fiscal stance and triggered a reduction in domestic debt in Mauritius.
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Despite a rise in inflation in Botswana, devaluation have contributed positively to a rise 
in domestic debt, which is attributed to events in the Botswana economy. Although taxes 
decreased only marginally by less than 0.1 per cent in Botswana, this insignificant tax 
effort was not adequate to bring about domestic debt reduction. Given the low level of 
domestic debt in Botswana, it has traditionally added foreign exchange earnings to its 
international foreign reserves101. This explains why domestic debt increases in the face of 
improvement in the trade balance because foreign exchange earnings were not used to 
service the domestic debt.
Given the deflationary effects of devaluation on the South African economy, a rise in real 
interest rate might have contributed to a rise in domestic debt, which is explained within 
the model. The rise in domestic debt in South Africa can also be explained by events in 
the South African economy, which are not captured in the model. For example, the lack 
of adequate foreign exchange receipts in South Africa as a result of observed exports’ 
contractions might have deteriorated government's fiscal position and thereby fuelled 
domestic debt by less than a quarter percentage point throughout the entire period. 
Following the independence of South Africa in 1994, domestic debt is rising at an 
alarming rate and government fiscal stance is deteriorating, which is a matter of great 
concern. One possible explanation deteriorating the internal imbalances is the ambitious 
poverty reduction and growth generation strategy based on expansionary fiscal policy, 
implemented after independence aimed at fighting abject poverty and escalating problem 
of unemployment.
Another explanation is the increasing crime rate, which is affecting the tourism sector 
negatively and hence resulting in declining number of foreign tourist (and therefore 
reducing foreign exchange earnings). It has been well recognized that in the context of a 
developing economy, the existence of a foreign exchange gap, which implies lower hade 
taxes and inadequate foreign aid has adverse effects on government revenues. The 
simulation results indicate that nominal devaluation can either reduce or raise the
101 Unlike other African economies, Botswana has successfully and wisely accumulated huge foreign 
exchange reserves.
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domestic debt, depending on its effects on the overall economy, and its effects are 
country-specific and cannot be generalised across countries. If the government decides to 
use the extra foreign exchange receipts to finance the domestic debt, the debt will fall. 
Alternatively, if is used to fund the war or added to foreign exchange reserves, the debt 
will increase.
6.6 Devaluation effects on foreign debt
Effects of nominal exchange rate devaluation on foreign debt
If external debt is denominated in the US$, then devaluation will worsen external debt. 
With a rise in external debt in the developing world at an alarming rate, most 
governments in developing economies are demanding more lending (in addition to debt 
relief and forgiveness) from the IMF to foster growth and thereby to fund the external 
debt. Evidence shows that without external financing, in the face of the failure to ensure 
domestic adjustment to reduce external indebtedness, the unsustainable external debt is 
likely to cripple these economies. It is well known that developing countries use the IMF 
as a lender of last resort, only turning to it when all other financing options have been 
exhausted. External financing assistance is sought only when these countries face severe 
balance of payments difficulties, depleted international reserves, and high levels of 
external debt, low investment and slow economic growth. The IMF lending is tied to 
policy conditionality. Some of the conditions include exchange rate devaluation, raising 
interest rates and reducing fiscal imbalances. Does devaluation reduce or worsen the debt 
in these economies?
IMF lending has positive effects when it is seen as efforts to eliminate currency 
overvaluation and raise domestic interest rate to encourage capital inflows and increase 
investors' confidence. It also has negative effects where devaluation generates 
expectations of further devaluation and raising interest rate indicate severe economic 
distress and thereby result in capital outflows. In figure 6.10, the effects of nominal 
devaluation on foreign capital inflows are shown. Foreign capital inflows increased in the 
period 1979-96 in Namibia and South Africa, surged massively in 1986-87 in Botswana, 
increased in 1973-76 in Mauritius. The massive increases in foreign capital inflows
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evident in Namibia and Botswana were caused by the effectiveness of devaluation, which 
has improved the trade balance in these two economies only. Similarly, trade balance 
deterioration has resulted into massive capital outflows in South Africa, but not in 
Mauritius. The theory suggests ambiguous conclusions102.
While IMF lending has been too little and too late; evidence shows that its lending is not 
associated with increasing lending from other sources. Its involvement is mostly seen as a 
indicator of the extreme severity of a country's economic difficulties; its lending is used 
to repay other creditors, but not to finance productive investment. As a consequence, 
many developing economies have found themselves in debt trap, and hence facing high 
and rising levels of external debt. However, these four economies are not facing the debt 
crisis, and their external debts are sustainable.
As shown in figure 6.8, nominal devaluation has resulted in a reduction of foreign debt in 
Namibia, Botswana, and Mauritius, but not in South Africa. Despite a rise in taxes in 
South Africa to finance directly the domestic debt and indirectly the foreign debt, the 
foreign debt has only worsened following devaluation. A rise in foreign debt is also well 
explained by deterioration in external imbalances. Clearly, the effects of nominal 
devaluation in all countries are large on foreign debt, indicating that nominal devaluation 
exerts greater effects on foreign debt than on domestic debt as expected. This is because 
devaluation affects the external balance of the economy more than the internal balance 
because foreign debts are priced in foreign currencies.
Devaluation appears to have reduced foreign debt in Botswana by more than 2 per cent. 
These results demonstrate that nominal devaluation is likely to be more effective in 
reducing foreign debt when the economy has a hard currency. While devaluation has 
increased domestic debt in Botswana, it has reduced the foreign debt. However, its effects
i02 Opponents of IMF lending argue that its lending create moral hazard by rewarding those countries that 
threaten default and demand debt rescheduling or debt relief, and delay adjustment in developing countries. 
On the other hand, supporters of the IMF lending argue that because of market failure and externalities, 
unwillingness of commercial creditors to provide finance, volatility of private capital flows and 
shortcomings in the international monetary system, lending is necessary to support structural adjustment in 
developing countries.
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in other countries have been consistent both with respect to its effects 011 foreign and 
domestic debt. One good explanation for a rise in domestic debt in Botswana is because 
this economy has in the past ran persistent fiscal surpluses, therefore, by allowing its low 
domestic debt to rise in response to devaluation, has not any adverse implications on its 
fiscal stance, unlike in the other economies.
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7.1 Government Spending Effects
After the great depression of the 1930s, and because of market failure to provide essential 
services such as education, defense, health, etc, the importance of government spending 
in promoting economic has received attention in the literature, hi the recent past, the use 
of public expenditure and its effectiveness in improving the quality of life has become a 
major focus of fiscal economics. This is because it has been recognized that market 
failures cause externalities, which the private sector is not prepared to cover. To reverse 
the economic decline that began in the 1970s, many Sub-Saharan African countries have 
unsuccessfully undertaken structural adjustment programs recommended by the World 
Bank and the IMF103. These programs have advocated fiscal restraint to reduce the fiscal 
deficit to a sustainable level by reducing government spending. Following these structural 
adjustment programs, many policy issues and controversial debates emerged. The issue 
has been which part of government expenditure to cut, should capital spending be 
increased or current spending reduced. Other related issues have been whether 
government spending is unproductive and should be reduced, and whether reducing 
government spending will not adversely affect economic growth and development. These 
controversies had prompted Peacock and Wiseman (1972) to argue that we have no 
theory of government expenditure.
hi their study using data for 69 developing countries, Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 
(1993) report that the traditional view, that public capital spending strengthens economic 
growth while current spending does not, is not borne out by experience in developing 
countries. Landau (1983), Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990) have distinguished between 
productive and unproductive government spending. According to Grier and Tullock 
(1989), while it provides utility to household, government consumption lowers economic 
growth because the higher taxes needed to finance the consumption expenditure reduce 
returns on investments and the incentive to invest. Barro (1990) finds that an increase in 
resources devoted to non-productive government consumption is associated with lower
Chapter 7 Policy Simulations: Fiscal Policy (Government Expenditure)
103 These programs are designed to pave the way for long-term development and prosperity by 
fundamentally restructuring African economies (World Bank, 1994).
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per capita growth. Available evidence reveals that an austerity program (designed to cut 
government expenditure irrespective of whether productive or unproductive), has resulted 
in an increase in political unrest. It has also worsened poverty because it has more 
disastrous effects on the poor than the rich, especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa104. The lack of political will on the part of politicians to cut government spending, 
coupled with increasing political resistance, have made it difficult for governments in 
LDCs to pursue a policy of fiscal restraint.
It is for this reason that many developing economies have faced a deteriorating fiscal 
position. The lack of fiscal restraint in the developing world has also been one of the 
principal causes of poor economic performance. Furthermore, Pfeffermann and 
Madarassy (1993) found that about 43 percent of total investment in 47 developing 
countries was public sector investment, which highlighted the critical role played by the 
public sector in the development process. That the public sector and the level of 
government spending matters in the development process is well confirmed by Agenor 
and Montiel (1996) who argues that the supply-side of the public sector should not be 
ignored.
Clearly, the literature shows that government spending is an important policy instrument 
and its effects arising form a rise in sound government spending can promote growth and 
accelerate the development process. Similarly, unsound government spending can lead to 
macroeconomic instabilities and economic slowdown. The effects on the economy 
associated with a rise in government spending (10%) investigated in this chapter are 
reported in figure 7.1-7.11. Because the economies under study have neither undertaken 
the structural adjustment program of the Fimd and the Bank (except Mauritius) nor have 
pursued unsound macroeconomic policies, it is expected that a rise in government 
spending in these economies would contribute positively to the development process.
104 This political resistance has partly made the Fund and the Banks programs unsuccessful. Another reason 
advanced in the developing world for die inappropriateness of these programs was their demand side 
approach of reducing aggregate demand. Hence it has been argued that these programs have overlooked 
efforts to improve die supply side of die economy by increasing output and tiierefore they are inappropriate. 
More reasons for die failure of the Fund and Bank programs have been advanced in the literature, however, 
die reasons are beyond the scope of tiiis study.
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7.2 Government spending effects on investment and consumption
Effects of a rise in government spending on investment
Figure 7.1 presents the results of a 10% permanent increase in government spending. The 
results revealed that government spending has stimulated investment in all countries. As 
evidence shows, an investment boom has occurred in the 1980s in Namibia, and in the 
1970s in Mauritius. After 1979 the effects has remained constant around 4 per cent in 
South Africa, and in late 1990s in Botswana.. These results suggest that most of 
government spending in these economies were productive and hence have shifted the 
production frontier outward. In theory, when the domestic economy faces the debt 
overhang problem, investment is discouraged. While a rise in government spending has 
raised the level of debt in these economies (see figure 7.7), it has stimulated investment. 
This is because these economies are not heavily indebted countries and their debt levels 
are sustainable. The low and declining effects of government spending in Mauritius is 
attributed to the rapid rise in the debt in the 1990s, which is creating a disincentive to 
raise productive investment. Government spending has contributed to massive investment 
in South Africa, larger than in other economies.
Effects of a rise in government spending on consumption
Before these economies adopted sound economic policies in the 1980s, high levels of 
consumption were observed in the 1970s, as shown in figure 7.2. A persistent decline in 
consumption in the late 1990s observed in Namibia and Mauritius rightly coincide with 
the low levels of imports in the same period. From figure 7.3, a downward trend in 
imports is well documented. Because Namibia and Mauritius are relatively high 
consumption economies, the observed decline in consumption is necessary and justifiable 
so as to release more resources for investment. Differences in macroeconomic 
performance of world economies have shown that fast growing economies have invested 
much of their resources and have less consumed them. On the other hand, high 
consumption combined with low investment has triggered poor economic performance in 
a growing number of poor countries. A fall in imports in Botswana in early 1980s has 
consistently caused a fall in consumption during the same period, and import instability 
explains the observed variations in consumption. Consumption smoothing in South
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Permanent Shock Simulation: Percentage changes from the base line 
Figure 7.1 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on investment
Figure 7.2 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on consumption
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Africa is consistent with steady levels of imports observed in this economy. Clearly, 
imports are a major determinant of consumption in these economies, because most 
imported goods are consumed rather than invested. Because consumers in these 
economies are not forward-looking (thus are shortsighted), consumption depends on 
current income alone so that income has major effects on consumption.
7.3 Government spending effects on imports and taxes
Effects of a rise in government spending on imports
Figure 7.3 shows the effects of government spending on imports. Simulation results tell 
us that since the mid-1980s, high levels of government spending has increased imports in 
these economies. The accumulated huge international reserves have contributed 
positively to high levels of imports in South Africa. High imports propensity in excess of 
2.5% evident in South Africa is consistent with the high degree of openness of the South 
African economy as well as the size of the domestic market in South Africa and of its 
neighboring countries. As noted earlier, most of imports from overseas into the remaining 
economies and other Southern African economies are re-imported from South Africa. It 
follows that, most of South Africa imports are not only for the domestic market, but also 
are mostly re-exported to other regional economies.
That South Africa is indeed a large cosmopolitan economy which caters for all regional 
economies in Southern Africa, is well-confirmed by simulation results, which reveal high 
levels of imports in this economy, hi order to live within its means and maintain the 
external balance, Botswana has kept its imports low and hence has succeeded in building 
its strong international reserves. Evidence reveals that Namibia and Mauritius have in the 
recent past experienced insufficient and falling levels of international reserves explain the 
declining levels of imports in these economies. Unlike in the remaining economies, rising 
government spending in South Africa has contributed positively to the imports of factor 
inputs needed in supporting domestic infant industries. These industries with aid of 
government subsidies are then encouraged to export goods and services to neighbouring 
countries.
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Effects of a rise in government spending on taxes
The tax stabilization rule which entails the financing of a quarter of debt cumulated in the 
previous period by increasing taxes have stabilized the level of debt from 1985 
throughout the 1990s in South Africa only, as shown in figure 7.6. As expected, efforts to 
finance the debt have increased the tax burden in these economies. The results 
demonstrate that a rise in government spending today implies that more taxes tomorrow 
to finance the debt are inevitable. However, if increasing tax finances more than a quarter 
of debt it would constraint domestic investment. Alternatively, failure to fund the debt 
through more taxes, the problem of government solvency will arise, thus, discouraging 
further capital inflows from abroad, and which ultimately will create liquidity problems. 
A combination of these factors has disastrous effects of crippling the domestic economy 
and causing severe economic back down, and eventually inviting a debt crisis.
Unlike in other economies, tax increases in Botswana have remained constantly around 
5% throughout the simulation period before a sharp tax rise in 1992. Botswana recorded 
its first fiscal deficits since 1980 in 1992, and hence the tax increase was necessary to 
finance the debt and hence foster macroeconomic stability. Another objective of 
increasing the tax was to restore investors' confidence in the economy that the economy 
is not facing unsustainable debts. As the results show, a rise in government spending has 
raised taxes in all countries as expected, but by less than the increase in government 
spending.
7.4 Government spending effects on real exchange rate
Effects of a rise in government spending on real exchange rate
The effects of an increasing government spending on the exchange rate is reported in 
figure 7.5. Based on the simulation model, expansionary fiscal policy has inflationary 
pressures on the domestic economy, thereby appreciating the real exchange rate. While 
governments spending is expected to raise the level of national income via its positive 
effects on investment and consumption; it has also unwarranted negative effects on the 
level of national income. The latter effects are due to the appreciation of the exchange
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Figure 7.3 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on imports
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Figure 7.5 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on real exchange rate
rate, which discourages exports and thereby reducing income. As confirmed by 
simulation results that government spending exert effects on the real exchange rate, this 
finding shows that the conduct of fiscal policy has major impact on the volatility of real 
exchange rate.
In the real world, if government spending remain on the rise in the long- run, a persistent 
appreciation of the currency will result in growing hade deficits. As external imbalances 
are worsening, the fiscal stance of the government will deteriorate due to declining trade 
revenues used to finance government activities. As a result the domestic debt will rise, 
and efforts to finance the debt will lead to accelerating domestic inflation and rocketing 
real interest rates. This would depress domestic investment and bigger economic 
slowdown. If taxes are raised to finance the debt, domestic savings will decrease, as 
investors will move capital gains and profits abroad into safe heavens, hi addition there 
would be no incentives to invest domestically. Eventually, capital outflows and the 
subsequent collapse of the exchange rate will follow (hence the exchange rate will
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depreciate massively in the long run), which will necessitate a large exchange rate 
devaluation. Therefore, rising government spending will only cause the currency to be 
overvalued and hence contributing, adversely to long- run growth prospects.
7.5 Government spending effects on domestic debt and foreign debt
Effects of a rise in government spending on domestic debt
The traditional Keynesian wisdom of raising government spending to revive the economy 
imposes additional costs on the economy in the form of a high debt burden. While it can 
raise the level of income, it results in additional debt creation. If the debt created is not 
sustained and reduced over time, it has the potential to turn growth into a prolonged 
economic decline and growing macroeconomic instabilities. Ultimately it would slow 
down the development process in the face of falling levels of income. Low level of debts 
evident in these economies appears to have not yet created the problem of debt overhang 
and consequently there are incentives to encourage productive investment. From figure 
7.6, clearly, as expected, the simulation results has confirmed that rising government 
spending is the root cause of increasing public sector indebtedness in these economies. 
The domestic debt is on the rise and has worsened in the 1990s. The tax stabilization rule
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Figure 7.6 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on domestic debt
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has stabilized the domestic debt in South Africa only after the period 1986. Since 1983 
the domestic debt has increased by more than 10 per cent in South Africa. Such a large 
peacetime increase in domestic debt is unprecedented in the history of these economies.
Effects of a rise in government spending on foreign debt
Many developing countries accumulated huge foreign debts in the 1970s, before the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s. In August 1982, Mexico suspended payments on its foreign 
debt, which have triggered an international debt crisis. Since then an increasing number 
of developing countries has become externally indebted and demanded debt forgiveness. 
Sachs (1984) have argued that the existence of a debt overhang creates disincentives for 
domestic investment in the debtor country, and that debt forgiveness can both stimulate 
domestic investment and increase the actual payments received by creditors. Available 
evidence seems to suggest that that poor growth performance of many developing 
countries in the past years has partly caused by the prevalence of debt overhang in these 
economies. The relationship between the levels of income and debt is a well-established 
fact. An economy faced with low debt/GDP ratio is likely to experience a high growth 
rate than a severely indebted economy (i.e, with unsustainable, and high debt/GDP ratio).
In the real world, servicing any unsustainable foreign debt has adverse effects on the 
domestic economy. Increasing external debt tends to raise domestic interest rates and 
consequently crowding out investment. Capital outflows as a consequence of external 
indebtedness have a depressing effect on the growth performance of the economy. Figure
7.7 confirm that government spending has also increased the foreign debt in all countries, 
hi this model, a rise in government spending exerts effect on the trade balance via its 
effects on income and the real exchange rate. When rising government spending 
deteriorates the trade balance, it will worsen the level of external debt. The results 
indicate that the effects of government spending on foreign debt were reduced in the early 
1980s in Botswana, but then start rising again after 1986. Government spending has 
inflicted upward effects on the foreign debt in all countries, however, showing a sharp 
fall in South Africa, which coincide with its independence in 1994. These findings reveal 
that the new government in South Africa has successfully reduced the adverse effects of
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Figure 7.8 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on inflation
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Figure 7.10 Effects of a rise in government spending (10%) on employment
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government spending on foreign debt. Efforts to lessen the effects of governments 
spending on foreign debt appear to have failed to materialize in Namibia and Mauritius.
From figure 7.11, raising government spending is reducing real income in Namibia and 
Mamitius105. Its upward effects on foreign debt as a result of the deterioration in the trade 
balance can partly explain falling income in these countries. Because government 
spending has contributed positively to foreign debt throughout the entire period, the 
servicing of the debt, coupled with increasing external imbalances has reduced domestic 
finance on investment activities106, and hence resulted in a persistent decline in domestic 
real income. Given that government spending has caused a fall in foreign debt in 
Botswana in the early 1980s and in South Africa in the 1990s, it has partly contributed 
positively to a rise in investment in these economies. If government spending effects have 
resulted in an improvement in the trade balance, then it might have caused foreign debt to 
fall, which explain rising levels of income in these economies.
The central message here is that simulation results has confirmed that rising foreign debt 
caused by the deterioration in the trade balance has crowded out investment and hence 
reduced real income in Namibia and Mamitius. On the other hand, due to improvement in 
the trade balance, it has crowded in investment and raised real income in South Africa 
and Botswana. More importantly, is that while a rise in government spending may lead to 
an increase in income directly, it may lead to a deterioration in the hade balance. Hence, 
the net effect could be a fall in income. Therefore, when government spending is on the 
rise, its effects on the trade balance is more important than its debt effects.
These interesting finding indicate that while government spending is increasing foreign 
debt, it does not always cause investment decline and negatively affects growth 
performance, however, it can in some countries. Therefore, its effects on income are 
country-specific and cannot generalized across countries. There is overwhelming
105 Declining investment and savings in Namibia and Mauritius is attributed to a rapid and persistent rise in 
foreign debt arising from increasing government spending.
106 As shown in figure 7.1, government spendmg has resulted in falling levels of investment in both 
Namibia and Mauritius, but not in Botswana and South Africa.
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evidence that all government spending causes a rise in foreign debt, but it may reduce or 
increase domestic income. Evidence shows that, as long as there is debt repayment and 
the level of debt is sustainable, debt creation my raise the level of income.
7.6 Government spending effects on employment and real income
Effects of a rise in government spending on employment
Figure 7.10 shows the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy on employment107, hi 
conformity with theoretical expectations, employment creation in all countries is evident. 
The simulation results confirmed that employment creation in South Africa would remain 
on the rise. In Mauritius, job created surged in the 1970s only, and then sharply declined 
throughout the remaining period. Since the mid-1980s, employment levels remained 
falling in Namibia, however, above 3 per cent. In Botswana, employment surged in the 
1970s, fell in the 1981-83s, and remained on the rise since then. The results clearly 
demonstrate that, unlike in the remaining economies, the conduct of fiscal policy in 
Mauritius has failed to create sufficient jobs and to sustain the level of employment in the 
long run. The crowding out of domestic savings coupled with consumption boom arising 
from the conduct of fiscal policy might have reduced the availability of domestic finance.
Hence it might have caused employment contraction in the major sectors of the economy. 
Although savings declined in Namibia, it was not severe like in Mauritius, that explain 
why more jobs were created in Namibia. In the real world, domestic saving is vital in 
financing domestic investment especially in these economies faces limited access to 
international finance. If domestic saving is declining, investment activities would shrink 
and employment creation would be at stake.
Effects of a rise in government spending on real income
When the tax stabilisation rule is relaxed, government spending effects on real income is 
shown in figure 8.4, and when is imposed government-spending effects are depicted in 
figure 7.11. Knowing the effects of government spending on real income, under two
107 Although employment does not affect anything else in the model, given the importance of employment 
creation in these economies, it is interesting to look at simulation effects on employment.
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scenarios, that is when the tax stabilisation rule if followed and when is relaxed, is of 
crucial importance in the devise of an appropriate and a sound fiscal policy. Comparing 
these alternative fiscal policies the findings are threefold. Firstly, real income surges 
more when the tax rule is relaxed in all countries, (2) the relaxation of the tax rule has 
soared real income in Namibia, (3) irrespective of whether the tax rale is in place or not, 
real income has declined in Mauritius. Interestingly, income has increased in Botswana 
and South Africa under the two alternative fiscal policies. The important message here 
appears to suggest that the tax stabilisation rale that would raise the level of savings and 
hence of income is highly needed for Mauritius. Namibia should follow a tax stabilisation 
rule to ensure that rising government spending would raise the productive capacity of the 
economy.
Without a tax stabilisation rale, rising government spending would trigger economic 
decline in Namibia and Mauritius, but not in Botswana and South Africa. Given the 
depressing effects on domestic savings arising from the tax stabilisation rule, countries 
which display low propensity to save, would require a much lower level of government 
spending to boost income than high savings economies. This is because the imposition of 
tax stabilisation rale reduces domestic savings in the low savings economies (Namibia 
and Mamitius) while it may not at all reduce domestic savings (alternatively the fall may 
be insignificant to affect the availability of domestic finance) in high savings economies 
(Botswana and South Africa).
7.7 Effects of a rise in government spending on inflation and real wage rate
As shown in figure 7.8, government spending is inflationary in all countries. That 
govermnent spending has a negative effect on the real wage rate is well-established fact 
in figure 7.9. The real wage rate has declined because of rising inflation. As shown in 
figure 7.10, employment, therefore, has increased as a result of a fall in the real wage 
rate. These results indicate that using fiscal policy the government can create 
employment but not raise the real wage rate at the same time because government 
spending is inflationary. To affect the real wage rate more directly an income policy of 
either increasing or reducing wages can be applied. Since government spending has been
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less inflationary in Namibia and Mauritius, the real wage rate in these countries has fallen 
less severe than in Botswana and South Africa.
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8,1 Controversies Surrounding Tax Cut Effects on the Economy108
All governments have some debt, although the amount varies substantially from country
to country. The traditional view of government debt states that a debt-financed tax cut 
stimulates consumer spending and lowers national savings. The contraction in saving 
raises the interest rate, which crowds out investment. Tax cuts have both short run and 
long run effects on the economy. In the short run, a rise in interest rates would encourage 
foreign capital inflows. A rise in unsterilised foreign capital inflows would appreciate the 
domestic currency and hence making exports less competitive in international commodity 
markets, hi addition, higher consumer spending would necessitate a rise in output supply, 
which would raise employment. In the long run, a smaller national saving would yield a 
low level of capital stock accumulation. In an attempt to close the domestic saving- 
investment gap through additional inflows of capital from abroad to fund domestic 
investment, the domestic economy would accumulate foreign debt and hence inn into a 
debt trap. Therefore, tax cut would increase government indebtedness.
In contrast, the Ricardian view of government debt states that a tax cut would not 
stimulate consumer spending. This is because if consumers were sufficiently forward- 
looking, the household would save the generated extra disposable income. This saving 
would then be used to pay tax liability due to the anticipated tax hike in the future 
implied by the present tax cut. The level of national saving would remain unaffected 
because the decrease in public saving is offsets by a rise in private saving. Accordingly, a 
tax cut today would lead to a tax hike in the future because the government will have to 
raise taxes in order to repay the debt and service interest payments on the debt.
A tax cut financed by government debt reschedule the tax burden between current 
generations and future generations but does not reduce it. Given that permanent income 
remained the same, consumption would not increase. The tax cut raises transitory income
Chapter 8 Policy Simulations: Fiscal Policy (Taxes) and
Income Policy (Wages)
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that eventually will fall in the future. This view which maintained that financing the 
gvemment debt is equivalent to financing it by taxes, is called Ricardian equivalence, hi 
the light of these theoretical controversies surrounding the effects of a tax cut on the 
economy, tax cut effects on the economy are analysed and discussed in this chapter109.
8.2 Tax cut effects on savings and foreign debt
Effects of a tax cut on savings
Figure 8.1 shows that tax cut has raised savings in all countries. There are two effects 
arising from tax cut on savings. Following a tax cut, disposable income and consumption 
would increase, while the former raises saving, the latter would reduce saving. 
Depending on the strengths of these two opposite effects, savings may either fall or rise. 
If the disposable income effects dominate the consumption effects, saving would 
increase, and vice versa. Based on simulation results, the dominance of the disposable 
income effects is well confirmed. Large fluctuations in saving in low savings economies 
(Namibia and Mauritius) are prevalent than in the high savings economies (Botswana and 
South Africa).
Unlike in other countries, saving has risen by less than 5 per cent throughout the 
simulation period, which suggest that most of national savings is translated into huge 
savings abroad. The inadequate and low position of international reserves coupled with 
deteriorating fiscal stance have in recent times generated expectations of massive 
depreciation of the Namibia dollar, if the govermnent happens to delink from the South 
African rand. Therefore many investors are not covered by this perceived exchange rate 
risk and hence are channeling savings in South African financial institutions. From figure
8.2 tax cuts has raised the level of foreign debt in all countries, as expected.
108 On the 28 February 2001, the Bush administration in the US presented a tax cut plan of $1.6 billion over 
the next 10 years in order to revive the largest world economy, which signify the relevance and importance 
of tax cut in any economy.
109 In this chapter, the tax rule is not followed and taxation is exogenised.
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Permanent Shock Simulation: Percentage changes from the base line 
Figure 8.1 Effects of a tax cut (10%) on savings
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8.3 Tax cut effects on income and employment
Effects of a tax cut 011 real income
That a tax cut can revive a slackening economy and generate growth is borne out by 
simulation evidence, as shown in figure 8.3. Unlike in South Africa, the tax cut effects on 
income in the remaining economies is volatile. These results indicate that following a tax 
cut, confidence on the part of consumers and investors would prevail in South Africa and 
they would not expect a tax hike in the future which prompt them to spend the extra 
disposable income generated through tax cut. In contrast in the remaining economies, a 
tax cut would be met by speculation on whether the tax cut today implies a severe tax 
hike in the future. Based on these speculations, uncertainty would affect consumption and 
investment decisions in these economies, which would have resulted in volatile spending. 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 shows the lack of consumption and investment smoothing, following 
a tax cut in Namibia, Botswana, and Mauritius. Clearly, a policy of tax cut would 
generate a surge in consumer spending and more investment activities would be 
forthcoming.
As available evidence reveals, tax cut effects would trigger more consumption but less 
investment in Mauritius and Botswana; more investment but less consumption in 
Namibia. In South Africa, the tax cut effects on consumption and investment appeal's to 
be the same. Effects of government spending on real income (when the tax stabilisation 
rule is relaxed) are contained in figure 8.4. Overwhelmingly, a rise in government 
spending would spur the growth process faster than a tax cut in Botswana, South Africa, 
and Namibia, whilst a tax cut would generate growth in Mauritius. Clearly, a tax cut is 
urgently needed in the latter economies (with low propensity to save) so as to encourage 
domestic savings and hence contribute positively to the development process.
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Figure 8.3 Effects of a tax cut (10%) on real income
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Figure 8.4 Government spending (10%) on real income (tax rule relaxed)
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Figure 8.5 Effects of a tax cut (10%) on consumption
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Figure 8.7 Effects of a tax cut (10%) ou employment
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Figure 8.8 Effects of a tax cut (10%) on real wage rate
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Effects of a tax cut on employment
The effects of a tax cut on employment are revealed in figure 8.7. As widely expected, 
employment rise is inevitable in all countries, suggesting that by reducing taxes 
incentives to invest more and hence to employ more people is created. High levels of 
employment are witnessed in Namibia, followed by South Africa. Comparing the effects 
of a rise in government spending on employment (see figure 7.10) with the tax cut 
effects, reveal the following findings. A fiscal policy of reducing the tax burden would 
create more jobs in Namibia whereas a rise in govermnent spending would result in high 
levels of employment in Botswana.
In Mamitius, employment creation would rise following a tax cut. Whether the 
government raises government spending or reduces taxes, the effects of these two 
alternative policies on tackling employment appears to be the same in South Africa, 
however government spending seems to be more potent. Comparing the effects of a tax 
cut with a rise in government spending (see figure 7.9 and figure 8.7) on the real wage 
rate, it reveals that a tax cut has greater effect on the wage rate in Namibia and Mauritius. 
Government spending exerts larger effects on the wage rate in Botswana. The effects of 
these two alternative policies appear to be the same for South Africa.
8.4 Wage rise effects on employment
Figure 8.10 shows the effects of a rise in the costs of labour (nominal wages) on 
employment, hi theory, firms tend to hire more workers when the cost of labour is low, 
and vice versa. As expected, a rise in nominal wages have increased the real wage rate as 
shown in figure 8.9, and have contracted the level of employment in all countries.
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Figure 8.9 Effects of a rise in nominal wages (5%) ou real wage rate
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Figure 8.10 Effects of a rise in nominal wages (5%) on employment
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Simulation evidence confirmed that the real wage rate has increased more in Namibia and 
Botswana, but less in Mauritius and South Africa. Clearly, a 5 per cent rise in wages 
have reduced employment by less than 1 per cent in all countries, which indicates the 
prevalence of decreasing return to employment. The wage effects of reducing 
employment are greater in the short run than in the long run, which shows that in the 
long- run employment will rise in the face of rising wages. Following a wage hike, 
employment will contract only in the short run. This is because in the long run when the 
wage effect is felt on the economy, it will raise the aggegrate demand, which in turn will 
increase the level of income. As income rises in the long run, it will exert a positive effect 
on profits of employers and hence induce them to employ more people.
However, in the long run, few people will be made redundant. This is due to time lag in 
taking employment decisions and associated negotiations with trade unions on the part of 
employers when deciding to employ less or retrenching workers, which must be in 
conformity with labour laws. Employment would decline immediately in all countries, 
suggesting that employers respond to changes in nominal wages immediately. Clearly, 
wage policy appears to be effective in tackling the problem arising from 
underemployment in these economies.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future Research 
Introduction
The main objective of this study has been to model macroeconomic performance of 
African economies during the period 1980-97110. To undertake this task a macro 
econometric model was constructed for four African economies: Namibia, Botswana, 
South Africa, and Mauritius. For each economy, long ran and error correction models 
were estimated for the period 1970-96. A number of behavioral functions were estimated: 
consumption, investment, exports, imports, money demand, inflation, natural output, and 
employment. To use the model for policy analysis, a dynamic simulation model was 
developed. The econometric package used to solve and simulate the model is WinSolve, 
version 3.40111. The model was then used to perform historical simulation, and policy 
simulations. In this "shock" simulation, the effects of economic policies on the economy 
were assessed: fiscal policy (taxes and government expenditure), monetary policy 
(interest rate), and exchange rate policy, and income policy (wages).
The model developed in this study was compared with the existing models on Botswana, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Kenya112. One major weakness of these models is that neither 
error correction models nor policy rales are features of these models, hi addition, 
simulation models that combine both the long ran model and error correction model are 
non-existent. Therefore, this study is a first attempt to construct a macroeconometric 
model on African economies, which incorporate both tax stabilisation rale113, while 
combining the long run and short ran coefficient estimates in the simulation model114. 
The unique properties of the current model demonstrate its strength, importance and 
relevance to the real world.
110 Macroeconomic performance was modelled during the period 1980-97.
111 Richard Pierse (2000) of die University of Surrey (Department of Economics, United Kingdom) 
developed this econometric package (WinSolve).
112 The model of die South African economy, developed by the South African Reserve Bank exists but is 
not in the public domain and therefore was not available.
113 According to this rale, about 25 per cent of the debt created in die previous period are raised in taxes in 
order to stabilise the level of debt in the long ran.
114 To die best of my knowledge, existing models have used only the long ran model in policy simulations 
and hence, have undermined die importance of short run dynamics and die error correction mechanism.
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The relevance of any macroeconometric model to explain the real world is of utmost 
importance. If the model fails to explain the real world, the model will be less important 
and irrelevant in the design and evaluation of macroeconomic policies. One crucial 
property of the current model lies in its strength to explain the coordinated conduct of 
fiscal and monetary policy of the US economy in the early 2001. During this period, a tax 
cut of US$1.35 trillion for the next ten years was accompanied by a series of interest rate 
cuts in an attempt to boost the US economy. Clearly, a policy of interest rate cut has been 
accommodated by a policy of tax cuts, which confirm a positive relationship between 
interest rates and taxes115. More importantly, and perhaps impressively, this positive 
relationship in the direction of these policy instruments observed in the US economy is 
well confirmed in the simulation model developed in the current study. From the 
simulation model, a rise in interest rates will add positively to the domestic indebtedness 
of these economies and thereby raise the tax collection effort. Similarly, a policy of 
interest rate cut will reduce the domestic debt burden, and contribute towards lower taxes. 
Hence, the current simulation model is relevant.
9.1 Findings
Important findings drawn from the study are threefold: findings based on estimation, 
historical simulation and policy simulation, plus assertions based on macroeconomic 
perfonnance of African economies.
9.1.1 Observed Macroeconomic Performance and Proposed Growth Policy Targets 
in African Economies
Three approaches were undertaken to quantify macroeconomic performance of African 
economies116. Firstly, the performance of Africa as a continent was assessed in relation to 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Secondly, the comparative 
macroeconomic performance within individual African countries was analysed. Thirdly,
115 From January to November 2001, the Fed (US central bank) has cut interest rates ten times.
116 A study of macroeconomic performance of African economies is vital in order to shed light on policy 
recommendations, which would help African economies to catch up with the Asian growth performance.
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African economies were grouped into two groups of countries: good performers and bad 
performers117.
Evidence based on macroeconomic performance reveals that some of the economic 
characteristics which inflict severe economic consequences in developing countries are, a 
low reserve position in the IMF, deteriorating balance of payments, inadequate 
international reserves, a high level of inflation, and poor export performance. Spectacular 
growth performance evident in the newly industrialised Asian economies is attributed to 
sound economic policies. Unsound economic policies pursued in many African 
economies appear to have contributed to a prolonged economic slowdown, which explain 
the poor economic performance witnessed in the African continent. Despite the structural 
adjustment and stabilisation policies of the IMF and the World Bank adopted in African 
economies since the early 1980s, the levels of per capita income in most economies (an 
exception being Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa)118 is relatively low.
Botswana has experienced a spectacular growth performance and is the African "Tiger 
economy". Botswana's good macroeconomic performance is equivalent to Singapore's 
remarkable performance in Asia, hi terms of macroeconomic performance, the good 
performers in order are Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia119. The good performers have 
achieved high savings and investment, adequate international reserves, strong position of 
current account, low and sustainable fiscal deficits, good export performance, high 
growth rates and high per capita income. In addition, low level of debt, low inflation and 
interest rates coupled with little nominal exchange rate depreciation is prevalent. It is 
sufficient to note that the opposite holds for the bad performers. The bad performers are 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, South Africa and 
the DRC.
117 The countries under study are Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Morocco, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Uganda, and Burkina Faso.
118 Given this abject poverty, the IMF launched the Poverty reduction and growth facility in 1999.
119 The trade embargoes and sanctions applied against South Africa in the past due to its apartheid policies 
have adversely affected macroeconomic performance of the South African economy. If it was not these 
trade sanctions, South Africa could have grown much faster like Asian economies.
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From a policy perspective, African economies should implement sound economic 
policies in order to improve macroeconomic performance and achieve long-term 
economic growth. Sound economic policies, among other things, include low budget 
deficits, sustainable current account imbalances, and low inflation, export diversification, 
mobilisation of domestic savings, accumulation of international reserves, and low growth 
of money supply. Other indicators of sound economic policies include: high degree of 
financial intermediation, low consumption spending, and promoting productive 
investment, increasing absorptive capacity, and avoiding exchange rate misalignments, 
absence of debt overhang and financial repression, and introducing financial 
liberalisation.
Proposed Growth Policy Targets120
A comparative macroeconomic performance of South Africa and Singapore provide vital 
policy recommendation, which would help African economies to catch up with Asian 
growth experience. This comparative analysis reveals that the macroeconomic 
performance of African economies would improve only if there are clear growth policy 
targets to be followed. Based on cross-country growth evidence emanating from the 
present study, sound economic policies expressed in policy targets should ensure that 
inflation is single-digit (below 6%), government spending remained below 50%, taxes do 
not exceed 60% (all percentages of GDP), and interest rate of less than 7% is achieved. 
Economic policies should target investment rate of more than 30% and saving above 
40%, exports in excess of 50%, consumption below 60%, fiscal deficit of less than 2.5% 
and annual growth of money supply below 15% (all percentages of GDP).
Based on Botswana’s growth experience in managing its debt, a number of assertions 
have emerged. To stabilise the debt as well as keeping the debt at sustainable levels, debt 
targets to keep the domestic debt (as a percentage of GDP) below 5%, external debt (as 
percentage of exports) below 25%, and external debt (as percentage of GDP) below 15%,
120 The proposed growth policy targets should be promoted by the envisaged African Union and should be 
part of the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) presented by African leaders in the recent G8 
summit in Genoa (Italy). These targets if successfully implemented would place Africa on a path of 
sustainable growth and development.
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should be promoted. In addition, international reserves expressed in special drawing 
rights should exceed one thousand and a high degree of financial intermediation in excess 
of 50% should be promoted. These policy measures would generate a positive growth and 
the level of per capita income would rise. Intuitively, available evidence suggests that any 
African economy following these policy recommendations is likely to catch up with the 
Asian growth performance. Hence an annual growth target of more than 5 per cent would 
be achievable. Implementation of these policy recommendations would generate long- 
run growth, restore sustainable macroeconomic stability and improve the overall 
macroeconomic performance of African economies.
In the face of current poor macroeconomic performance of African economies, 
macroeconometric models are not widely applied (excluding South Africa) as vital tools 
in the development planning and economic management of these economies. Clearly, to 
improve macroeconomic perfonnance of African economies, the use of 
macroeconometric models as ingredients in the development process should be 
intensified. Policy instruments should be clearly identified and consistently adjusted to 
generate and sustain economic growth.
9.1.2 Econometric Evidence (Estimation)
Given the endogeneity of some regressors in the model, the use of instrumental variable 
estimation technique mitigates the problem of simultaneous equation bias in the model. 
Econometric results reveal that disposable income is the major determinant of 
consumption, and not interest rates. This suggests that consumers are not forward-looking 
and consumption depends on current income alone. An interest rate effect on investment 
is significant for South Africa only, which implies that the level of interest rate does not 
influences investment decisions in the remaining economies. In all economies, 
investment depends positively and significantly on domestic income. The insignificance 
of the real interest rate supports the thesis that consumers and investors are liquidity 
constrained, because they cannot easily borrow to sustain current consumption and 
investment in the expectation of higher future income. An overwhelmingly statistically
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significant relationship between foreign income and exports in all countries is well 
confirmed. It implies that export expansion is an increasing function of foreign income. 
Econometric evidence indicates that exports are determined by foreign demand in all 
countries. Exchange rate depreciation appears to boost exports in the economies, which 
followed a pegged exchange rate regime (Namibia), hi the remaining economies, the 
depreciation of the exchange rate has exerted no significant effect on the expansion of 
exports. Domestic demand has a positive and significant impact on imports in all 
countries. Exchange rate depreciation has significantly reduced imports in the economies, 
with a weak currency or those that had witnessed a massive depreciation of the local 
currency in the past (Mauritius). Imports are not affected by changes in the real exchange 
rate in the remaining economies. Clearly, the real exchange rate appears not to influence 
exports or imports in most of these economies.
Money demand depends negatively and significantly on nominal interest rates in 
Botswana and South Africa, but not in Namibia and Mauritius. This suggests that 
speculative demand for real money balances exists in Botswana and South Africa only, 
but is non-existent in Namibia and Mauritius. In all countries, money demand is a 
positive and significant function of real domestic income, which indicates that a high 
level of domestic income will increase the demand for financial services. Technical 
progress has a positive and significant effect on growth performance in these economies 
suggesting that, as expected, technological progress is the engine of growth. In all 
countries, employment depends positively and significant on real income; but negatively 
and significantly on real wages. Therefore econometric evidence confirmed that rising 
income is transformed into high levels of employment whilst employment will contract 
when labour costs are on the rise.
Using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression model, the test for contemporaneous 
correlation of disturbances between the four countries was undertaken to model both 
individual country effects and contagion effects. The results confirm the existence of 
contemporaneous correlation of disturbances between these economies, which shows the 
high interdependence of these economies and the great need for macroeconomic policy
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co-ordination among these economies. Clearly, investment decisions in one country are 
influenced by investors’ behaviour* in the other countries and hence the prevalence of 
contagion effects across countries is confirmed. Available evidence suggests that 
Namibia and Botswana face imitation lag and therefore tend to imitate most of their 
infrastructure and superstructure from South Africa. On the other hand, most imports into 
the region are imported via South Africa, and then re-exported to Namibia and Botswana.
An increasing financial deepening and widening of the financial sector, witnessed in the 
region in the recent years, is due to bureaucratic expertise exported mainly from South 
Africa. This is because South Africa is the cosmopolitan city in the region and most of 
the commercial banks in individual countries have their headquarters situated in South 
Africa. These results are clearly in favour of the current negotiations and dialogues in 
Southern Africa aimed at fostering economic integration in the region. An important 
lesson based on these findings appears to suggest that policymakers in the region should 
have macroeconomic policy co-ordination at the forefront of policy discussions. In the 
face of rapid integration of world economies and emerging trade blocks in the developed 
world, these countries cannot fimction successfully in the global economy without co­
ordinating economic policies across countries, and hence economic integration in the 
region is inevitable121.
A poolability test, to test whether pooling was justified or not, indicates that pooling was 
not justified. The findings that pooling is not justified have important implications that all 
intercept terms and slope coefficients are not the same across countries. It means that 
these countries are different and therefore the long-run models are different for different 
countries. It implies that intercepts terms and slope coefficients varied across countries 
and country specific effects are important. These findings suggest that the behaviour of 
economic agents differ significantly across countries. From policy perspective, it means 
that policy prescriptions in these countries should be counfry specific and should reflect
121 The Euro launched in 1999 is a clear signal that Western Europe is becoming more integrated than in the 
past.
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institutional structure of the economy in question, and should not be generalised across 
countries.
9.1.3 Historical Simulation
The model of Southern African Economies shows no weaknesses in tracking the actual 
data of these economies, which suggest that the model is consistent with past data and 
explains the past behavior of these economies. The relatively low and satisfactory root- 
mean squared prediction errors obtained for most of equations, coupled with the ability of 
the model to simulate turning points of the actual data series, confirm the goodness of the 
dynamic simulation tracking performance of a model. Excellent simulation performance 
witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s has worsened in the 1990s, which suggests that the 
ability of the model to track actual data is diminishing in the long ran. hi terms of the 
performance of the historical simulation, the fastest growing economy (Botswana) has 
outperformed the slow growing economies, which suggests that the simulation model has 
a better fit in an economy that has experienced more macroeconomic stability than in 
economies that have been severely exposed to external shocks.
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Table 9.1 provides evidence on the interest rate policy simulation, which shows that 
changes in interest rates exert effects on the level of income in all countries. Consistent, 
with the level of financial development in South Africa, the conduct of interest rate 
policy in this economy is more potent in influencing economic activity than in the other 
economies. At present the South African Reserve Bank is following a policy of inflation 
targeting to reduce inflation below 3 per cent by 2002. Unlike in other economies, the 
interest rate effect on inflation is effective for South Africa only, which confirm that 
South Africa is pursuing an effective interest rate policy. A hike in interest rates has a 
severe income depressing effect on the Namibian economy. The greater negative effect 
on income in Namibia is attributed to the lack of an independent interest rate policy in 
this economy.
9.2 Policy Implications122
9.2,1 Interest Rate Policy
Table 9.1 Potency of Interest Rate Policy (1% rise) on the Economy
Policv effects on: Namibia Botswana Mamitius South Africa
Consumption Effective* Effective Ineffective Ineffective
Investment Effective Ineffective Ineffective Effective*
Money demand Effective Effective* Ineffective Effective
Inflation Ineffective Ineffective Ineffective Effective*
Domestic debt Effective* Effective Effective Effective
Taxes Ineffective Effective Effective* Effective
Income Effective* Effective Effective Effective
Policy effectiveness implies that effects are greater than 1 per cent 
Policy ineffectiveness implies that effects are less than 1 per cent 
The * refers to the country with the greater policy effects
Given the pegging of the Namibian dollar to the South African rand, the conduct of 
interest rate policy in Namibia is not independent and the Bank of Namibia is pursuing an 
interest rate policy similar to that of the South African Reserve Bank. Hence, interest 
rate shocks on the Namibian economy are more severe because the exchange rate policy
122 According to Hendry and Mizon (2000), the policy implications derived from any estimated 
macroeconometric system depend on the formulation of its equations, the methodology used for the 
empirical modelling and evaluation, the approach to policy analysis, and the forecast performance.
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is not consistent with developments in the domestic economy. Because interest rate 
policy in Botswana has effects on taxes, it also influences the level of consumption in this 
economy.
However, interest rate policy ineffectiveness on investment evident in Botswana, indicate 
that consumers are worse-off than investors. This is due to the fact that much of 
investment in Botswana is in the mining sector, which is foreign-owned. Foreign 
investors borrow in international capital markets and are not sensitive to changes in the 
interest rates prevailing in the Botswana economy, which explain why interest rate policy 
is not effective in influencing investment activities in this economy.
In contrast, interest rate policy cannot be used to contain inflation in Mauritius. Policies 
of interest rate control (at 6 per cent) in the period 1970-76, coupled with massive 
exchange rate depreciation of the Mauritius rupee in the past has eroded both consumer 
and investors confidence in the economy, which explains the ineffectiveness of interest 
rate policy in this economy. These factors explain why a rise in interest rate is 
inflationary in Mauritius, not deflationary like in the remaining economies. It is this 
inflationary consequence of a rise in the interest rate, which explains why interest rate 
policy is not effective in influencing the behavior of consumers and investors. The Bank 
of Mauritius cannot effectively use interest rate policy to contain inflationary pressures 
on the economy or counter economic slowdown.
On the other hand, the conduct of interest rate policy appears effective in influencing the 
level of domestic debt and thereby the taxation policy, which is the current mechanism 
through which interest rate policy affect national income in Mauritius. However, interest 
rate policy is effective at reducing the domestic debt and minimising the tax burden on 
the economy. To enhance an effectiveness of an interest rate policy in Mauritius, an 
accommodating tax policy is necessary in order to affect economic activities. Without 
changes in the taxation policy, the potency of interest rate policy is in doubt.
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Simulation evidence on these economies appears to suggest that interest rate policy have 
a greater effect on consumption and domestic debt in Namibia, on investment and 
inflation in South Africa, on money demand in Botswana and on taxes in Mauritius. It 
implies that interest rate policy is relevant and effective to achieve policy development 
objectives. These interest rate policy objectives should be to achieve policy targets such 
as: to enhance consumer confidence and ease domestic debt in Namibia, promote 
investment activities and contain inflation in South Africa, encourage financial activities 
in the financial sector of Botswana, and reduce tax burden on the Mauritius economy. 
Without a low interest rate policy in these economies, it is difficult to meet these 
objectives. While interest rate simulation confirms the workability and applicability of 
interest rate policy in these economies, a low interest rate policy should be country- 
specific.
The mean interest rate differential per annum against Singapore for the period 1980-97, is 
10% (South Africa), 4% (Botswana), and 8% (Mauritius). Given the level of interest rates 
of 20.8% in Mauritius, 18.1% in Namibia, 15% in South Africa, and 14.5% in Botswana 
in 1996, it is appropriate to advocate a fall in interest rate by 10% in South Africa and 
Namibia, 8% in Mauritius, and 4% in Botswana. From a policy perspective, it is vital to 
slash interest rates annually by 2 per cent (South Africa), 1.6 per cent (Mauritius), and 0.8 
per cent (Botswana) for the next five years123. This low interest rate policy will bring 
interest rates down by 2007, to 5% in South Africa, 12% in Mauritius, 10% in Botswana, 
and 8% in Namibia.
The main objective of the low interest rate policy would be to promote economic 
activities in order to boost economic growth. A policy of inflation targeting to achieve 
single-digit inflation should be promoted. Apart from South Africa, changes in interest 
rates appeal* to exert very little influence on inflation, which is attributed to the high level 
of interest rates in these economies. Consequently, a policy of low interest rate is 
preferred. By the same token, price stability should be the main policy objective of
123 A two per cent annual interest rate reduction advocated for South Africa is computed as a/b, where a is a 
percentage with which interest rate should decline, and b is the period within which the desired policy 
target should be achieved. Hence, for South Africa, a = 10 and b = 5, etc.
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central banks in these economies. To ensure price stability, the independence of central 
banks should be promoted.
9.2.2 Exchange Rate Policy
Traditionally, the policy objective of devaluation is to promote exports while 
discouraging imports in order to improve the hade balance. When the restoration of 
external balance is a policy target, an appropriate exchange rate policy is crucial to 
achieve this objective. From table 9.2, exchange rate devaluation improves the hade 
balance in Namibia and Botswana whilst deteriorates the trade balance in Mauritius and 
South Africa. The policy ineffectiveness associated with real exchange rate and inflation 
explain, why the worsening trade balance in Mauritius is not effective, whereas policy
Table 9.2 Potency of Exchange Rate Policy (5% devaluation) on the Economy
Policy effects on: Namibia Botswana Mauritius South Africa
Trade balance Improve* Improve* Deteriorate Deteriorate*
Inflation Inflationary Inflationary Inflationary Deflationary*
Real exchange rate Effective Effective Ineffective Effective
Taxes Decreases Increases Decreases Increases*
Domestic debt Decreases Increases Decreases Increases
Foreign debt Decreases Decreases* Decreases Increases*
Income Increases* Increases Increases Increases
The presence of * denotes policy effectiveness and absence denotes ineffectiveness 
Policy effectiveness means that effects are greater than 1 per cent 
Policy ineffectiveness means that effects are less than 1 per cent
effectiveness of devaluation on real exchange rate contributes to a major deterioration in 
South African external balance. A huge rise in the tax burden, which discourages foreign 
investment and accumulation of foreign debt, which encourages capital outflows evident 
in South Africa, are factors, which contribute negatively to the position of external 
balance. In the context of the South African economy, the central message here reveals 
that devaluation (while is deflationary) has a negative trade balance effect if it results in 
raising taxes and accumulating foreign debt.
Policy evidence confirms the prevalence of inflationary consequences of devaluation in 
these economies, apart from South Africa. Inflationary pressures are due to the
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availability of extra foreign exchange earnings resulting from devaluation, which has a 
positive income effect. The improvement in the trade balance is attributed to there being 
little inflationary effect arising from devaluation in Namibia and Botswana. In the context 
of the Namibian and Botswana economies, devaluation (while it is inflationary) has a 
positive trade balance effect if it results into an easing of foreign debt. Clearly, 
irrespective of whether devaluation is inflationary or deflationary, its effects 011 the trade 
balance depend also on its effects on foreign debt and domestic taxes. Therefore, the 
conventional belief that the inflation pass-through effect determines the success of 
devaluation on the trade balance only is not borne out by the evidence, hi addition to the 
inflationary or deflationary effect of devaluation, the current simulation evidence shows 
that the tax effect and foreign debt effect arising from devaluation can cause the external 
balance either to improve or deteriorate. Hence, the tax and foreign effects of devaluation 
are important and should not be ignored, but rather anticipated.
From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to assess the success of devaluation in 
a simulation model in terms not only of its inflation effect (as is traditionally known), but 
also its effects on taxes and foreign debt, when the tax rule is followed. These findings 
suggest that a relevant taxation policy and foreign debt policy must accompany a policy 
of devaluation. Policy implications of these findings shows that the policy objective of 
devaluation should not be only to restore the external balance, but also to either ease the 
tax burden on the economy 01* to reduce external indebtedness of the domestic economy. 
When devaluation is beneficial in terms of increasing the availability of foreign exchange 
earnings, the government can either reduce the tax burden on the economy by reducing 
taxes. The use of foreign exchange earnings will finance the fiscal budget, which has an 
effect of easing the tax burden and reducing the domestic debt.
Alternatively, the use of foreign exchange earnings will finance the foreign debt, which 
has the effect of reducing the foreign debt. However, if foreign exchange earnings are 
added to international reserves, the domestic and foreign debt may rise. Given these 
possibilities of how to inject foreign exchange earnings in the economy, a policy on the 
use of foreign exchange earnings should be clearly devised. Available evidence shows
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that devaluation has country-specific effects on taxes and the level of both domestic and 
foreign debt, which implies that depending on the taxation and debt policy to be pursued 
after devaluation, its effects on the economy cannot be generalized across countries. 
Clearly, exchange rate devaluation has costs and benefits on the economy, which should 
be assessed before the policy is initiated. While recognizing the importance of assessing 
the costs and benefits of devaluation on inflation, taxes and debt (domestic and foreign), 
the income effect of devaluation is crucial. In all these economies, devaluation has a 
positive income effect, which reject the contractionary income effect of devaluation.
When the external balance is a policy target as in Namibia and Botswana, a policy of 
exchange rate devaluation can be promoted, but it will cause inflation. When a tax rise is 
a policy target as for South Africa, devaluation will increase government revenues, but it 
will cause foreign debt creation. When a reduction in domestic taxes and reducing foreign 
indebtedness is a policy target (Mauritius), devaluation will be effective in doing these, 
but it will cause the external balance to deteriorate. Given massive depreciation of the 
Mauritius rupee in the past, coupled with current ineffectiveness of devaluation, future 
exchange rate devaluation should be avoided in this economy. Mauritius has a relatively 
weak currency, and the monetary authorities should intensify efforts to protect the value 
of the currency. If a currency is allowed to depreciate to fulfill specified policy objectives 
or due to market forces, central banks should ensure that the mean currency depreciation 
is below 10 per cent per annum.
That a sound conduct of an exchange rate policy is of crucial importance in the 
development process is well founded. Since the nominal exchange rate devaluation has 
resulted in a massive increase in income in Namibia, these impressive results suggest that 
a nominal devaluation have greater positive income effects, if the devaluing economy has 
a pegged exchange rate regime124. Despite the short ran benefits of devaluation for 
Namibia, this result does not necessarily imply that the current exchange rate regime
124 The Namibia dollar is pegged to the South African rand. Hence it appears to suggest that despite the 
absence of an independent exchange rate policy, pegging have additional beneficial effects in terms of 
raising the productive capacity of the economy, which increases output, when the domestic currency is
1 9 4
should be maintained in perpetuity. Without changing the current exchange rate policy in 
the long- ran, it will impose additional costs on the economy, which may render future 
devaluation to be ineffective.
9.2.3 Fiscal Policy: Government Spending
As shown in table 9.3, government spending is a powerful policy instrument that has 
enormous effects on the South African economy. This interesting simulation evidence 
confirms the policy effectiveness associated with the use of government spending in the 
most powerful African economy, hi contrast, fiscal spending is relatively less effective in 
Mauritius. Because South Africa is a larger economy, which exports to other African 
economies, public spending has much higher import content than in the remaining 
economies. Govermnent spending is inflationary in all the countries, which indicate that a
Table 9.3 Potency of Government Spending Policy (10% rise) on the Economy
Policv effects on: Namibia Botswana Mamitius South Africa
Investment Effective* Effective Effective** Effective
Imports Effective Ineffective Effective** Effective*
Taxes Effective Effective* Effective ** Effective
Savings Decreases Increases Decreases Increases*
Real exchange rate Effective** Effective Effective Effective*
Domestic debt (year when 
surges above 10%) 1990 1980 1993 1982
Foreign debt (year when 
surges above 10%) 1994 1978 1992 1989-1994
Inflation Effective** Effective* Effective Effective
Real wage rate Ineffective** Effective Ineffective Effective*
Employment Effective* Effective Effective** Effective
Income (with tax rule) Effective Effective Effective** Effective*
Income (without tax rule) Effective* Effective Effective** Effective
Policy effectiveness means that effects are greater than 1 per cent 
Policy ineffectiveness means that effects are less than 1 per cent 
The * refers to the country with the greater policy effects 
The ** refers to the country with the smallest policy effects
less expansionary fiscal policy will contain inflation and contribute positively to a rise in 
the real wage rates. Clearly, to control inflation and maintain reasonable wages, a sound 
conduct of fiscal policy will do this. This evidence of real wage effects confirms that
devalued. However, it imposes additional costs on the domestic economy by not insulating external shocks 
via the use of exchange rate policy.
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fiscal policy can be used to influence the welfare and well being of workers in the work 
place in all economies.
Sound government spending which crowd in investment is evident in all countries. The 
relatively low investment effects in Mauritius show the great need to redirect public 
spending towards investment activities. Available evidence rejects the argument that 
government spending crowds-out investment, meaning that government spending of not 
more than 10% is not detrimental to growth in these economies. Government spending 
has powerful and positive effects on taxes and employment in all countries, which shows 
that the policy objective of achieving high level of employment can be achieved. It would 
be in the economic interest of the latter economies, to allow government spending to 
increase by less than 10%. Because Namibia has a pegged exchange rate system, 
spending effects on the real exchange rate are relatively low.
When growth is a policy target, government spending is effective in promoting growth in 
all the countries. Whether the tax rule (i.e., 25% of domestic debt is tax financed) is 
followed or not, government spending generates growth, however, the growth effects are 
greater in the absence of a tax rule. This is because a tax rule is not a legal requirement 
and is only necessary if the economy is experiencing a high debt burden, which requires 
urgent financing. Provided there is no debt problem, there would be no need to follow a 
tax rule in order to service the debt. Hence, when the tax rule is not enforceable (meaning 
that the economy is facing no debt overhang), fiscal policy is potent because none of 
domestic resources are used to finance the debt, which means that all resources are spend 
on domestic development activities. It is for these reasons, why fiscal spending has 
greater income effect when the tax rule is not in force. While these economies benefit 
from growth creation, debt creation (both domestic and foreign) is evident in all 
countries.
From a policy perspective, while a debt financing policy is vital, it is important to pursue 
a prudent fiscal policy, which will result in low sustainable debts. Both domestic and 
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP should remain below 20%. Given the savings
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contraction associated with government spending in Namibia and Mauritius, the tax rale 
should be enforced and be allowed to be part of a fiscal policy in these economies. In the 
absence of a tax rale, government spending has no adverse macroeconomic consequences 
on Botswana and South African economies, however, the tax rale should be implemented 
when necessary. Clearly, government spending is not an effective policy for Mauritius, 
whereas it is very effective for South Africa. The policy objectives of fiscal spending 
should be centred on containing inflation, easing the tax burden on the economy, 
encouraging domestic savings, reducing domestic and foreign debt, creating employment, 
and promoting growth. As a percentage of GDP, government spending should not exceed 
50 per cent for Namibia and Mauritius; and not 60% for Botswana and South Africa.
Table 9.4 Potency of Tax Cuts Policy (10%) on the Economy
Policv effects on: Namibia Botswana Maiuitius South Africa
Consumption Effective** Effective* Effective Effective
Investment Effective** Not effective Effective Effective
Savings Effective** Effective Effective* Effective
Real wage rate Effective Effective Effective** Effective*
Employment Effective** Not effective Effective Effective
Foreign debt Effective* Effective** Effective Effective
Income Effective Effective** Effective Effective*
Policy effectiveness means that effects are greater than 1 per cent 
Policy ineffectiveness means that effects are less than 1 per cent 
The * refers to the country with the greater policy effects 
The ** refers to the country with the smallest policy effects
9.2.4 Fiscal Policy: Tax Cut
The objective of tax cuts is to stimulate economic activities when the economy is on the 
slowdown. This policy stimulates consumer spending and creates a favorable investment 
climate due to lower investment taxes. It encourages the savers to save wisely and 
investors to invest productively. Therefore, a tax cut policy increases both the propensity 
to save and invest, which has a positive growth effect on the economy. From table 9.4, a 
tax cut policy is relatively less effective in Namibia, followed by Botswana. Unlike with 
government spending, tax cuts appear more effective in Mauritius. Like with government 
spending, a tax cut policy is very effective in South Africa. Clearly, the conduct of fiscal
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policy (whether taxes are cut or government spending increased) is effective on the South 
African economy.
A tax cut stimulates more consumers spending in Botswana, but less in the remaining 
economies. The performance of a tax cut on the Namibian economy is disappointing and 
its effects on consumer spending, investment stimulation, savings mobilization, and 
employment creation are relatively low. Huge foreign debt accumulation following a tax 
cut explains the low policy effectiveness in Namibia. This is caused by huge foreign debt 
accumulation, which reduces consumer confidence, discourages investment spending, 
increases dissavings, and contract employment opportunities of the economy. 
Ineffectiveness of a tax cut policy to stimulate investment and create employment in 
Botswana causes relatively low positive growth effect. Tax cuts accumulate less foreign 
debt in Botswana, but with large effects on consumer spending. It follows that a low tax 
policy has less adverse effects on foreign debt accumulation than a rise in government 
spending.
To mobilize domestic savings in Mauritius, a tax cut is the best policy rather than a rise in 
government spending. By easing the tax burden on these economies, income increases 
more in South Africa, than in the other economies. The best policy to promote growth is 
government spending rather than a tax cut, which implies that government spending is 
more potent than a tax cut in these economies. As a percentage of GDP, mean taxes per 
annum should not exceed 20 per cent. Based on the evidence, South Africa witnessed 
mean taxes (% of GDP) per annum of 23% during the period 1980-97, whereas it was 
26% in Botswana. Therefore, the objective of a low tax policy should be to mobilize 
domestic savings, without allowing the foreign debt to escalate.
Relationship between Coefficient Estimates and Simulation model
An important relationship evident between estimated coefficients and the simulation 
model should not be ignored in any empirical work. The positive interest rate effect on 
consumption in the simulation model evident in Mauritius is attributed to the positive
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coefficient estimate of real interest rate in the long run model. In the estimation model, 
interest rate effect on consumption, investment and money demand is insignificant for 
both Namibia and Mauritius. However, the effects of interest rate policy on these 
variables in the simulation model are effective for Namibia, but ineffective for Mauritius. 
The ineffectiveness of interest rate policy on Mauritius is explained by the policy of 
financial repression pursued in this economy in the 1970s and 1980s125. Unlike the other 
economies, Mauritius has pursued an inappropriate interest rate policy, which explain the 
impotency of interest rate policy on the Mauritian economy in this economy, as revealed 
by the present empirical evidence.
Another important relationship is that of the exchange rate. From coefficient estimates in 
the estimation model, the exchange rate effect is neither significant on exports nor on 
imports for both Botswana and South Africa, but in the simulation model, exchange rate 
devaluation exert effective effects on the trade balance in these economies, hi the long 
run model, wages exert significant effect on employment in all countries, but these wage 
effects in the simulation model is ineffective for all countries, which is attributed to the 
insignificance of wage coefficient estimates in the error correction model. The most 
important message here is that, while policy instruments (interest rate and exchange rate) 
are insignificant in the estimation, they appear to be effective when the model as a whole 
is simulated. It implies that the policy instruments of the model are potent, and hence can 
be successfully applied to affect the overall macroeconomic performance of these 
economies.
Now that the simulation results have been analyzed and more important infonnation has 
emerged, it is appropriate to deduce that these economies have pursued appropriate 
exchange rate policies in the past. These findings demonstrate the validity and 
importance of simulation results in any empirical work. More meaningful and powerful 
conclusions can be made when simulation results are taken into account. This is because 
in simulation in this study (unlike in past studies) have successfully captured both short
125 Among these economies, Mauritius is the only economy that has embarked on a structural adjustment 
and stabilisation program (SAP) of the IMF and the World Bank.
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and long ran behavior of economic agents and the economy is moving back towards 
equilibrium.
9.3 Future Research
The macro econometric model developed in this study is simple, but comprehensive in 
explaining the structure of African economies. This model is a crucial foundation, which 
provide a useful direction for future research in model building in these economies. One 
advantage of the model lies in the fact that all policy instruments are clearly identified. 
To build on the current work the future research agenda can talce several directions. 
Whatever the research agenda would entail, there are many ways to improve or extend 
the demand and supply side of the model. Hence the model developed in this study has 
deficiencies (all models have strengths and weaknesses), which can be remedied by 
improving the demand and supply side of the model as follows.
9.3.1 Demand side of the model
A change in US economic policy (interest rate) or a change in world oil and commodity 
prices is an external shock, which will hit all these African economies. The model in the 
current form camiot be applied to study the effects of a rise in US interest rate on these 
economies. To facilitate this task nominal exchange rate can be made endogenous by 
incorporating the uncovered interest rate parity condition with forward expectations in 
the model. Nominal exchange rate can be defined as follows,
et = et+ie + (rt - t* ) + r|(TB/GDP)t
where e is nominal exchange rate, et+ie is expected exchange rate in the next period, r is 
domestic interest rate, r* is foreign (US) interest rate, TB is trade balance (or current 
account), and r\ is the parameter which can be 0.1. Given the possibility that interest rate 
differentials and expected depreciation of the exchange rate can cause volatility of the 
exchange rate, the above exchange rate rule can be used to stabilise the nominal exchange 
rate by allowing improvement or deterioration in the external balance. This is important
especially when the restoration of external balance is a policy target. This rule is useful to 
determine the nominal exchange rate under the floating exchange rate regime126.
9.3.2 Supply side of the model
When data on unemployment becomes available, an unemployment equation defined by 
Okun's law can be easily introduced in the model as follows.
UM = constant + log Yct
where UM is unemployment rate, and Yct is the GDPGAB as defined in the supply side of 
the model. Hence the effects of all policy instruments on unemployment can be simulated 
(or studied) without difficulty.
The supply side of the model could be improved in different ways. A nominal wage 
equation can be estimated. Depending on the availability of data, a typical wage equation 
can be specified as follows.
m n
log Wj =  constant +  Y  Pj -^ -ij "J" k^ Ujk +  Sj
7=1 fc=1
Wj is worker i's wage, the Xy 's are worker characteristics (such as age, education, 
occupation, and so on), and the Djk's are dummy variables for employment in different 
industries, hi addition, the specification of the wage equation, can include a productivity 
measure of labor (for example, the growth of output per worker). As a result, a growth 
accounting identity can be incorporated into the model127. Hence, we can study the 
effects of technological progress on the level of wages, and hence on employment. By 
using the growth accounting, growth determination in the model can be made 
endogenous.
126 In support of the future research agenda, Taylor (2000) suggests the need for the central bank to adjust 
die interest rate in response to the exchange rate, as well as to inflation and real output. He argued that 
more research on the effect of exchange-rate fluctuations and on policy rales that take account of die 
exchange rate is needed.
127 Following Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957), who pioneered the growth accounting, the growth of 
output per worker is decomposed into the contribution of growth of capital per worker and contribution of 
technological progress.
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The current simulation model can not be used to study the effects of changes in nominal 
wages on the real and monetary sectors of the economy. To allow for these feedback 
effects and in order to link the labour market with other markets of the economy (the 
goods and money markets) a government employment rule could be introduced. To 
implement this rule government spending can be endogenoused [(meaning that G =
0.25*EM(-1)] in the simulation model128. This rule implies that about quarter of 
employment created in the previous period be financed by an expansionary fiscal policy. 
This government employment rule is crucial and would stress the importance of targeting 
employment as a serious problem facing many African economies. Unlike in previous 
empirical work, with this employment rule in force (in addition to wage effects on 
employment), it would be possible to study the effects of a rise in nominal wages on 
government spending, inflation, income, real interest rate, and real exchange rate, etc. 
Clearly, the current study provides important direction for future research in model 
building on African economies.
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Appendix A Definition of Variables: Data Used in Table 1.7-1.8
Definition of Variables Lines from IFS Yearbook
Inflation Page 64x
Interest rates 60p
Money supply 351
Real income 99b
Government consumption 91f
Tax revenues IV
Growth of money supply 34x
Exchange rate ae
Growth rate of real GDP 99bp
Gross capita formation 93er
Consumption 96fr
Producer prices 63x
Gold lad
Fiscal deficit or surplus 80
Population 99z
Reserve position in the IMF 1 c s
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1998).
Inflation is measured as consumer prices, tax revenues is the consolidated central 
government revenue, current account and the overall balance of payments are expressed 
in millions of US Dollars. Gold is expressed in millions of ounces, saving is calculated as 
income minus consumption, and foreign capital inflows is measured as investment minus 
savings.
2 0 3
Appendix B Data Sources and Definition of Variables: Data Used in Model 
Estimation
The data for Namibia, was obtained from Ministry of Finance, Economic Review (1986, 
1993); National Planning Commission, Central Statistics Office (May, 1998), and Bank 
of Namibia Annual Report (1998) and International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(various issues). For the remaining countries, data were extracted from the International 
Financial Statistics, Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (various issues), and 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (various issues). In addition, Central Banks Annual 
Reports (various issues) were also used to obtain harmonised and consistent time series. 
GDP deflator to obtain real values deflated the series. Domestic inflation rate is proxied 
by the GDP deflator, computed as the change in the log of GDP deflator times 100.
Real interest rate is defined as nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. Foreign 
income is proxied by the average income of the G7 economies. A rise in exchange rate 
implies exchange rate depreciation. Real disposable income equals real income minus 
real taxes. Taxes are proxied by tax revenues. The time trend variable takes the value of 1 
in the first observation. Detrended output is the residual obtained from the regression of 
log income on the constant and time trend. Log of natural output is computed as log of 
income minus detrended output. Real exchange rate is computed as nominal exchange 
rate against the US dollar times the GDP deflator of the G7 economies and GDP deflator 
of the domestic economy then divides the product. Foreign prices are proxied by the GDP 
deflator of the G7 economies, and domestic prices by domestic GDP deflator. Wages are 
defined as the average real wage rate per man-hour employed and employment data 
refers to the total number of persons in employment.
The model consists of the following equations:
1. Inflation
D pt = fl [ D yrt, D mt, D et, D ptf, D pt-1 ]
2. Real Income
D yrt = f2 [ D ert, D pt, D mint, D agrt, D aidt ]
3. Change in Exchange Rate
D et = £3 [ D mt-1, D pt-1, D it, D aidt ]
4. Government Revenue
tt = f4 [ yt, mint, imt, aidt, ptcopper ]
5. Imports
imt = f5 [ yt, et, aidt-1, imt-1 ]
6. Growth in Agricultural Production
D agrt = f6 [ D yrt, D ert-1, D pt-1 maize, raint ]
7. Growth in Mining Production
D mint = f7 [ D yrt, D ert-1, D imt, D pt-1 copper ]
8. Money Supply
D Mst = D DCt + D NFAt
9. Balance of Payments
D NFAt = EXt -  IMt + C APt + AIDt
10. Domestic Credit
D DCt = Gt -  Tt + D CPt
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Appendix C Model of the Zambian Economy
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Definition of Variables
D pt - rate of inflation (based on the CPI, 1990=100)
D pt-1 - a proxy for the expected inflation rate at time t 
D ptf - a proxy for foreign rate of inflation (based on the U.S. CPI, 1990=100)
D yt - growth rate of nominal GDP 
D yrt - growth rate of real GDP (1990 prices)
D agrt - change in agricultural production index (1990=100)
D mint - change in mining production index (1990=100)
D it - change in domestic nominal interest rate (Treasury Bill Rate, percent per annum)
D et - change in nominal exchange rate (in units of domestic currency per U.S. Dollar)
D eit - change in real exchange rate (nominal exchange rate adjusted for domestic and 
foreign prices)
D mt - change in nominal stock of money (Money plus Quasi-Money)
Ptcopper - world market price of copper (U.K., London, U.S. Dollars per pound)
Ptmaize - world market price of maize (U.S., Chicago, U.S Dollars per bushel)
IMt - imports of goods and non-factor services (in billions of Kwacha)
EXt - exports of goods and non-factor services (in billions of Kwacha)
Gt - government expenditure (in billions of Kwacha)
Tt - government revenue (in billions of Kwacha)
AIDt - foreign aid flows (in billions of U.S. Dollars)
NFAt - net foreign assets (in billions of Kwacha)
DCt - domestic credit (in billions of Kwacha)
CPt - claims of the banking system on the domestic private sector (in billions of Kwacha) 
CAPt - capital flows
DEBTt - external debt (in billions of U.S. Dollars)
RAINt - weather variable, defined as the absolute deviation from the mean rainfall in 
inches over 1967-97 in the region of Momba farms and Green’s farm.
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Block 1: The GDP Block (Real value added in each of the country's main sectors) 
BlOCKl: OUTPUT 
Agriculture (Equation 1)
log (YAG) = constant + log (RAIN) + log (THAG) + log (FCFAG) + TIME 
Manufacturing (Equation 2)
log (YMF) = constant + log (THMF) + log (FCFMF) + log (YSHARE) + TIME 
Mining (Equation 3)
log (YMIN) = constant + log (THMIN) + log (FCFMIN) + TIME 
Utilities (Equation 4)
log (YEL) = constant + log (THEL) + log (FCFEL) + log (RAIN) + TIME 
Construction (Equation 5)
log (YCS) = constant + log (THCS) + log (FCFCS) + TIME 
Trade and Hotels (Equation 6)
log (YTH) = constant + log (THTH) + log (FCFTH) + TIME 
Transport (Equation 7)
log (YTP) = constant + log (THTP) + log (FCFTP)
Financial Institutions ('Equation 8)
log (YFI) = constant + log (THFI) + log (FCFFI) + TIME
Social and Personal Services (Equation 9)
log (YSPS) = constant + log (THSPS) + log (FCFSPS)
General Government (Equation 10)
log (YGG) = constant + log (THGG) + log (FCFGG)
Identities
Y = YAG + YMIN + YMF + YEL + YCS + YTH + YTP + YFI + YGG + YSPS 
BLOCK 2: LABOUR (MAN-HOURS 
Agriculture (Equation 11)
log (THAG) = constant + log (QWAG) + log (YAG) + log (THAG(-l))
Utilities ('Equation 12)
log (THEL) = constant + log (YEL) + log (QWEL) + log (THEL(-l))
Transport (Equation 13)
log (THTP) = constant + log (QWTP) + log (YTP) + log (THTP(-l)) + TIME 
General Government ('Equation 14)
log (THGG) = constant + log (YGG) + log (QWGG) + log (THGG(-l))
Social and Personal Services ('Equation 15)
log (THSPS) = constant + log (QWSPS) + log (YSPS) + log (THSPS(-l)) + TIME
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Mining (Equation 161
log (THMIN) = constant + log (QWMIN) + log (YMIN) + log (THMIN(-l)) + TIME 
Manufacturing (Equation 17)
log (THMF) = constant + log (QWMF) + log (YMF) + log (THMF(-l)) + TIME 
Construction (Equation 18)
log (THCS) -  constant + log (QWCS) + log (YCS) + log (THCS(-l)) + TIME 
Trade and Hotels (Equation 19)
log (THTH) = constant + log (QWTH) + log (YTH) + log (THTH(-l)) + TIME 
Financial Institutions (Equation 201
log (THFI) =  constant + log (QWFI) + log (YFI) + log (THFI(-l))
Formal Employment (Equation 21)
log (EF) = constant + log (YNTRADI) + log (YNTRADI(-l)) + log (FCF(-l))
Traditional Agriculture and Informal Employment (Equation 22) 
log (ETAI) =  constant + log (ETAI(-l))
BLOCK 3: CONSUMPTION (ON GDP)
Durables and Non-durables (Equation 23)
log (PVCDND) = constant +  log (YDP) + log (PVDND(-l))
Service Consumption (Equation 24)
log (PVCS) = constant + log (YDP) + log (PVCS(-l))
Identities
PVCOTV = PVCDNDV + PVCSV
BLOCK 4: FIXED INVESTMENT
Agriculture (Equation 25)
log (FCFAG) = constant + log (QWAG) + log (YAG) + log (FCFAG(-l)) + TIME 
Manufacturing (Equation 26)
log (FCFMF) = constant + log (QWMF) + log (YMF) + log (FCFMF(-l)) + TIME 
Mining (Equation 27)
log (FCFMIN) = constant + log (QWMIN) + log (YMIN) + log (FCFMIN(-l)) + 
TIME
Utilities (Equation 28)
log (FCFEL) = constant + log (QWEL) + log (YEL) + log (FCFEL(-l)) + TIME 
Construction (Equation 291
log (FCFCS) = constant + log (QWCS) + log (YCS) + log (FCFCS(-l))
Trade (Equation 30)
log (FCFTH) = constant + log (YTH) + log (QWTH) + log (FCFTH(-l))
Transport (Equation 31)
log (FCFTP) = constant + log (YTP) + log (QWTP) + log (FCFTP(-l)) + TIME
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Financial Institutions (Equation 32)
log (FCFFI) =  constant + log (YFI) + log (QWFI) + log (FCFFI(-l)) + TIME 
Social and Personal Services ('Equation 33)
log (FCFSPS) =  constant + log (YSPS) + log (QWSPS) + log (FCFSPS(-l)) 
General Government (Equation 34)
log (FCFGG) = constant + log (YGG) + log (QWGG) + log (FCFGG(-l))
Inventory Investment (Equation 35) 
log (II) =  constant + log (Y)
BLOCK 5: GOVERNMENT SECTOR
Customs Revenue (Equation 36)
YCR = constant + IM P(-l)
Taxes Revenue (Equation 37)
YTAX =  constant +  YNTRADI
Rent. Royalties and Dividends (Equation 38) 
YRRD -  constant + YMIN + RL
Government Debt (Equation 39)
GVDBT =  constant + MGB + MLP
BLOCK 6: PRICES AND SECTORAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITIES
Consumer Price Index (Equation 40)
log (CPI) = constant + log (PIMPE) + log (LPRO) + log (PIMPE(-l))
GDP Deflator National (Equation 41)
log (PGDP) = constant + log (PIMPE) + log (LPRO)
Agriculture GDP Deflator (Equation 42)
log (PAGR) = constant + log (LPRAG) + log (PIMPE(-l))
Mining GDP Deflator (Equation 43) 
log (PMIN) = constant + log (PGDP)
Manufacturing GDP Deflator (Equation 44) 
log (PMF) = constant + log (PIMPE) + log (PGDP)
Utilities GDP Deflator (Equation 45) 
log (PEL) = constant + log (PIMPE)
Construction GDP Deflator (Equation 46)
log (PCS) =  constant + log (PIMPE) + log (LPRCS)
Trade and Hotels GDP Deflator (Equation 47)
log (PTH) =  constant + log (PIMPE) + log (LPRTH) + log (WTH)
Transport GDP Deflator (Equation 48)
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log (PTP) = constant + log (PIMPE)
Financial Institutions GDP Deflator (Equation 49) 
log (PFI) =  constant + log (PIMPE)
Social and Personal Services GDP Deflator (Equation 50) 
log (PSPS) =  constant + log (LPRSPS) + log (PIMPE)
General Government GDP Deflator (Equation 51) 
log (PGG) =  constant + log (LPRGG) -I- log (PIMPE)
Fixed Capital Formation GDP Deflator (Equation 52) 
log (PFCF) = constant + log (PCS) + log (PMF) + log (PFI)
Derivation o f Sectoral Labour Productivity
Labour productivity, agriculture: LPRAG = YAG/EAG
Labour productivity, mining: LPRMIN =  YMIN/EMIN, etc.
BLOCK 7: MONETARY SECTOR
Public's Cash Holding (Equation 53) 
log (CP) =  log (Y) + log (CPI) + log (RA)
Total Deposits (Equation 54)
log (TDEPS) = log (Y) + log (RRID) + log (TDEPS(-l)) 
Excess Reserves (Equation 55)
log (EXRVS) = log (DCREDI) + log (RA) + log (EXRVS(-l)) 
Domestic Credit (Equation 56)
log (DCREDI) = log (CBL) + log (RA) + log (GCB(-l))
BLOCK 8: EXTERNAL TRADE
Producer Price o f B eef (Equation 57)
log (PRBEE) = log (PRBEEX) + log (EXCH) + log (CPI)
Producer Price o f Copper (Equation 58)
log (PRCOP) = log (PRCOPX) + log (EXCH) + log (BCLM)
Producer Price o f Nickel (Equation 59)
log (PRNIC) = log (PRNICX) + log (EXCH) + log (BCLM)
Diamond Production (Equation 60)
log (DIAM) = constant + log (LDIAP) + log (KDIAP) + TIME 
Copper-Nickel Production (Equation 61)
log (COPNIC) = constant + log (LCPNIC) + log (KCPNIC) + TIME 
B eef Production (Equation 62)
log (BEEF) = constant + log (PRBEE(-l)) + log (PIPEAP(-l))
Imports o f  Consumer Goods (Equation 63)
log (CONIMP) = log (CONS) + log (EXPO(-l)) + log (YIPF)
210
Imports o f Intermediate Goods ('Equation 64) 
log (INTIMP) = log (EXPO(-l)) + log (NEKIF)
Imports o f Capital Goods (Equation 65) 
log (KAPIMP) = log (FCF) + TIME
BLOCK 9: INCOMES, TAXES, AND WAGES
Urban Household Income (Equation 66)
YUH = YNONTR + YUH (-1)
Rural Household Income (Equation 67)
YRH = YTRADI + YRH (-1)
Gross Surplus o f Public Corporations (Equation 68) 
YGSPC = YGPCP + YGSPC (-1)
Gross Surplus o f Public Corporations (Equation 69) 
YPCP = constant + YGPSP + UI
Personal Taxes (Equation 70)
TXP =  TX P(-l) + YPIMGT
Corporate Taxes (Equation 71)
TXCT = constant + YPCP + YTAXCR
Corporate Taxes (Equation 72 and 73)
TXGPG =  constant + WGE + TXGPG (-1)
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DEFINITION OF  VARIABLES (MO D E L  O F  B O T S W A N A )
B C LM Real B C L  margin
B E E F Beef production
C B L Capital consumption allowance
CO NIM P Consum er goods imports (million Pula)
C O N S Total private and government consumption
C O PN IC Copper-nickel production
C P Public's cash holding
CPI Consum er price index
D C R E D Domestic credit
DIAM Diamond production
E A G Employment in agriculture
E F Labour force in formal sectors
EMIN Employment in mining
ETAI Labour force in traditional agriculture and informal sectors
E X C H Exchange rate US$ per one Pula
E X P O Real exports
E X R V S Excess reserves
F C F Real gross fixed capital formation
F C F A G Fixed capital formation, agriculture
F C F C S Fixed capital formation, construction
F C F E L Fixed capital formation, utilities
F C F F l Fixed capital formation, financial institutions
F C F G G Fixed capital formation, general government
F C F M F Fixed capital formation, manufacturing
FCFM IN Fixed capital formation, mining
F C F S P S Fixed capital formation, social and personal services
F C F T H Fixed capital formation, trade and hotels
F C F T P Fixed capital formation, transport
G C B Government cash balance
G V D B T Government debt
II Inventory investment
IMP Imports
INTIMP intermediate goods imports
KAPIM P Capital goods imports
K CPN IC Capital stock in copper-nickel production
KDIAP Capita! stock in diamond production
LCPN IC Labour force in copper-nickel production
LDIAP Labour force in diamond production
L P R A G Labour productivity in agriculture
L P R C S Labour productivity in construction
L P R G G Labour productivity in general government
L P R O Labour productivity in overall economy
L P R S P S Labour productivity in social and personal services
LP R T H Labour productivity in trade and hotels
L P R T P Labour productivity in transport
M G B Government borrowing
MLB Net lending to parastatals
NEKIF Net capital inflow
P A G R Agriculture G D P  deflator (1979/80 = 100)
P C S Construction G D P  deflator
P E L Utilities G D P  deflator
P F C F Fixed capital formation G D P  deflator
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES CONTINUE
PFI Financial institutions G D P  deflator
P G D P G D P  deflator
P G G General government G D P  deflator
PIM PE Import price index of arable land
PM F Manufacturing G D P  deflator
P R C O P X Export price of copper
PRNIC Producer price of nickel
PRN ICX Export price of nickel
P S P S Social and Personal services G D P  deflator
PTH Trade and hotels G D P  deflator
P TP Transport G D P  deflator
P V C D N D Real private consumption, durables and non-durables
P V C D N D V Private consumption, durables and non-durables
P V C O T V Total private consumption
P V C S Real private consumption, services
P V C S V Private consumption, services
Q W A G Agriculture ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
Q W C S Construction ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
Q W E L Utilities ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
QWFI Financial institutions ratio of rentai price of capital to money wage
Q W G G General government ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
Q W M F Manufacturing ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
QW MIN Mining ratio of rental price of capita! to money wage
Q W S P S Social and personal services ratio of rental price of capital to money 
wage
Q W TH Trade and hotels ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
Q W TP Transport ratio of rental price of capital to money wage
RA Credit terms (Average commercial banks interest rate per annum
RAIN Botswana average rainfall
RL Long term interest rate
RR1D Relative rate of interest of deposits
T D E P S Total deposits
T H A G Total hours, agriculture (average per person per year times number of 
persons (million man-hours)
T H C S Total hours, construction
T H E L Total hours, utilities
THFI Total hours, financial institutions
T H G G Total hours, general government
T H M F Total hours, manufacturing
THMIN Total hours, mining
T H S P S Total hours, social and personal services
T H TH Total hours, trade and hotels
T H T P Total hours, transport
T X C T Total corporate taxes
T X G P G Government contributions to pensions and gratuity
T X P Total personal taxes
Ul Unemployment as percentage of the country's labour force
W G E Total wage bill
Y Real G D P  (million Pula)
Y A G G D P  in agriculture
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES CONTINUE
YCR Customs revenue
Y C S G D P  in construction
Y D P Disposable income
Y E L G D P  in utilities
YFI G D P  in financial institutions
Y G G G D P  in general government
Y G P C P Public corporations product
Y G P S P Private sector product
Y G S P C Gross surplus of public corporations
YIPF index of production of food
Y M F G D P  in manufacturing
YMIN G D P  in mining
Y N O N T R Non-traditional agriculture G D P
YNTRADI Traditional agriculture G D P
Y P C P Private corporate profit
Y PIM G T Total personal income minus government transfer payments
Y R H Rural household income
Y R R D Real rent, royalties and dividends revenue
Y S H A R E Manufacturing percentage contribution to the G D P
Y S P S G D P  in social and personal services
Y T A X Income tax revenue
Y TH G D P  in trade and hotels
Y T P G D P  in transport
YTRADI Traditional agriculture G D P
YU H Urban household income
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Appendix E M O D E L  O F  MAURITIAN E C O N O M Y  (1995)
Real Sector
Income Identity
RY = RC + RTI + REXP -RIMP + RRA 
Real total consumption 
RC = RPVC + RPUC 
Private consumption expenditure
RPVC = constant + log (RY) + AVGDTXR + log (RPVC (-1))
Public consumption expenditure
RPUC = constant + log (RY) + log (CPI (-1)) + log (RPUC (-1))
Real total investment 
RTI = RPVI + RPUI 
Private investment expenditure
RPVI = constant + log (REXP) + PUKRA (-1) + LR + log (RPVI (-1))
Public investment expenditure
RPUI = constant + PUKRA (-1) + BUDEFRA + log (RY) + log (RPUI (-1)
External Sector
Real total exports
REXP = RSUGX + REPZX + RTQEA + ROTHX 
Sugar exports
RSUGX = constant + log (RYSUG) + log (RBCSUG (-1))
EPZ exports
REPZX = constant + RYEPZ + log (RBCEPZ) + log (RER) + log (RFY)
+ log (REPZX (-1))
Tourist earnings
RTOEA = constant + log (TOARR) + log (RETR) + log (RTI) + log (RFY (-1)) 
Other exports
ROTHX = constant + log (RBCOTH) + log (RER) + log (RYU) + log (ROTHX (-1)) 
Real total imports 
RIMP = RRMIM + ROIM 
Raw materials imports
RRMIM = constant + log (RYEPZ) + log (NRUS (-1)) + log (RRMIM (-1))
Other imports
ROIM -  constant + log (REXP) + log (NRUS) + AVGMDR + log (ROIM (-1))
Current account balance
CAB = constant + BUDEF + NRUS
Fiscal Sector
BUDEF= TGE + LENREP -  TOTREV -  GRANTS 
Government expenditure
TGE = WS + EGS + INTINDBT + INTEXDBT + ST + GKEP 
Expenditure on other goods and services 
EGS = constant + log (NY) + log (CPI (-1))
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Interest payment on internal debt
INTINDBT = constant + INTDEBT (-1) + DMBRWRA + log (BRATE) 
Interest payment on external debt
INTEXDBT = constant + EXTBRWRA + MVLIB + log (INTEXDBT (-1)) 
Government revenue
TOTREV =TXTDIR + TXTIND + NTXREV 
Total direct taxes
TXTDIR -  constant + log (NY) + AVGDTXR + log (CPI (-1))
Total indirect taxes
TXTIND = TXDGS + IMPD + TXINDO
Domestic taxes on goods and services
TXDGS = constant + log (NY) + AVGTXRGS + log (CPI (-1))
Import duties
IMPD -  constant + log fNIMP) + AVGMDR 
Other indirect taxes
TXINDO = constant + log (NSUGX) + AVGEXDT 
Total non-tax revenue
NTXREV = constant + log (NY) + log (CPI (-1)) + log (NTXREV (-1))
Monetary Sector
AMR = CWR + DDBM + TDEP 
DDBM = TDDBM -  BDDBM 
Currency with public
CWP = constant + BUDEFRA + log INF ABM) + log (NY)
Total deposits
TDEP = constant + log (NY) + log (NSUGX (-1)) + DEPRT + log (CPI (-1))
Bankers’ demand denosits at Bank of Mauritius
BDDBM = constant + log (TDEP) + CRR + LAR + log (BDDBM (-1))
Nominal total bank credit to private sector
NTBCPV = constant + log (TDEP) + LR (-1) + log (NTBCPV (-1)
Bank rate
BRATE = constant + log (TBWY) + log (BRATE (-1))
Net foreign assets of Bank of Mauritius
NFABM = constant + log (NSUGX) + log (NPVTR) + log (NRUS)
Price Sector
General price level
CPI = constant + log (AMR) + log (RY) + AVGTXRGS (-1) + log (NRUS)
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DEFINITION O F  VARIABLES (MOD E L  O F  MAURITIUS)
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
AMR AGGREGATE MONETARY RESOURCES
BDDBM BANKERS’ DEMAND DEPOSITS AT BANK OF MAURITIUS
BRATE BANK RATE
BUDEF GROSS FISCAL DEFICIT
CAB NOMINAL CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
CPI CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
CWP CURRENCY WITH PUBLIC
DDBM DEMAND DEPOSITS WITH BANK OF MAURITIUS
EGS EXPENDITURE ON OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES
GDPDEF GDP DEFLATOR
IMPD IMPORT DUTIES
INTEXDBT INTEREST PAYMENT ON EXTERNAL DEBT
INTINDBT INTEREST PAYMENT ON INTERNAL DEBT
NFABM NET FOREIGN ASSETS OF BANK OF MAURITIUS
NIMP TOTAL NOMINAL IMPORTS
NSUGX NOMINAL SUGAR EXPORTS
NTBCPV NOMINAL TOTAL BANK CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR
NTXREV NON-TAX REVENUE
RBCEPZ REAL BANK CREDIT TO THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE SECTOR
RBCOTH REAL BANK CREDIT TO OTHER SECTOR
RBCSUG REAL BANK CREDIT TO SUGAR SECTOR
RC REAL TOTAL CONSUMPTION
REPZX REAL EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE EXPORTS
REXP REAL TOTAL EXPORTS
RIMP REAL TOTAL IMPORTS
ROIM REAL OTHER IMPORTS
ROTHX REAL OTHER EXPORTS
RPUC REAL PUBLIC CONSUMPTION
RPU REAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT
RPVC REAL PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
RPVI REAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT
RRMIM REAL RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS
RSUGX REAL SUGAR EXPORTS
RTBCPV REAL TOTAL BANK CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR
RTI REAL TOTAL INVESTMENT
RTOEA REAL TOURIST EARNINGS
RY REAL OUTPUT
TDEP TOTAL DEPOSITS
TGE TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
TOTREV TOTAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
TXDGS TAXES ON DOMESTIC GOODS AND SERVICES
TXINDO OTHER INDIRECT TAXES
TXTDIR TOTAL DIRECT TAXES
TXTIND TOTAL INDIRECT TAXES
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EXOGENOlLIS VARIABLES
AVGDTXR AVERAGE DIRECT TAX RATE (TXTDIR/NY)
AVGEXDT AVERAGE EXPORT DUTY RATE (TXINDO/NSUGX)
AVGMDR AVERAGE IMPORT DUTY RATE (IMPD/NIMP)
AVGTXRGS AVERAGE TAX RATE ON DOMESTIC GOODS & SERVICES (TXDGS/NY)
BUDEFRA BUDGET DEFICIT RATIO (BUDEF/NY, Actual Values)
CRR CASH RESERVE RATIO
DEPRT DEPOSIT RATES
DMBRWRA DOMESTIC BORROWING AS A RATIO OF BUDGET DEFICIT
EXPDEF EXPORTS DEFLATOR
EXTBRWRA EXTERNAL BORROWING AS A RATIO OF BUDGET DEFICIT
GRANTS TOTAL GRANTS RECEIVED
GKEP GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
IMPDEF IMPORTS DEFLATOR
INTDEBT OUTSTANDING INTERNAL DEBT
LAR LIQUID ASSETS RATIO
LENREP LENDING MINUS REPAYMENT
LR LENDING RATES
MVLIB WORLD INTEREST RATE (2-yr moving average o f LIBOR 
Rates on 6-mth deposits
NPVTR NOMINAL PRIVATE TRANSFERS
NRUS NOMINAL RS/US $ EXCHANGE RATE
PUKRA PUBLIC CAPITAL STOCK AS A RATIO OF TOTAL CAPITAL STOCK
RER TRADE WEIGHTED REAL EXCHANGE RATE (Weights =  Exports)
RETR TRADE WEIGHTED REAL EXCHANGE RATE (Weights =  Tourist Arrivals)
RFY REAL FOREIGN INCOME
RRE REAL RESIDUAL EXPENDITURE
RYEPZ REAL EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE OUTPUT
RYSUG REAL SUGAR PRODUCTION
RYU REAL US GDP
ST SUBSIDIES AND TRANSFERS
TBWY TREASURY BILL WEIGHTED YIELD
TDDBM TOTAL DEMAND DEPOSITS WITH BANK OF MAURITIUS
TOARR TOURIST ARRIVALS
WS WAGES AND SALARIES
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The equations 
A general specification (i)
Aggregate output, real gross domestic product (GDP)
(1)Y = C + I + G + X - IM [goodsmarket]
Money supply
(2) M = L [money market]
Balance of payments
(3) B s  P*X - Q*IM + F [balance of payments]
Model of Uganda 90/1
(Kenya, Tanzania)
Source: V. Murinde, Application of stochastic simulation and policy sensitivity 
techniques to a macroeconomic model of Uganda, Applied Economics, 24, 1992, 1-17. 
The stabilization potency of budgetary and financial policy in developing economies, 
Ph.D. thesis, Cardiff Business School, University of Wales, 1990. Macroeconomic policy 
modelling for developing countries, Avebury, Aldershot, Brookfield, USA, Hong Kong, 
Singa-pore, Sydney, 1993, 315, 319, 324, 356
A general specification (ii)
(1)' Y = C(Y) + I(i) + G + X(P. E) - IM(Q.E,Y)
(2)' M = L( Y, i, E, W)
(3)' B -  P.X(P.E) = -Q.IM(Q. E,Y) + F( i)
Appendix F Model of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania: By: V. Murinde (1992)
General notation w.r.t. (i) and (ii)
S(T) means that S is a function of T (SI{C. I, X. IM, L, F})
{+ , - } denote the sign of the partial derivative of S with respect to T. 
The sign structure is evaluated after that part of the behavioral 
structure e.g. of the production sector, e.g. of the supply side, which 
is explicitly missing and has been integrated.
A general specification (iii)
(1) Growth rate of real GDP Y:= InY - InY t-1
=a 1,1 + a 1,2 In Q + a 1,3 In 11-1 + a 1,4 In 11-2 + a 1,5 In 11-3 + a 1,6 In F 
+ a 1,7 R + a 1,8 lnL + a 1,9 In L t-1 + a 1,10 TY t-1 + a 1,11 XT 
+  a 1,12 In G +  a 1,13 In M t-1 +  a 1,14 In Y t-1 +  u 1
(2) Inflation rate (GDP deflator Q):= InQ - InQ t-1 
=a 2,1 + a 2,2 In Q* + a 2,3 In Q t -  1
* + a 2,4 In E + a 2,5 In E t-1
+ a 2,6 In 11-1 + a 2,7 In L + a 2,8 In L t-1 + a 2,9 In F + a 2,10 In F t-1 
+ a 2,11 R + a 2,12 In Q t-1 + a 2,13 In G + a 2,14 In Y + a 2,15 In Y t-1 
+ a 2,16 TY + a 2,17 In M t-1 + a 2,18 XT t-1 + D + u 2
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(3) Actual exchange rate (E):= InE - InE t-1
=a 3,1 + a 3,2 In Y + a 3,3 In Y t-l + a 3,4 In E t-1  + a 3,5 In Q*
+ a 3,6 In Q t-  1
* + a 3,7 In Q + a 3,8 In Q t-1  + a 3,9 In I t-l + a 3,10 R t-1  
+ a 3,11 In K t-1  + a 3,12 XT + a 3,13 In F + a 3,14 In G + a 3,15 In L t-1  
+ a 3,16 TY t-1  + a 3,17 In M t-1  + D + u 3
Exogenous and stochastic variables
C Consumption expenditure 
D Dummy variable
E Exchange rate, units of domestic per foreign currency unit 
F Net foreign capital inflows (foreign reserves)
G Real government expenditures 
I Real gross domestic investment 
i, R Interest rate, domestic, official (regulated)
IM Imports 
K Capital flows
L, M Money, demand, supply (Reserve money)
P Foreign price of export
Q, Q* Producer prices, domestic, foreign
TY Income tax rate
u k Equation error of equation k (k = 1,2,3)
W Wealth
X, XT Exports, Export tax rate
Note: An identical specification is used for Kenya and Tanzania.
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Namibia (In millions of Namibia Dollars, unless otherwise specified)129
Appendix G  Data Used in Estimation of the Model
Years C I X M G T
1970 140 455 2 0 0 1 1910 689 1250
1971 334 550 2104 2115 741 1370
1972 328 745 2362 2402 774 1399
1973 522 780 2418 2508 805 1468
1974 629 801 2499 2682 835 1592
1975 736 852 2562 2717 865 1645
1976 843 896 2696 2422 880 1778
1977 1057 990 2842 2578 894 1781
1978 1485 975 2868 2899 907 1815
1979 1913 1007 2900 2960 919 1837
1980 2041 1083 3045 3175 930 1845
1981 2285 1109 3195 3251 1410 1910
1982 2406 1230 3237 3316 1487 2250
1983 2513 1271 3303 3458 1529 2343
1984 2626 1305 3585 3455 1555 2493
1985 2829 1345 3601 3696 1394 2508
1986 2950 1402 3640 3184 1498 2538
1987 3337 1452 3674 3887 1763 2615
1988 3061 1486 3700 3509 1727 2807
1989 3419 1505 3742 3734 1638 2890
1990 3622 1590 3802 3814 1862 3061
1991 3952 1660 3830 4259 2216 3111
1992 3883 1740 3979 4451 2515 3213
1993 4006 1876 4017 4481 2426 3424
1994 3919 1956 3925 4300 2275 3560
1995 4829 2132 3914 4776 2361 3691
1996 4838 2230 4047 4752 2453 3988
129 Employment data (EM) are expressed in thousands for Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius.
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Namibia (In millions of Namibia Dollars, unless otherwise specified)
Years N E NIR DP MD FY FP
1970 0.7172 5.5 14.7 305 13618.3 24.0
1971 0.7652 6.5 15.2 595 14906.1 25.5
1972 0.7829 6.0 17.8 601 16940.0 26.9
1973 0.6911 3.78 18.9 615 20379.4 29.3
1974 0.6896 6.48 19.1 700 23985.3 33.2
1975 0.8695 7.42 19.7 716 26338.4 36.6
1976 0.8695 8.28 21.4 725 29457.3 39.7
1977 0.8695 8.41 23.9 801 32706.0 42.6
1978 0.8695 7.87 24.6 814 35935.0 45.7
1979 0.8268 4.70 27.4 834 38885.7 49.3
1980 0.7453 9.50 31.6 865 36232.0 54.1
1981 0.9565 12.0 32.7 926 44487.7 57.7
1982 1.0763 19.3 36.7 945 45833.9 60.1
1983 1.2219 20.5 40.8 998 47060.3 63.9
1984 1.9849 22.3 45.4 1001 49051.2 64.1
1985 2.5575 21.5 48.0 1099 51446.9 72.3
1986 2.1834 14.3 50.0 1103 52801.1 74.9
1987 1.9299 12.5 53.4 1115 54936.8 77.3
1988 2.3777 15.3 73.7 1236 58301.6 80.1
1989 2.5360 19.8 88.0 1378 61018.6 83.1
1990 2.5625 21.0 100.0 1598 63893.4 86.9
1991 2.7430 23.3 104.0 1725 66270.5 90.6
1992 3.0530 20.2 114.0 1954 66972.1 93.6
1993 3.3975 18.0 120.0 2025 67168.9 96.0
1994 3.5435 17.0 123.6 2148 67664.6 97.7
1995 3.6475 18.5 126.2 2345 68677.4 100.0
1996 4.6825 18.1 158.9 2945 71316.3 101.8
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Namibia (In millions of Namibia Dollars, unless otherwise specified)
Years EM W NW DD FD
1970 29.7000 4.4218 65.0000 372.4490 124.1497
1971 30.5000 4.5395 69.0000 399.6711 133.2237
1972 33.1000 4.2135 75.0000 530.8989 176.9663
1973 35.3000 4.0741 77.0000 567.4603 189.1534
1974 42.8000 4.2408 81.0000 659.6859 219.8953
1975 45.5000 4.2640 84.0000 1138.300 379.4416
1976 47.9000 4.1589 89.0000 1160.000 386.6822
1977 49.1000 5.9833 143.0000 1136.000 378.6611
1978 51.3000 6.4634 159.0000 1201.200 400.4065
1979 57.4000 6.0949 167.0000 1256.400 418.7956
1980 59.8000 5.5380 175.0000 1255.500 418.5127
1981 65.1000 5.5352 181.0000 1350.900 450.3058
1982 67.4000 5.2861 194.0000 1369.200 456.4033
1983 69.8000 5.0735 207.0000 1242.600 414.2157
1984 81.6000 4.8018 218.0000 1291.900 430.6167
1985 116.3000 4.6875 225.0000 1231.300 410.4167
1986 125.7000 5.0400 252.0000 1191.000 397.0000
1987 131.4000 5.0689 271.0000 909.0909 303.0303
1988 157.5000 3.9174 289.0000 867.8571 289.2857
1989 199.1000 3.3977 299.0000 608.5227 202.8409
1990 257.6000 3.1100 311.0000 674.2500 224.7500
1991 289.4000 3.0481 317.0000 761.5385 253.8462
1992 305.7000 2.8158 321.0000 642.7632 214.2544
1993 325.1000 3.9250 471.0000 760.0000 253.3333
1994 329.6000 4.5845 567.0000 752.5862 250.8621
1995 347.8000 5.5216 697.0000 825.0000 275.0000
1996 387.6000 4.4223 703.0000 857.8402 285,9467
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Botswana (In m illio n s  o f  B o tsw a n a  P u la , unless otherw ise specified)
Years C I X M G T
1970 369.0000 337.0000 454.0000 751.0000 124.0000 153.0000
1971 404.0000 416.0000 461.0000 767.0000 146.0000 195.0000
1972 439.0000 495.0000 478.0000 785.0000 168.0000 237.0000
1973 514.0000 574.0000 495.0000 801.0000 190.0000 279.0000
1974 609.3960 653.6913 512.7517 817.4497 212.7517 221.4094
1975 644.6328 674.5763 529.9435 833.8983 234.4633 279.8305
1976 684.7291 716.5025 666.0099 923.6453 286.6995 196.9951
1977 1076.316 732.8947 836.8421 1059.649 351.7544 297.8947
1978 1168.444 853.3333 872.4444 1268.889 426.2222 392.5778
1979 1205.801 873.2028 1113.167 1368.683 393.9502 465.0890
1980 1220.597 968.3582 1373.134 1454.925 443.8806 573.2537
1981 1326.513 825.3602 1587.896 1753.026 585.5908 601.5274
1982 1345.783 1048.229 1713.855 2039.458 730.7229 656.3253
1983 1538.798 1082.361 2031.967 2106.011 824.8634 834.5355
1984 1553.283 1095.000 2180.808 2116.667 916.1616 1052.955
1985 1584.815 1443.210 2229.218 2118.107 911.7284 990.1852
1986 1608.027 1469.692 2354.348 2212.709 889.2977 1272.525
1987 1647.649 1579.154 2528.213 2237.461 1132.602 1560.925
1988 1747.471 1759.000 2893.000 2294.682 1364.851 1396.109
1989 1784.517 1854.719 3112.725 2629.374 1254.401 1519.406
1990 1973.200 2126.200 3657.400 3369.800 1435.700 1939.500
1991 2114.639 2281.179 3907.510 3469.487 1808.175 1936.407
1992 2386.101 2320.307 4094.495 3592.690 1819.856 2198.466
1993 2518.114 2405.045 4197.684 3998.346 2146.567 1974.773
1994 2670.671 2505.512 4288.127 4089.399 2242.120 1609.470
1995 2869.683 2782.999 4474.467 4191.984 2266.904 1421.267
1996 2998.460 2936.019 4710.782 4256.872 2441.232 1408.472
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Botswana (In millions of Botswana Pula, unless otherwise specified)
Years N E NIR DP MD FY FP
1970 0.7172 5.25 11.3 283.1858 13618.3 24.0
1971 0.7653 5.75 12.4 306.4516 14906.1 25.5
1972 0.7828 6.25 12.5 368.0000 16940.0 26.9
1973 0.6712 6.75 13.2 386.3636 20379.4 29.3
1974 0.6896 7.75 14.9 382.5503 23985.3 33.2
1975 0.8696 7.75 15.7 355.9322 26338.4 36.6
1976 0.8696 8.25 17.6 423.6453 29457.3 39.7
1977 0.8282 7.75 24.8 478.0702 32706.0 42.6
1978 0.8282 6.75 25.5 697.7778 35935.0 45.7
1979 0.7887 5.75 28.1 708.1851 38885.7 49.3
1980 0.7418 5.75 33.5 717.4627 36232.0 54.1
1981 0.8801 9.60 34.7 731.2968 44487.7 57.7
1982 1.061 22.2 33.2 740.9639 45833.9 60.1
1983 1.1555 13.4 36.6 863.3880 47060.3 63.9
1984 1.5601 12.0 39.6 931.8182 49051.2 64.1
1985 2.1008 11.5 48.6 1046.091 51446.9 72.3
1986 1.8376 11.0 59.8 1013.378 52801.1 74.9
1987 1.5657 10.9 63.8 1587.774 54936.8 77.3
1988 1.9357 7.8 67.1 1592.737 58301.6 80.1
1989 1.8723 7.2 94.3 1800.620 61018.6 83.1
1990 1.8713 7.1 100.0 2056.000 63893.4 86.9
1991 2.0725 11.1 105.2 2079.848 66270.5 90.6
1992 2.2568 14.0 110.8 2136.462 66972.1 93.6
1993 2.5648 14.1 139.9 2244.342 67168.9 96.0
1994 2.7174 13.2 141.5 2290.459 67664.6 97.7
1995 2.8217 14.3 154.7 2436.264 68677.4 100.0
1996 3.6443 14.5 168.8 2589.000 71316.3 101.8
225
Botswana (In millions of Botswana Pula, unless otherwise specified)
Years EM W NW DD FD
1970 35.8000 1.4464 48.0000 111.9469 414.3363
1971 39.4000 1.4526 53.0000 106.0484 440.8065
1972 41.3000 1.7084 69.0000 109.2000 500.0000
1973 46.9000 1.6964 72.0000 112.1212 532.8788
1974 51.6000 1.7295 84.0000 99.5973 524.6980
1975 57.3000 1.8107 96.0000 94.0764 547.6433
1976 59.4000 1.7861 105.0000 84.7727 533.0682
1977 62.7000 1.5254 114.0000 61.8952 409.9194
1978 69.4000 2.1320 215.0000 56.8235 429.4118
1979 75.6000 2.0980 229.0000 50.8185 311.7794
1980 83.4000 1.9309 231.0000 43.7910 294.7164
1981 71.1000 1.9128 235.0000 3.8905 381.7003
1982 72.5000 1.9655 237.0000 1.7169 600.0904
1983 70.4000 1.9490 257.0000 1.5847 634.8907
1984 77.9000 2.0013 293.0000 1.2626 961.1616
1985 116.8000 1.8235 301.0000 1.0288 845.5967
1986 130.1000 1.6227 303.0000 .83612 792.8428
1987 150.2000 1.5776 309.0000 .53292 873.8401
1988 169.5000 1.6431 347.0000 .50671 1064.000
1989 189.5000 1.5243 433.0000 .36055 797.3277
1990 209.0000 1.5665 479.0000 .42000 801.9200
1991 228.9000 1.6504 548.0000 .36122 918.0608
1992 224.8000 1.7845 660.0000 .34296 989.4404
1993 229.0000 1.7424 799.0000 .25018 896.7119
1994 245.0000 1.7667 828.0000 .22615 973.1449
1995 294.0000 1.7362 878.0000 .16160 930.1228
1996 345.4000 1.6989 923.0000 .12441 1065.100
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Mauritius (In m illio n s  o f  M a u rit iu s  R upees, un less otherw ise specified)
Years C I X M G T
1970 9175.000 2012.500 6475.000 6437.500 2075.000 2062
1971 9211.765 2164.706 9847.059 6905.882 2141.176 2058
1972 9577.320 3960.825 10910.31 7443.299 2257.732 2127
1973 9929.204 4247.788 11309.73 9176.991 2079.646 2569
1974 9303.867 4143.646 10839.78 10508.29 1988.950 2429
1975 9884.211 4989.474 11494.74 11721.05 2331.579 4999
1976 11169.23 5528.205 12246.15 13907.69 3005.128 4853
1977 14786.01 7707.819 12930.04 13312.76 3283.951 4415
1978 15516.73 7148.699 12055.76 14925.65 3468.401 4124
1979 16176.10 7500.000 13251.57 14075.47 3172.956 5964
1980 16323.38 7485.075 13069.65 14288.56 3044.776 4983
1981 16316.14 8780.269 14237.67 15632.29 3188.341 5038
1982 17167.01 8391.753 14400.00 15080.41 3348.454 5527
1983 16796.58 9277.567 14321.29 16378.33 3269.962 7896
1984 17417.70 9601.770 15369.91 16221.24 3247.788 8227
1985 18166.67 10372.55 15534.31 17049.02 3129.085 8163
1986 18154.31 10535.55 18031.77 18046.90 3128.593 8593
1987 19905.15 10399.73 21191.06 20516.26 3841.463 7149
1988 21473.11 10876.53 22695.60 24435.21 4454.768 7056
1989 23436.12 11403.08 23527.53 26212.56 4491.189 7718
1990 25370.00 12127.00 25619.00 28458.00 4617.000 8111
1991 26149.91 11838.92 25941.34 27500.00 4832.402 7861
1992 27239.89 12799.65 26150.26 27579.96 5004.394 8149
1993 29199.19 14095.93 27247.97 30097.56 5546.341 8940
1994 30738.04 15412.30 27523.92 31775.25 5969.628 9304
1995 32294.50 12887.84 29815.48 31047.76 6036.903 8700
1996 33623.04 12947.51 34426.04 34736.88 6432.175 8538
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M a u r it iu s (In m illio n s  o f  M a u rit iu s  R u pees, un less otherw ise specified)
Years N E NIR DP MD FY FP
1970 5.570 6 8.0 4765 13618.3 24.0
1971 5.224 6 8.5 5298 14906.1 25.5
1972 5.678 6 9.7 6984 16940.0 26.9
1973 5.739 6 11.3 7592 20379.4 29.3
1974 5.677 6 18.1 8760 23985.3 33.2
1975 6.589 6 19.0 9245 26338.4 36.6
1976 6.639 6 19.5 9586 29457.3 39.7
1977 6.350 7 24.3 9877 32706.0 42.6
1978 5.921 9 26.9 12037 35935.0 45.7
1979 7.586 10.5 28.7 12791 38885.7 49.3
1980 7.800 10.5 42.2 13045 36232.0 54.1
1981 10.300 12.2 44.5 13951 44487.7 57.7
1982 10.900 13.4 48.5 14157 45833.9 60.1
1983 12.700 15.1 52.6 14315 47060.3 63.9
1984 15.600 13.3 56.5 14965 49051.2 64.1
1985 14.300 13.8 61.2 16313 51446.9 72.3
1986 13.100 14.3 66.1 19910 52801.1 74.9
1987 12.200 14.1 73.8 20501 54936.8 77.3
1988 13.800 14.9 81.8 21477 58301.6 80.1
1989 14.900 16.1 90.8 22330 61018.6 83.1
1990 14.300 18.0 100.0 24567 63893.4 86.9
1991 14.800 17.8 107.4 25890 66270.5 90.6
1992 16.900 17.1 113.8 30501 66972.1 93.6
1993 18.700 16.6 123.0 31025 67168.9 96.0
1994 17.900 18.9 131.7 34638 67664.6 97.7
1995 17.700 20.8 138.2 35180 68677.4 100.0
1996 17.900 20.8 146.7 36697 71316.3 101.8
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Mauritius (In millions of Mauritius Rupees, unless otherwise specified)
Years EM W NW DD FD
1970 116.5000 8.7500 70.00 4886.3 2011.3
1971 122.5000 9.1765 78.00 4310.6 1808.2
1972 130.4000 8.4536 82.00 3269.1 1733.0
1973 141.4000 7.5221 85.00 3677.9 1233.6
1974 150.3000 5.6906 103.00 2970.2 1149.2
1975 168.6400 6.5263 124.00 4180.5 1300.5
1976 180.6400 9.1795 179.00 4954.9 1348.2
1977 194.4000 8.7654 213.00 5441.2 1329.2
1978 196.8000 9.4796 255.00 6412.3 2343.1
1979 199.7000 9.3728 269.00 7826.1 3172.8
1980 197.0800 7.2275 305.00 6949.1 3392.7
1981 194.8800 14.9438 665.00 8076.0 4985.2
1982 194.2200 28.3093 1373.0 9180.8 7299.0
1983 191.5400 26.6730 1403.0 9901.1 6581.7
1984 195.5800 27.4336 1550.0 10351.5 6981.8
1985 203.6200 25.9804 1590.0 9745.1 8508.7
1986 223.1800 28.6687 1895.0 9456.7 7008.3
1987 244.9900 30.0136 2215.0 8266.0 6563.4
1988 264.0000 34.4132 2815.0 7333.3 7091.8
1989 268.4900 36.7291 3335.0 9224.2 6316.6
1990 283.4900 35.2400 3524.0 9770.0 5868.1
1991 287.6300 37.9888 4080.0 11070.0 5553.1
1992 291.7200 39.8067 4530.0 9279.3 4811.6
1993 290.0800 38.8537 4779.0 9508.5 4644.0
1994 392.3800 43.8800 5779.0 10743.4 4377.8
1995 436.3000 45.8321 6334.0 12525.9 4181.1
1996 545.8000 45.8828 6731.0 13097.9 6243.4
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South Africa (In millions of South African Rand, unless otherwise specified)
Years C I X M G T
1970 104287.7 47780.82 38630.14 35684.93 20767.12 17547.95
1971 110857.1 44285.71 39662.34 40129.87 23740.26 26948.05
1972 110500.0 56418.60 49904.65 41488.37 22523.26 33360.47
1973 109156.9 58970.59 41558.82 43196.08 21754.90 35911.76
1974 111067.8 69415.25 56915.25 57949.15 23745.76 37508.47
1975 115778.6 65091.60 57099.24 58045.80 28145.04 39961.83
1976 118861.1 69416.67 59055.56 61076.39 31006.94 40798.61
1977 118212.5 75887.50 61618.75 63068.75 31462.50 42668.75
1978 118460.7 74230.34 62241.57 65792.13 31044.94 44393.26
1979 119156.1 79770.73 65341.46 68385.37 30873.17 46341.46
1980 121248.0 83263.78 70100.79 71062.99 32118.11 49421.26
1981 134105.6 99904.93 72845.07 73045.77 34778.17 49760.56
1982 137969.0 72823.53 74687.31 75965.94 38269.35 53092.88
1983 137957.2 93114.97 74857.22 76390.37 37740.64 52165.78
1984 143177.5 94014.39 77182.25 78184.65 42990.41 58100.72
1985 136708.7 101613.6 79020.66 79979.34 44002.07 62576.45
1986 138672.0 108551.4 80687.94 81161.35 45517.73 60799.65
1987 144840.1 117947.2 82507.76 82638.20 47385.09 62072.98
1988 152700.4 126717.9 84124.16 84464.24 48400.81 67767.88
1989 154148.4 128497.1 85973.53 86506.33 51453.39 77163.41
1990 159530.0 129634.0 87714.00 88046.00 52702.00 70435.00
1991 161725.1 130121.0 89392.07 90740.97 53893.39 70348.90
1992 163711.5 135605.2 90849.10 91043.78 54790.46 63175.92
1993 164133.1 139389.5 92612.61 93934.14 56505.67 69009.21
1994 167576.1 148455.5 93514.84 95467.74 58285.16 70255.48
1995 175105.0 154481.6 95275.80 98736.06 57409.25 74637.60
1996 180995.6 164131.8 97707.33 99835.34 60444.20 82246.17
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Ltli A f r i c a  (In m illio n s  o f  S outh  A fr ic a n  R and , unless otherw ise specified)
Years N E NIR D P MD FY FP
1970 0.71723 4.55 7.3 96876.71 13618.3 24.0
1971 0.76526 5.61 7.7 99857.14 14906.1 25.5
1972 0.78290 5.37 8.6 105627.9 16940.0 26.9
1973 0.69116 4.12 10.2 119529.4 20379.4 29.3
1974 0.68962 6.13 11.8 120457.6 23985.3 33.2
1975 0.86957 6.24 13.1 129526.7 26338.4 36.6
1976 0.86957 8.50 14.4 128270.8 29457.3 39.7
1977 0.86957 8.29 16.0 127131.3 32706.0 42.6
1978 0.86957 7.99 17.8 132567.4 35935.0 45.7
1979 0.89786 5.39 20.2 136440.6 38885.7 49.3
1980 0.74538 4.40 25.4 139651.4 36232.0 54.1
1981 0.95657 2.05 28.4 145227.3 44487.7 57.7
1982 1.07630 10.90 32.3 137349.8 45833.9 60.1
1983 1.22190 13.98 37.4 135951.9 47060.3 63.9
1984 1.98491 20.31 41.7 140105.5 49051.2 64.1
1985 2.55754 18.21 48.4 149233.5 51446.9 72.3
1986 2.18341 11.92 56.4 151578.0 52801.1 74.9
1987 1.92994 9.50 64.4 154900.6 54936.8 77.3
1988 2.37773 13.90 74.1 156587.0 58301.6 80.1
1989 2.53601 18.77 86.9 161069.0 61018.6 83.1
1990 2.56253 19.46 100.0 165933.0 63893.4 86.9
1991 2.74303 17.02 113.5 169712.8 66270.5 90.6
1992 3.05300 14.11 127.9 176864.7 66972.1 93.6
1993 3.39750 10.83 145.2 178424.9 67168.9 96.0
1994 3.54350 10.24 155.0 182431.0 67664.6 97.7
1995 3.64750 13.07 168.6 186600.8 68677.4 100
1996 4.68250 15.54 182.8 191384.0 71316.3 101.8
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South Africa (In millions of South African Rand, unless otherwise specified)
Years EM W NW DD FD
1970 1987.8 15.7534 115.00 70493.2 3123.3
1971 2054.4 16.3636 126.00 72727.3 5402.6
1972 2092.8 15.6977 135.00 75581.4 5837.2
1973 2175.0 14.7059 150.00 70235.3 3529.4
1974 2271.8 14.5763 172.00 63355.9 4322.0
1975 2325.0 15.2672 200.00 70290.1 6763.4
1976 2361.4 15.9722 230.00 74868.1 9201.4
1977 2310.8 16.0625 257.00 78843.8 8475.0
1978 2313.6 15.8989 283.00 84634.8 6651.7
1979 2567.4 15.9901 323.00 85401.0 4623.8
1980 2735.1 14.5669 370.00 76299.2 2374.0
1981 2841.7 15.8803 451.00 73352.1 3147.9
1982 3105.9 16.9350 547.00 75687.3 4111.5
1983 3542.8 16.5508 619.00 75780.7 3641.7
1984 4175.9 16.4508 686.00 78738.6 5580.3
1985 5036.4 15.4339 747.00 78235.5 5690.1
1986 5093.9 15.2482 860.00 81258.9 4485.8
1987 5197.7 16.2267 1045.0 87976.7 3520.2
1988 5302.7 16.3968 1215.0 90803.0 3237.5
1989 5333.9 16.5478 1438.0 102703.1 2339.5
1990 5301.5 16.6000 1660.0 100404.0 1956.0
1991 5192.8 16.6520 1890.0 108212.3 1849.3
1992 5082.7 17.1618 2195.0 113338.5 1850.7
1993 4950.5 16.8457 2446.0 124340.2 3440.8
1994 5517.8 19.2516 2984.0 149455.5 5198.7
1995 5918.1 18.6595 3146.0 157698.1 5699.9
1996 6525.3 18.3698 3358.0 157740.2 7800.3
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Appendix H Simulation Model in WinSolve (Simulation Program)130 
Namibia
dlog(RC)= .024029+.43427*dlog(RDY)-.62046*diff(RIRl(-l)) 
+.24847*dlog(RC(-3))-.40951 *( log(RC(-l)) 
-.36234-.94292*log(RDY(-l))+.060399H:RIRl(-l) );
@ investment
dlog(RI)= ,015495-.10898iH)LOG(RY(-l))+.095743*DIFF(RIRl) 
+.78462*DLOG(RI(-1))-.072505*( log(RI(-l)) 
-L2385~.70005*log(RY(-l))+.47700*RIRl(-l) );
@ exports
dlog(RX)= .0075326+. 10036*dlog(FRY(-2))+.065744*dlog(RE) 
+.22137*dlog(RX(-l))-.14908*( log(RX(-l)) 
-4.3025-.34756*log(FRY(-l))-.10403*log(RE(-l)) );
@ imports
dlog(RM)= .0233 97+.049931 *dlog(RY (-1))-.27198*dlog(RE(-1)) 
+.28500*dlog(RM(-2))-.33361H:( log(RM(-l)) 
-4.1502-.47779*log(RY(-l))+.095763*log(RE(-l)) );
@MONEY DEMAND
LOG(MD) = -.76714+.89364*LOG(RY)-.l 1379*LOG(NIRN);
@ inflation
DLOG(GDPDEF)= .087748-.026826*RLY+.047338*RLY(~1);
@ EMPLOYMENT
dlog(REP)= .046367+.027067*dlog(RY(-2))-.52834*dlog(RW) 
+.53747*DLOG(REP(-1))-.028182*( log(REP(-l)) 
+4.3759-1.3510*log(RY(-l)+1.5886*log(RW)) );
@Real wage rate identity 
RW=LOG(NW)-LOG(GDPDEF);
130 Note that notations used in WinSolve are slightly different from those in the actual data presented in 
appendix G. R refers to real, RW is W, GDPDEF is DP, REP is EM, RIR1 is IR, RLY is Yct, and NIRN is 
NIR.
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@ income identity 
RY=RC+RI+RG+CA;
@REAL EXCHANGE RATE IDENTITY 
RE=(NER*GDPDEFG7)/GDPDEF;
@ disposable income identity 
RDY=RY-RT;
@ natural output
LRYN =7.4232+.068681 *TIME(1970);
@ detrended output identity 
RLY = log(RY)-LRYN;
@ real interest rate identity 
RIR1 = NIRN-DLOG(GDPDEF);
©DOMESTIC DEBT IDENTITY 
RDD=( 1+RJR1 )*RDD (-1 )+RG-RT;
©TAX STABILISATION RULE 
RT=0.25*RDD(-1);
©FOREIGN DEBT IDENTITY 
RFD=( 1+RJR1 )*RFD(-1 )-C A;
©TRADE BALANCE 
CA=RX-RM;
©Foreign capital inflows identity 
FCI=RI-RS;
©SAVINGS IDENTITY 
RS=RDY-RC;
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@ consumption
dlog(RC)= .036300+.080358*dlog(RDY(-2))+.60751*diff(RIRl(-l)) 
+.40648*dlog(RC(-l))-.50331*( log(RC(-l)) 
-1.4072-.74611*log(RDY(-l))+.27696*RIRl(-l) );
Botswana
@ investment
dlog(RI)= .029703+.40069*dlog(RY)-. 15431 *diff(RIRl (-1)) 
+.053933*dlog(RI(-2))-.042650*( log(RI(-l)) 
-L1579-.73867'Hog(RY(-l))+.065724*RIRl(-l) );
@ exports
dlog(RX)= .082112+.059550*dlog(FRY)-.22122*dlog(RE) 
+.037618*dlog(RX(-2))-.31337H‘( log(RX(-l))
+10.8220-1.7068*log(FRY(-l))-.082874*log(RE(-l)) );
@ imports
dlog(RM)= .026513+.025624*dlog(RY)-.034333*dlog(RE(-l)) 
+.57157*dlog(RM(-l))-.22007*( log(RM(-l))
-1.4597-.75629*log(RY (-1 ))+.013671 *log(RE(-1)) );
@ money demand
dlog(NMD)= .024975+.37018'Mlog(RY)-.065772*dlog(NIRN) 
+.28067*dlog(NMD(-l))-.088688*( log(NMD(-l)) 
+1.3216-.96112*log(RY(-l))+.19355*log(NIRN(-l)) );
@ EMPLOYMENT
dlog(REP)=.0069425+.14238*dlog(RY)-.25898*dlog(RW2(-l)) 
+.79410*DLOG(REP(-l))-.l 1730*( log(REP(-l)) 
+.30543-.81588*log(RY(-l)+.89915*log(RW2)) );
@Real wage rate identity 
RW2=LOG(NWl)-LOG(GDPDEF);
@real exchange rate identity
RE=(NER* GDPDEFG7)/GDPDEF;
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@ inflation
DLOG(GDPDEF)= ,10376-.099148*RLY+.19632*RLY(~1);
@ income identity 
RY=RC+RI+RG+CA;
©Government employment rule 
RG=0.5*REP(~1);
©  disposable income identity 
RDY=RY-RT;
©  natural output
LRYN =6.5366+. 10233*TIME(1970);
@ detrended output identity 
RLY = log(RY)-LRYN;
@ real interest rate identity 
RIR1 = NIRN-DLOG(GDPDEF);
©DOMESTIC debt identity 
RDD=( 1+RIR1) *RDD(-1 )+RG-RT;
@TAX STABILISATION RULE 
RT=0.25*RDD(-1);
©FOREIGN DEBT IDENTITY 
RFD=(1+RIR1)*RFD(-1)-CA;
©TRADE BALANCE IDENTITY 
CA=RX-RM;
©SAVINGS IDENTITY 
RS=RDY-RC;
©Foreign capital inflows identity 
FCI=RI-RS;
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Mauritius
©  consumption
dlog(RC)= .026798+.38544*dlog(RDY)+.30746*diff(RIRl(-l)) 
+.16650*dlog(RC(-l))-.045000*( log(RC(-l)) 
+.11982-.98411*log(RDY(-l))-.48962*RIRl(-l) );
@ investment
dlog(RI)= .086295-.076188*dlog(RY(-l))+.34206*diff(RIRl) 
-,099434*dlog(RI(-l))-.49346*( log(RI(-l))
+3.8145-1.2492*log(RY(-1))+. 17922*RTR1 (-1) );
@ exports
dlog(RX)= .059662-.37542*dlog(FRY)-.30159*dlog(RE(~l)) 
+.16886*dlog(RX(-l))-.029611*( log(RX(-l)) 
-1.8158-.74219* log(FRY (-1))-.0040941 * lo g(RE(-1)) );
@ imports
dlog(RM)=.035850+.11020*dlog(RY(-l))~.14682*dlog(RE) 
+.34698*dlog(RM(-l))-.11644*( log(RM(-l)) 
+1.7028-1.2156*log(RY(-l))+.39687*log(RE(-l)) );
@ money demand
dlog(MD)= .016343+.30414*dlog(RY)-.048914*dlog(NlRN) 
+.62115*dlog(MD(-l))-.19485*( log(MD(-l))
+6.3722-1.5478*log(RY(-l))+.061271*log(NIRN(-l)) );
©  EMPLOYMENT
dlog(REP)= .030135+.33935*dlog(RY)-.23855*dlog(RW) 
+.62875*DLOG(REP(-1))-.022267*( log(REP(-l)) 
+9.3097-1.5200*log(RY(-l)+.30832*log(RW)) );
©Real wage rate identity 
RW=LOG(NW)-LOG(GDPDEF);
©real exchange rate identity
RE=(NER*GDPDEFG7)/GDPDEF;
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©  inflation
DLOG(GDPDEF)= .11425-.46036*RLY+.63499*RLY(-1);
@ income identity
RY=RC+RI+RG+CA;
@ disposable income identity 
RDY=RY-RT;
@ natural output
LRYN =9.5376+.048270*tIME(1970);
@ detrended output identity 
RLY = LOG(RY)-LRYN;
©  real interest rate identity 
RIR1 = NIRN-DLOG(GDPDEF);
©DOMESTIC DEBT IDENTITY 
RDD=(1+RIR1)*RT)D(-1)+RG-RT;
©TAX STABILISATION RULE 
RT=0.25*RDD(-1);
©FOREIGN DEBT IDENTITY 
RFD=(1+RIR1)*RFD(-1)-CA;
©TRADE BALANCE 
CA=RX-RM;
©SAVINGS IDENTITY 
RS=RDY-RC;
©Foreign capital inflows identity 
FCI=RI-RS;
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@ consumption
dlog(RC)= .0052978+.34630*dlog(RDY)+.20836*diff(RIRl) 
+. 13440*dlog(RC(-l))-.84907*( log(RC(-l)) 
-3.9314-.64258*log(RDY(-l))-.15975*RIRl(-l) );
South Africa
@ investment
Dlog(RI)= .082100+.10306*DLOG(RY(-2))-1.3043*diff(RIRl(-l)) 
-.73695*dlog(RI(-l))-.67054*( log(RI(-2))
+7.5397-1.518 l*log(RY(-l))+.61374*RIRl(-l) );
@ exports
dlog(RX)= ,0080977+.10103*dlog(FRY)+. 13221 *dlog(RE(-2)) 
+.38546*dlog(RX(-2))-.78830*( log(RX(-l)) 
-5.4970-.53299*log(FRY(-l))-.0040156*log(RE(-l)) );
@ imports
dlog(RM)=.010975+.44035*dlog(RY)-.037706*dlog(RE) 
+.36015*dlog(RM(-2))-.22291*( log(RM(-l))
+1.4308-1.0162*log(RY(-l))+.10740*log(RB(-l)) );
@ money demand
dlog(NMDl)= ,020770+.032736*dlog(RY)-,05941 l*dlog(NIRN) 
+.29145*dlog(NMD 1(-2))-.62124*( log(NMDl(-l)) 
-2.5394-.73959*log(RY(-l))+.038730*log(NIRN(-l)) );
@ EMPLOYMENT
dlog(REP)=.015269+.17631*dlog(RY)-.38285*dlog(RW) 
+.61594*DLOG(REP(-1))-. 12503*( log(REP(-l)) 
+11.4220-1.8996*log(RY(-l)+1.4887*log(RW)) );
@Real wage rate identity 
RW=LOG(NW)-LOG(GDPDEF);
@real exchange rate identity
RE=(NER*GDPDEFG7)/GDPDEF;
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DLOG(GDPDEF)=. 12392-.26643*RLY+.092998*RLY(-1);
@ income identity
RY=RC+RI+RG+CA;
@  inflation
©  disposable income identity 
RDY=RY-RT;
@ natural output
LRYN =12.0510+.031782*TIME(1970);
@ defended output identity 
RLY -  log(RY)-LRYN;
@ real interest rate identity 
RIR1 = NIRN-DLOG(GDPDEF);
©DOMESTIC DEBT IDENTITY 
RDD=( 1+RIR1 )*RDD(-1 )+RG-RT;
©TAX STABILISATION RULE 
RT=0.25*RDD(-1);
©FOREIGN DEBT IDENTITY 
RFD=( 1+RIR1 )*RFD(-1 )-C A;
©TRADE BALANCE 
CA=RX-RM;
©SAVINGS IDENTITY 
RS=RDY-RC;
©Foreign capital inflows identity 
FCI=RI-RS;
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